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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently 
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting 
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings; 
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various 
areas of the practice of law. 
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning, 
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible. 
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with 
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient 
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal. 
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REVIEW OF 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTATE PLANNING 
By 
John R. Cununins 
Greenebaum Doll & ~cDonald 
Louisville, Kentucky 
(§) Copyright 1987 
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I. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 
A. Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates 
1. General Rules 
The Act revises the tax rate schedules for 
nongrantor trusts and estates. For taxable years commencing 
after December 31, 1986, all trusts and estates (including 
existin~ trusts and estates) are subject to rate brackets 
which are compressed when compared with individual rate 
brackets. Under the revised rates, the first $5,000 of tax-
able income of trust will be taxed at 15 percent. Taxable 
trust income over $5,000 will be taxed at 28 percent. The 
maximum annual benefit available from having income taxed to 
a trust or estate is, therefore, $5,000 times 13%, which is 
$650. 
In addition, the benefit of the low 15% bracket 
is phased out as taxable income increases from $13,000 to 
$26,000. This is done through an additional 5% tax on tax-
able income above $13,000 and below $26,000. 
The income tax schedule for estates and trusts 
for 1987 has 5 brackets, as follows: 
If taxable income is--
Not over $500 
Over $500 but not over $4,700 
Over $4,700 but not over $7,550 
Over $7,550 but not over $15,150 
Over $15,150 
11% of taxable income 
$55 plus 15% of the 
excess over $500 
$685 plus 28% of the 
excess over $4,700 
$1,483 plus 35% of the 
excess over $7,550 
$4,143 plus 38.5% of the 
excess over $15,150 
The compressed rate brackets reduce the bene-
fits of estate and trust accumulations substantially, but 
"trapping" strategies to split income among an estate and 
A-I 
its trust beneficiaries may still prove worthwhile. The 
compressed brackets were proposed by the ABA as a simple 
alternative to proposals for radical Subchapter J reform. 
Neither estates nor trusts have a zero bracket 
amount or a standard deduction. Estates are entitled to a 
deduction of $600. Trusts which must distribute all of their 
income currently are entitled to a $300 deduction and all 
other t~usts are entitled to a $100 deduction. An unlimited 
charitable deduction is available. 
No intentional changes were made in the taxa-
tion 'of distributions to beneficiaries. There was some ques-
tion whether the 2% floor on deductible expenses applied to 
the distribution deduction; the 1987 Technical Corrections 
Bill would clarify that the distribution deduction is not 
subject to the 2% floor. Thus, distributions to beneficiaries 
will continue to be taxed to beneficiaries and deducted by 
the trust, to the extent of the distributable net income 
(DNI) of the trust. DNI is allocated first to distributions 
required to be made from income for the year, and second to 
distributions made to charity from the trust income, and 
finally to other distributions. 
Accumulation distribution rules (or "throw-
back rules") are still applied, without change, to the taxa-
tion of beneficiaries of a trust where the trust distributes 
income, excluding capital gain, that had been taxed previously 
to the trust. 
No change is made in the taxation of multiple 
trusts. For federal income tax purposes, two or more trusts 
will be treated as one trust if either of those trusts has 
substantially the same grantor or grantors and substantially 
the same primary beneficiary or beneficiaries or a principal 
purpose of such trust is the avoidance of federal income 
tax. 
2. Taxable Years of Trusts 
Under the Act, all trusts, including existing 
trusts, must use a calendar taxable year, commencing with 
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taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986, except for 
tax-exempt trusts under Section 501(a) and wholly-charitable 
trusts under Section 4947(a) (1). The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet 
has advised that this change will be effective for Kentucky 
trusts, without legislative action, because Kentucky income 
tax law requires taxpayers to report income on the same 
calendar or fiscal year as required for federal income tax 
purposes. See 6 Kentucky Tax Alert 2 (Feb. 1987). 
So, for example, if a trust has used a June 
30 fiscal year, it will now file a return for July 1, 1986 
through June 30, 1987 and will be required to file a second 
return for July 1, 1987 through December 31, 1987. There-
after, the trust tax year will be the calendar year. 
There is a transition rule in the new Act 
which allows a trust beneficiary to include distributions of 
current income from the trust during its short year in his 
gross income in equal amounts over four taxable year periods 
beginning with 1987. This rule does not apply to income 
retained by and taxed to trusts during the second, short 
1987 tax year, nor does it apply to accumulation distribu-
tions made during the short year, nor does it apply in the 
final trust year. 
An important note is that estates may continue 
to use taxable periods other than the calendar year. Thus, 
deferral possibilities remain. Estates can choose January 
as a fiscal year and achieve deferred taxation with "trapping" 
distributions of principal to trusts on a calendar year. 
3. Trusts and Estates Required ~ Make Estimated 
Income Tax Payments. 
Estimated tax payments are required by all 
trusts and estates for taxable years commencing after Decem-
ber 31, 1986 except that estates are exempt from estimated 
tax requirements for their first two taxable years. In addi-
tion, the Act repealed Section 6152 which allowed an estate 
to pay its income tax in four installments beginning with 
the due date of the return, for taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 1986. 
A-3 
Trustees may assign any amounts of a trust's 
quarterly payments to the beneficiaries in any manner the 
trustee chooses. This election may only be made on a tax 
return of the trust filed within 65 days of the close of the 
trust's taxable year. If the election is made, the amount 
of the credits assigned to the beneficiaries will be consi-
dered a distribution under the 65-day rule of Section 663, 
so that.the beneficiaries will be deemed to have received 
the distribution on the last day of the trust's taxable year. 
The amount deemed distributed should not be treated as a 
payment of the trust's estimated tax, but rather will be 
treated as a payment of the beneficiary's estimated tax on 
January 15th following the tax year. This election will be 
available only to the extent that the trust's total esti-
mated tax payments for the year exceeds its own tax liability. 
Nevertheless, the Committee report indicates that the recip-
ient beneficiaries will still treat the credits as received 
at the time the election is made for purposes of computing 
their estimated taxes. 
4. Grantor Trust Rules Revised. 
Clifford trusts and spousal remainder trusts 
are abolished by the new Act, for all practical purposes. 
Section 673, which applies to reversionary interests, is 
amended by the Act to treat the grantor as the owner of any 
portion of a trust in which the grantor has a reversionary 
interest, in either corpus or income, if at the inception of 
the trust the value of such interest exceeds 5% of the value 
of the trust. There is an exception if the trust is for a 
descendant of the grantor and if the reversionary interest 
takes effect on the death of the beneficiary before the bene-
ficiary attains age 21. The revised Section 673 applies to 
transfers made to trusts after March 1, 1986. 
Section 672 was also amended by the Act. If 
a grantor's spouse is living with the grantor at the time of 
the creation of any power or interest in the spouse, the 
grantor is treated as holding such power or interest. A 
A-4 
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or interest as a spouse of the grantor with whom the grantor 
is living is to be determined at the time of the transfer of 
the property to the trust. This change applies to transfers 
and trusts made after March 1, 1986 as well. 
5. Adainistration Expenses and Other Deductions. 
Individuals are now subject to a 2% floor on 
miscellaneous deductions. Trusts and estates are not subject 
r to this limitation as to expenses which would not have been 
, 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
i 
r 
r 
~ 
I 
r 
incurred except for the existence of the trust or estate. 
Administration expenses, for example, legal fees, executor's 
and trustee's commissions, should continue to be deductible 
by the estate or trust in computing its taxable income. 
A fully revocable trust will be ignored for 
income tax purposes and the 2% limitation for individuals 
will apply. If a trust beneficiary has a limited power of 
withdrawal and is taxed on a part of the trust income under 
Section 678, the 2% limitation may apply but the result is 
unclear at this time. The 1987 Technical Corrections bill 
clarifies that the Section 642(c) charitable deduction is 
not subject to the 2% limitation. 
6. Passive Activity Rules. 
a. Estates and trusts subject at entity 
level--not "pass through" level. 
b. Material participation for a trust must 
be by the trustee or fiduciary; material participation for 
an estate must be by the executor or administrator. 
c. The special $25,000 rental activity loss 
rule is applicable to estates for their first two tax years 
if the decedent actively participated. 
d. Effective for tax years beginning after 
December 31, 1986. 
7. Planning Points for Estate and Trust Income 
Taxation. 
(a) Some commentators believe that, trustees 
will have to file federal trust income tax returns, and pay 
the tax, for the short taxable year ending December 31, 1987 
in accordance with Section 443, dealing with returns for a 
period of less than 12 months when the taxpayer changes his 
annual accounting period with IRS approval. The Section is 
not clearly applicable, however, because in the literal sense 
a trustee will change the taxable year of trust not with IRS 
approval but as a result of a change in the tax law. 
(b) The transition rule that allows a bene-
ficiary who must include in his gross income in the first 
taxable year beginning after 1986 amounts of ON! attributable 
to the trusts short taxable year ending December 31, 1987 to 
include such amounts ratably over a four-year period commen-
cing with the beneficiary's first taxable year beginning 
after 1986 is not elective. It applies only to distributions 
of the trust's DNI for the short taxable year ending December 
31, 1987 and does not apply to any accumulation distributions 
occurring during the short taxable year. Because any accumu-
lation distributions made by the trusts to the beneficiary 
during the short taxable year would not qualify for the four-
year spread under the transition rule, they will be taxable 
to the beneficiary in 1987 under the throw-back rules. 
(c) Most likely, the trustee should consider maxi-
mizing the trust's DNI for the short taxable year ending 
December 31, 1987 in order to maximize the amount qualifying 
for the four-year spread. DNI for the short taxable year 
may be maximized, to the extent possible, by deferring income 
from the full fiscal taxable year ending in 1987 to the short 
taxable year and by accelerating deductions from the short 
taxable year to the full fiscal taxable year ending in 1987. 
Likewise, to the extent possible, income should be accelerated 
from the 1988 taxable year to the short taxable year ending 
December 31, 1987 and deductions should be deferred from the 
short taxable year to the 1988 taxable year. 
A-6 
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(d) The trustee should consider distributing the 
entire short year DNI in order to maximize the amount quali-
fying for the beneficiaries four-year spread. If the trustee 
has discretion as to the amount of income to be distributed 
among beneficiaries in different income tax brackets, the 
trustee should consider maximizing distributions during the 
short year to high bracket beneficiaries, because they will 
realize. greater tax benefits under the transition rule than 
low bracket beneficiaries. 
(e) If the trustee contemplates terminating the 
trust and distributing the trust property during 1987, he 
should consider delaying such action until 1988, if that is 
acceptable from a non-tax standpoint. DNI distributed to a 
beneficiary during the short year ending December 31, 1987 
on account of the termination of the trust will not qualify 
for the four-year spread. 
(f) If a testamentary or non-grantor trust was 
funded in 1986, the trustee should consider adopting, on the 
trust's first income tax return, a fiscal taxable year begin-
ning in 1986 and ending in 1987 in order to allow the bene-
ficiaries of the trust to take advantage of the four-year 
spread with respect to distributions of short year DNI. This 
is a good strategy despite the fact that the trust must comply 
with the calendar taxable year requirement with respect to 
its first taxable year beginning after 1986. 
(g) Using a funded inter vivos trust may present 
income tax disadvantages if the grantor-beneficiary dies 
after 1986. The inter vivos trust must adopt a calendar 
taxable year upon the death of a grantor-beneficiary and 
thus will be unable to achieve the same deferral of income 
tax at the beneficiary level as an estate could achieve. 
(h) Funded inter vivos trusts which are used to 
avoid probate upon the death of the grantor-beneficiary will 
not benefit from the two-year exception from the estimated 
tax rules available to estates. Only estates receive the 
two-year deferral. 
A-7 
(i) An important point concerning estimated taxes 
is that trusts and estates are, technically, not required to 
make estimated tax payments. Rather, the rules subject trusts 
and estates to penalties for underpayment of estimated income 
taxes unless the amount of each "required installment" is 
25% of the "required annual payment." With respect to calen-
dar year taxpayers, the "required installments" are due April 
15, June 15 and September 15 of the taxable year and January 
15 of the following taxable year. The "required annual pay-
ment" 'is the lesser of (i) 90% of the tax shown on the current 
year's return (or, if no return is filed, 90% of the tax for 
the current year) (the "90% safe harbor rule,") (increased 
from 80% by the new Act), or (ii) 100% of the tax shown on 
the previous year's return, if a return was filed for the 
previous taxable year and such year consisted of 12 months 
(the "100% safe harbor rule"). 
(j) Section 6654(d) (2) provides an alternative 
method of computing each required installment which is known 
as the annualized income method. This method may be used if 
it results in a lower required installment than either the 
90% or 100% safe harbor rules. Under the method, the fidu-
ciary determines the annualized income installment for the 
installment periods set forth above by annualizing taxable 
income for the months ending before the installment due date, 
computing the tax on the annualized taxable income, and 
paying certain percentages of such tax, less any installment 
payments previously made. The percentages are: 22.5% for 
the first installment payment, 45% for the second, 67.5% for 
the third and 90% for the fourth. 
(k) Internal Revenue Service Notice 87-32, I.R.B. 
1987-17, provides that, until further guidance is given, trusts 
and estates should not consider alternative minimum taxable 
income for purposes of complying with the estimated tax 
rulings. Further, the Notice states that the Service will 
waive the penalty for underpayment of estimated tax for 
installments due before July 1, 1987 if the fiduciary computes 
A- 8 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
,.. 
I 
the required installments under either the 90' safe harbor 
rule or the annualized income method, and if the fiduciary 
makes a good faith effort to determine accurately the amount 
of the required installment and timely pays the amount of 
the installment. Note also that the Service has released 
the 1987 Form l04l-ES, Estimated Income Tax for Fiduciaries. 
(1) Notice 87-32 describes how a fiduciary may 
use the.100' safe harbor rule to compute the minimum required 
estimated tax payments for both the short taxable year ending 
December 31, 1987 and the 1988 taxable year. For the short 
year ending December 31, 1987, the fiduciary may compute the 
required annual payment by dividing by 12 the tax shown on 
the return for the preceding taxable year and multiplying 
the resulting quotient by the number of months in the short 
taxable year. An exception to the general rule is that the 
100% safe harbor rule may ~ be used if the preceding tax-
able year consisted of fewer than 12 months. A trust with a 
short taxable year ending December 31, 1987 may use the 100% 
safe harbor rule for the 1988 taxable year if the short year 
was preceded by a taxable year of 12 months. The tax shown 
on the return for the short year ending December 31, 1987 is 
increased for this purpose by dividing the tax by the number 
of months in the short year and multiplying the resulting 
quotient by twelve. 
(m) No provision in the new Act requires the trustee 
to assign the excess estimated tax payments to trust benefi-
ciaries in the same proportions as income was distributed. 
In fact, neither the new Act nor the Conference Report ad-
dresses this issue. 
B. Income of Minor Children 
New Section l(j) of the Act taxes the "net unearned 
income" of a child under age 14 at the parent's tax rate, 
even if the child received the money or other property before 
1987. 
Children Under the Age of 14. Net unearned income, 
including income derived from gifts made prior to 1987, will 
A- 9 
be taxed at the child's parent's rate for regular income tax 
purposes, and, under the 1987 Technical Corrections bill, 
for alternative minimum tax purposes as well. The minimum 
tax is computed on the sum of the child's unearned alterna-
tive minimum taxable income and the parents', if the alterna-
tive minimum tax computed on this sum exceeds the sum of the 
child's and the parents' regular tax, the minimum tax is the 
excess •. Wages and other earned income are exempt from these 
under-l4 rules. 
Child age 14 or over. Generally, all income, earned 
or unearned, is taxed at the child's rate. 
The new rules apply if the child has not attained 
age 14 prior to the close of the tax year and either parent 
of the child is alive at the close of the tax year. 
Calculation of tax. The tax equals the greater 
of: (1) the tax that would be imposed on the child's income 
if there were no special rules concerning the child's unearned 
income; or (2) the sum of the tax that would be payable if 
the child had not received unearned income and the child's 
share of the parental-source tax. The definition of Net 
Unearned Income is the child's unearned income minus the sum 
of $500 and the greater of $500 of standard deduction or 
$500 of itemized deductions, or the deductions allowed the 
child that are directly connected with the production of the 
child's income. Thus, in general, the child will be taxed 
on unearned income in excess of $1,000. 
These examples were taken from the General Explana-
tion of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prepared by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. 
Example 1: If the child has $400 of unearned in-
come and no earned income, the child's standard deduction is 
$400 which is allocated against the child's unearned income 
so that the child has no federal income tax liability. 
Example 2: If the child has $900 of unearned in-
come and no earned income, the child's standard deduction is 
$500 which is allocated against the first $500 of unearned 
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income. The child's remaining unearned income is $400. Be-
cause the child's net unearned income is less than $500, the 
remaining unearned income is taxed at the child's rate. 
Example 3: If a child has $1,300 of unearned in-
come and no earned income, the child's standard deduction is 
$500, which is allocated against unearned income. The child's 
remaining unearned income is equal to $800 of which the first 
$500 is. taxed at the child's rate, and the remaining $300 of 
unearned income is taxed at the top rate of the parents. 
Example 4: If a child has $700 of earned income 
and $300 of unearned income, the child's standard deduction 
is $700 of which $300 is allocated against unearned income 
and $400 allocated against earned income. The child has no 
net unearned income and the remaining $300 of earned income 
is taxed at the child's rate. 
Example 5: If a child has $800 of earned income 
and $900 of unearned income, the child's standard deduction 
is $800 of which $500 is allocated against unearned income 
and $300 is allocated against earned income. The child's 
remaining unearned income is $400. Because net unearned 
income is less than $500, the child's remaining unearned 
income is taxed at the child's rate. The remaining $500 of 
earned income is also taxed at the child's rate. 
Example 6: Assume a child has $300 of earned in-
come and $1,200 of unearned income, and itemized deductions 
of $400 (net of the 2% floor) which are directly connected 
with the production of the unearned income. The child has 
$400 of other deductions. Because the deductions directly 
connected with the production of the unearned income ($400) 
are less than the maximum amount of deductions ($500) which 
are allocated against unearned income, $500 of the $800 total 
deductions are allocated against unearned income. Therefore, 
the child's remaining unearned income is $700 ($1,200 of 
unearned income less $500) of which $500 is taxed at the 
child's rate and $200 is taxed at the parent's rate. 
A~l 
Example 7: Assume a child has $700 of earned in-
come and $3,000 of ~nearned income, and itemized deductions 
of $800 (net of the 2' floor) which are directly connected 
with the production of the unearned income. The child has 
$200 of other deductions. The entire amount of deductions 
related to the production of unearned income is allocated 
against his unearned income, because this amount ($800) ex-
ceeds $500. Therefore, the child's remaining unearned in-
come is equal to $2,200 ($3,000 of unearned income minus 
$800) of which $500 is taxed at the child's rate and $1,700 
at the parent's top rate. The child has $200 of deductions 
which are allocated against earned income. The remaining 
$500 of earned income is taxed at the child's rate. 
These new provisions are effective for taxable 
years beginning after February 22, 1986. 
C. Excise Tax on Excess Qualified Plan Distributions 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains two amendments 
to employee benefit provisions that will have a significant 
impact on estate planners. The first amendment is that Sec-
tion 1122 of the Act repeals capital gains treatment and 
changes ten-year forwarding averaging to five-year forwarding 
averaging. 
Second, and more important for estate planning 
purposes, Section 1153 of the Act added a new section to the 
Internal Revenue Code. That section is Section 4981 (there 
was already another section by that number, therefore, this 
provision will most likely be redesignated as Section 498lA 
and it will be referred to by that designation here) which 
imposes a 15% excise tax on "excess distributions" from quali-
fied retirement plans. 
Generally, the rule applies an excise tax during 
life on distributions in excess of $112,500 (indexed for 
inflation) or $150,000 on a calendar year basis. However, 
Section 498lA(c) (5) allows the taxpayer to elect to grand-
father amounts accumulated on August 1, 1986, in which event 
the annual limit is $112,500 (indexed for inflation). This 
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election must be made on an income tax return for 1987 or 
1988. 
As a deathtime equivalent of the excess distribu-
tion tax, Section 498lA(d) states that the estate tax imposed 
under Chapter 11 "shall be increased by an amount equal to 
15% ~f the individual's excess retirement accumulation." 
Thereafter, the excess distribution tax does not apply. The 
"excess ,retirement accumulation" is the excess of all quali-
fied retirement plan interests that are includible for federal 
estate tax purposes, over the discounted present value of an 
annual annuity of $150,000, payable for the life expectancy 
of the decedent, as computed immediately prior to the dece-
dent's death. The annual annuity is presumably the greater 
of $112,500 (indexed for inflation) or $150,000 if the grand-
father election is not made, and $112,500 (indexed for infla-
tion) if the grandfather election is made. Presumably, the 
Section 72 life expectancy tables will be used and a 10% 
discount factor will be applied in making this computation; 
however, neither is specified. 
No unified credit is available, nor is any chari-
table or marital deduction allowed, to reduce or eliminate 
the supplemental estate tax. However, the 1987 Technical 
Corrections Bill will permit a surviving spouse to elect to 
avoid the tax at the participant's death; if the election is 
made, the spouse remains subject to the excess distribution 
tax during lifetime and, perhaps, the excess retirement 
accumulation tax at his or her own death. Therefore, absent 
the spousal election, this supplemental estate tax must 
actually be paid and there will be no right of reimbursement 
permitted to the decedent's personal representative to col-
lect taxes imposed on these benefits from the recipient bene-
ficiary. The 1987 Technical Corrctions Bill does specify 
that an IRD deduction is allowed under Section 691 for the 
supplemental estate tax. 
This provision is applicable to estates of decedents 
dying after December 31, 1986. As a planning point, it may 
A- 13 
be better to incur the tax during life, in order to reduce 
the decedent's estate by the income taxes paid during life. 
The liability certainly affects marital deduction planning 
because "reduce to zero" formula marital deduction bequests 
may not work if taxes cannot be reduced to zero due to the 
supplemental estate tax. In determining whether sufficient 
estate liquidity exists, the new tax must be considered. It 
is unc1~ar at this time whether the tax qualifies for Section 
6161 deferral, although it appears that it does. 
D. Filing Estate Tax, Current Use Valuation Elections 
(Sect'ion 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) 
The new Act retains Section 2032A which allows 
real property used in certain farming and other closely-held 
business activities to be valued at its current use, rather 
than fair market value, for estate tax purposes. Section 
2032A is available only if it is properly elected on the 
first estate tax return filed, and only if the election sub-
stantially complies, when filed, with the requirements of 
the Treasury Department Regulations. 
The estates of individuals dying prior to January 
1, 1986 are now allowed to perfect defective current use 
elections within 90 days of being notified of errors by the 
Service, if several requirements are met. First, the elec-
tion must substantially comply with the requirements enume-
rated on the Federal Estate Tax Return that was actually 
filed. Substantial compliance with the Regulations, or with 
the instructions for the return, is not required. Second, 
the original election must be timely filed within the meaning 
of Sect ion 2 032A (d) (1) • 
E. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (Chapter 13 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) 
Substantial changes were made in the generation-
skipping tax by the new Act. Those provisions will be covered 
in detail by a subsequent speaker so they will not be included 
in this outline. 
A-14 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
I j 
J 
J 
J 
J 
j 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
! 
r 
I 
,.. 
, 
r 
r 
I 
F. Section 2057: Sales of Employer Securities to 
ESOPS 
Section 2057 allows a deduction in computing a 
decedent's estate tax equal to 50% of the "proceeds of a 
qualified sale of employer's securities." Subsection (b) 
defines a "qualified sale" as any sale of employer securities 
by the executor of an estate to an employee stock ownership 
plan or .an eligible worker-owned cooperative. Subsection 
(c) defines "qualified proceeds n as the amount received by 
the estate from the sale of employer securities at any time 
before the due date of the estate tax return. Certain securi-
ties are specifically disqualified by Section 2057(c) (2). 
Proceeds from the sale of employer securities will not be 
"qualified proceeds" if such securities were received by the 
decedent, (1) in a distribution from a plan exempt from tax 
under Section 501 (a) which meets the requirements of Section 
40l(a); or (2) as a transfer pursuant to an option or other 
right to acquire stock to which Section 83, 422, 422A, 423 
or 424 applies. In order to receive the deduction, the execu-
tor must file a written statement that either the employer 
whose employees were covered by the ESOP or EWOC consents to 
the application of Section 4979A with respect to such employer 
or cooperative. Such statement must be a statement of the 
employer or authorized officer, as the case may be, and it 
must be a verified, written statement. The term "employer 
securities" has the same meaning given such term by Section 
409(1). A Section 2057 deduction is not available to any 
sale prior to October 23, 1986 or after December 31, 1991. 
One important note is that the qualified sale must 
be made by an executor. A sale by a trustee of an irrevocable 
trust included in the decedent's-grantor's gross estate can-
not be a qualified sale. A bill now before Congress, dis-
cussed infra, would eliminate retroactively this requirement. 
An estate can profit from the sale of securities 
to an ESOP through the deduction even though the sale price 
is below the fair market value of the shares sold. If the 
A~5 
estate is paying tax at the 50% rate, a profit will be made 
if the sales price exceeds 80% of fair market value. That 
is, at 80%, the 40% deduction saves 20% (at the 50% rate) 
which equals the "lost" proceeds. At present, an estate can 
benefit even if the marital deduction eliminates the estate 
tax already. The will must create a "minimum" marital deduc-
tion pecuniary bequest to be funded at date of distribution 
values •. The reduction in the gross estate reduces the amount 
which must be placed in the marital share to reduce the estate 
tax to zero. This saves taxes at the surviving spouse's 
death. 
Section 2057 does not require that the employer 
securities sold be owned by the decedent before death or 
included in the decedent's gross estate. However, IRS Notice 
87-13 provides that the estate tax deduction under this Sec-
tion will not be available unless: (1) the decedent directly 
owned the employer securities immediately before death; and 
(2) after the sale, the employer securities are allocated to 
plan participants or are held for future allocation in con-
nection with an exempt loan under Section 4975 or in connec-
tion with a transfer of assets from a defined benefit plan 
under the rules of Section 4980(c) (3). The Service has deter-
mined that this Notice is an accurate statement of congres-
sional intent and, therefore, clarification of the Notice is 
effective as if included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
The Technical Corrections Act would impose limits 
on how the ESOP allocates the stock purchased under Section 
2056 to conform to'the Section 1042 rules. This would prohi-
bit the stock from being allocated to the decedent's family 
as defined in Section 267(b) (3) or 25% shareholders. The 
bill does permit the ESOP to allocate 5% of the purchased 
stock to the decedent's lineal descendants. 
On February 26, 1987, a bill was introduced by 
Lloyd Bentsen in the Senate, with a parallel bill in the 
House, that makes substantial changes in Section 2057. The 
bill confirms that the IRS Notice is an accurate reflection 
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of congressional intent and so amends Section 2057 retro-
actively. The bill also makes a number of other substantial 
changes, as follows: 
1. Tax-Credit Employee Stock Ownership Plans. 
The bill clarifies that the estate tax deduction is available 
in the case of sales of employer securities to tax-credit 
ESOPs under Section 409(a). This provision is effective as 
if included in the Tax Reform Act. 
2. Non-Publicl~ Traded Stock. The bill limits 
the deduction to sales of employer securities which are issued 
by a domestic corporation that has no stock outstanding that 
is readily tradable on an established securities market. 
That is, only the stock of a closely-held corporation may be 
. 
used to qualify for the Section 2057 deduction. The provi-
sion is effective with respect to sales after February 26, 
1987. 
3. Estate Requirements. 
(a) Sale by Executor. The bill alters the 
requirement that the deduction applies only to sales by the 
executor of an estate. All sales of employer securities, to 
the extent the securities are includible in the gross estate, 
would qualify. Thus, assets held in trust would be eligible 
for the estate tax deduction to the extent includible in the 
gross estate. However, if the decedent owned a partnership 
interest, the value of the partnership interest is reported 
on the estate tax return and not the assets of the partner-
ship. Therefore, even under the proposed bill, the assets 
of a partnership could not be sold in a transaction qualify-
ing for the estate tax deduction, according to Senator 
Bentsen's introductory remarks. This change is effective 
from the day of passage of the Tax Reform Act. 
(b) Limitation of Deduction. Congressional 
intent was not to eliminate estate tax liability totally. 
Therefore, the amount of the deduction allowable under Sec-
tion 2057 would be limited to 50% of the taxable estate (de-
termined without regard to Section 2057), and the amount of 
the estate taxes imposed by Section 2001 (prior to credits) 
cannot be reduced by more than $750,000 through use of the 
deduction. This limitation would be effective with respect 
to sales of employer securities to an ESOP after the date of 
introduction of the bill. Sales prior to the date of intro-
duction of the bill would not be subject to this limitation 
but would be taken into account in determining whether the 
limitation is met with respect to post-effective date sales. 
(c) Holding Period Requirement. In order to 
further congressional intent that deathbed stock purchases 
be prevented, the bill would impose a holding period require-
ment. In order for the estate tax deduction to be available, 
the securities must be assets that would be assets of the 
estate reported on the estate tax return if the decedent had 
died at any time during the shorter of (i) the five-year 
period ending on the date of death, or (ii) the period begin-
ning October 22, 1986 and ending on the date of death. For 
purposes of determining whether the holding period has been 
satisifed, securities which would be includible in the gross 
estate of the spouse of a decedent are treated as securities 
includible in the gross estate of the decedent during such 
period. The period for which a decedent is considered to 
have held the stock would be reduced under the bill for any 
period for which the holding period is reduced under Section 
246(c) (4), which relates to periods during which the risk of 
loss is diminished. The provision is effective with respect 
to sales to an ESOP after the date of introduction of the 
bill. 
(d) Assets Transferred From Other Plans. 
The estate tax deduction would not apply under the bill to 
the extent that the employer securities are acquired by and 
ESOP with transferred assets. "Transferred assets" are assets 
of an ESOP which are attributable to assets held by another 
qualified plan maintained by the employer (other than another 
ESOP) or assets attributable to a period of time when the 
plan was not an ESOP. Assets held by the ESOP on the date 
A~8 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
,.. 
, 
, 
I 
r 
r 
,. 
, 
r 
of introduction of the bill are not "transferred assets," 
regardless of their source. The d~nial of the deduction 
would extend to assets which are transferred directly from 
one plan to another (e.g., pursuant to Section 4980(c) (3», 
assets which are rolled over from another plan, assets which 
result from a conversion of another plan into an ESOP, and 
assets which are merged into an ESOP from another plan. The 
bill imposes an excise tax if a loan payment is made with 
transferred assets. This is to prevent an employer from 
acquiring securities in a 2057 transaction with the proceeds 
of the loan and then using transferred assets to make pay-
ments on the loan. The tax is imposed on the employer main-
taining the ESOP, but it is equal to 30% of the amount paid 
on the loan, including both principal and interest payments. 
The provision is effective with respect to sales to an ESOP 
after the date of introduction and transferred assets after 
the date of introduction in the case of transfers used to 
make payments on a loan. 
4. ESOP Allocation Requirements and Substitution 
Prohibition. 
i (a) Dispositions Within One Year Preceding 
r 
f 
r 
Sale. Under the bill, an ESOP would be prohibited from sell-
ing employer securities and using the proceeds to acquire 
substitute employer securities in a Section 2057 transaction. 
In addition, the bill modifies the rule currently reflected 
in the IRS Notice to provide that the deduction would be 
available with respect to proceeds from a sale to an ESOP 
only to the extent that the proceeds are greater than the 
excess of the proceeds from the disposition of employer 
securities during the one-year period preceding the sale 
minus the cost of employer securities purchased by the plan 
during such one-year period. For purposes of the rule, all 
ESOPs of the employer would be treated as one plan. To 
determine the proceeds of the plan from dispositions of 
employer securities, certain dispositions would not be con-
sidered. Dispositions required to meet diversification 
A-l9 
requirements under Section 40l(a) (28) would not be considered. 
In addition, distributions made because of the death or 
disability of the employee, or the retirement of the employee 
after he attains the age of 59 1/2, or a separation from 
service of the employee which results in a one-year break of 
service will also not be considered. This provision is 
effective with respect to sales to an ESOP after the date of 
introduGtion of the bill. 
(b) Dispositions Within Three Years Following 
Sale. An excise tax would be imposed on an employer maintain-
ing an ESOP if the ESOP disposed of qualified securities 
within three years of the date of sale qualifying for the 
estate tax deduction. The tax would be equal to 30% of the 
amount realized on the disposition. The provision would be 
effective with respect to dispositions by the ESOP after the 
date of introduction of the bill. The 30% excise tax would 
not apply to dispositions of securities with respect to which 
the estate tax deduction is denied due to a failure to meet 
the non-substitution requirement. 
(c) Failure to Allocate. An excise tax would 
be imposed on an employer maintaining the ESOP in the event 
of a failure to allocate securities required in a Section 
2057 transaction. The tax would be equal to 30% of the amount 
realized on the disposition of qualified employer securities 
before the securities are allocated to the accounts of plan 
participants if the proceeds from such disposition are not 
so allocated. This provision would apply to failures to 
allocate employer securities occurring after the date of 
introduction of the bill. The 30% excise tax would not apply 
to dispositions of securities with respect to which the estate 
tax deduction is denied due to a failure to meet the non-
substitution requirement. In addition, the excise tax would 
be coordinated with the excise tax on distribution within 
three years following the sale, so that both taxes should 
not apply to the same transaction. 
A-20 
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II. Final Disclaimer Regulations 
The Internal Revenue Service issued final disclaimer 
regulations under Section 2518 in August, 1986. The most 
important point to be made about the final regulations is 
that they permit disclaimers of a "separate interest" in 
income or principal without requiring that other separate 
interests be disclaimed. Thus, a special testamentary power 
of appointment over corpus may be effectively disclaimed 
while a right to receive corpus during life is retained. 
Other 'important points about the final regulations include: 
(1) A surviving spouse may have a $5,000 or 5% with-
drawal power, and an ascertainable standard withdrawal power, 
over a nonmarital trust into which disclaimed marital deduc-
tion property passes and the disclaimer will be a qualified 
disclaimer, [See §25.25l8-2(e) (5), examples (6) and (7)]; 
(2) a "reduce estate tax-to-zero" formula disclaimer may be 
used to reduce the surviving spouse's share and minimize 
estate tax at his or her subsequent death, [See §25.25l8-
3 (d), example (20)]; (3) a remainder interest in a Q-TIP 
marital trust must be disclaimed within nine months after 
the death of the creating spouse rather than the death of 
the surviving spouse--Q-TIP trusts are treated differently 
than general-power marital trusts, [See §25.25l8-2(c) (3)]; 
(4) defective Q-TIP trusts may be cured by non-spouse bene-
ficiaries who disclaim their interests which exist during 
the spouse's lifetime, without such beneficiary being required 
to disclaim interests arising after the spouse's death. [See 
example (11) to §25.25l8(3) (d)]; (5) the exercise, or lapse, 
of a general power of appointment starts a new disclaimer 
period, but a generation-skipping taxable distribution or 
taxable termination does not begin a new disclaimer period, 
'[See §25 .2518-2 (c) (3) and (5), examples (2) and (3)]. 
To be a qualified disclaimer, five general requirements 
must be met: 
(1) The disclaimer must be irrevocable and 
unqualified; 
A-2l 
(2) The disclaimer must be in writing; 
(3) The writing must be delivered to the 
tranferor of the interest, the transferor's legal 
representative, the holder of the legal title to 
the property to which the interest relates, or the 
person in possession of such property, within nine 
months after the later of (a) the date on which 
the transfer creating the interest in the disclaim-
ant is made, or (b) the date on which the disclaim-
ant attains age 21, 
(4) The disclaimant must not have accepted 
the interest disclaimed or any of its benefits; 
.and 
(5) The interest disclaimed must pass either 
to the spouse of the decedent or to a person other 
than the disclaimant without any direction on the 
part of the person making the disclaimer. 
The final regulations contain extensive treatment of 
when the nine month time limit begins to run in various situa-
tions. ~ §25.25l8-2(c). The position taken by the Service 
is that the time for making an effective disclaimer is crea-
tion of an interest, meaning when the transfer was regarded 
as complete for gift tax purposes, even if the property trans-
ferred is subsequently included in the donor's estate at 
death. This rule also applies even if the property is later 
includible in the estate of another beneficiary. Regulation 
25.2518-2(c) (3) provides that a new nine-month period is 
applicable following either the lapse or exercise of a gene-
ral power of appointment. In addition, the final regulations 
discuss the requirement that the disclaimer be made prior to 
an acceptance of benefits and that the disclaimed property 
pass without direction by the disclaimant. See §25.25l8-
2(d) and §25.25l8-2(e). Regulation 25.2518-2(e) provides 
that continued retention of fiduciary powers over disclaimed 
property will be ignored for purposes of testing whether a 
qualified disclaimer has been made, provided that the power 
is limited by an ascertainable standard. 
A disclaimed interest, if it is to be part of a quali-
fied disclaimer, must be one of the following interests: 
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(1) the disclaimant's entire interest in the propertY1 (2) 
an undiviQed portion (fractional share) of the disclaimant's 
entire interest, [See S25.2518-3 (b)]; (3) a separate interest 
~" 
in property if (a) the separate interest was created by the 
, .' 
transferor, or (b) the separate interest consists of sever-
able property, [see 525.2518-3 (a) (1) (i) and (ii)]; (4) an 
" --' .' 
undivided portion (fractional share) ot such a separate in-
terest,. [See 525.2518-3 (a) and (b)]; and (5) a pecuniary 
amount if certain requirements are met, [See 525.25l8-3(c)]. 
Certain changes have been made in the disclaimer regula-
tions relating to joint tenancy property. The Comments ap-
pended to the Regulations indicate that the drafters consi-
dered whether a joint tenant may disclaim the so-called 
"accretive share" of jointly held property (being the amount 
by which that tenant's share increases by virtue of another 
tenant's death) but rejected the suggestion, so that a sur-
viving joint tenant does ~ have a new nine-month period 
within which to disclaim even that accretive portion. How-
ever, for tenancies in real property created between spouses 
before 1982, and for which no Section 2515 election was made, 
Regulation 20.2518-2 (c) (4) (iii) provides special rules for 
the timing of a qualified disclaimer by a surviving spouse 
as the surviving joint tenant. The Regulations also provide 
that for residential real property held in joint tenancy, a 
joint tenant is not considered to have accepted the joint 
interest merely by virtue of having resided on the property 
prior to the disclaimer. Also, the new Regulations provide 
that no qualified disclaimer may be made with respect to any 
portion of jointly-held property that is attributable to 
contributions by the disclaimant. 
The most interesting part of the new regulation is 
525.2518-3, "Disclaimer of Less Than an Entire Interest." 
525.2518-3 Ca) (1) (i) contains the general separate interest 
rule: 
In general, each interest in property that is 
separately created by the transferor is treated as 
a separate interest. For example, if an income 
A-23 
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interest in securities is bequeathed to A for life, 
then to B for life, with the remainder interest in 
such securities bequeathed to A's estate, and if 
the remaining requirements of S25.25l8(b) are met, 
A could make a qualified disclaimer of either the 
income interest or the remainder, or an undivided 
portion of either interest. A could not, however, 
make a qualified disclaimer of the income interest 
for a certain number of years. Further, where 
local law merges interests separately created by 
the transferor, a qualified disclaimer will be 
allowed only if there is a disclaimer of the entire 
merged interest or an undivided portion of such 
merged interest. See example (12) and Paragraph 
(d) of this Section. See S25.25l8-3(b) for rules 
relating to the disclaimer of an undivided portion. 
Where the merger of separate interests would occur. 
but for the creation by the transferor of a nomi-
nal interest (as defined in paragraph (a) (1) (v) of 
this Section), a qualified disclaimer will be allowed 
only if there is a disclaimer of all the separate 
interests, or an undivided portion of all such 
interests, which would have merged but for the 
nominal interest. 
525.2518-3 (a) (1) (iv) defines "nominal interest" as an 
interest in property created by the transferor that (1) has 
an actuarial value (as determined under 520.2031-10) of less 
than 5% of the total value of the property at the time of 
taxable transfer creating the interest; (2) prevents the 
merger under local law or two or more other interests created 
by the transferor; and (3) can be clearly shown from all the 
facts and circumstances to have been created primarily for 
the purpose of preventing the merger of such other interests. 
The Regulation goes on to enumerate factors to be considered 
in determining whether an interest is created primarily for 
the purpose of preventing merger. Those factors will include, 
but will not be limited to, the following: 
The relationship between the transferor and 
the interest holder; the age difference between 
the interest holder and the beneficiary whose in-
terests would have merged; the interest holder's 
state of health at the time of the taxable trans-
fer; and in the case of a contingent remainder, 
any other factors which indicate that the possi-
bility of the interest vesting as a fee simple is 
so remote as to be neglible. 
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A particular topic which must be addressed under the 
new regulation is disclaimers by a spouse. For the most 
part, the final regulations resolve the major uncertainties 
left by the proposed regulations concerning disclaimers by 
the surviving spouse • 
Four examples are very important in understanding dis-
claimers by spouse. They are as follows: 
Example (4). B died testate on February 13, 
1980. B's will established both a marital trust 
and a nonmarital trust. The decedent's surviving 
spouse, A, is an income beneficiary of the marital 
trust and has a testamentary general power of ap-
pointment over its assets. A is also an income 
beneficiary of the nonmarital trust, but has no 
power to appoint or invade the corpus. The provi-
sions of the will specify that any portion of the 
marital trust disclaimed is to be added to the 
non-marital trust. A disclaimed 30% in the mari-
tal trust. (See §25.2518-3(b) for rules relating 
to the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an 
interest in property.) Pursuant to the will, this 
portion of the marital trust property was trans-
ferred to the nonmarita1 trust without any direc-
tion on the part of A. This disclaimer by A satis-
fies §25.25l8(b) (4). 
Example (5). Assume the same facts as in 
Example (4) except that A, the surviving spouse, 
has both an income interest in the nonmarita1 trust 
and a testamentary non-general power to appoint 
among designated beneficiaries. This power is not 
limited by an ascertainable standard. The require-
ments of §25.25l8 (b) (4) are not satisfied unless A 
also disclaims the non-general power to appoint 
the portion of the trust corpus that is attribut-
able to the property that passed to the nonmarital 
trust as a result of A's disclaimer. Assuming 
that the fair market value of the disclaimed pro-
perty on the date of the disclaimer is $250,000 
and that the fair market value of the nonmarital 
trust (including the disclaimed property) imme-
diately after the disclaimer is $750,000, A must 
disclaim the power to appoint one-third of the 
nonmarital trust's corpus. The result is the same 
regardless of whether the non-general power is 
testamentary or inter vivos. 
Example (6). Assume the same facts as in 
Example (4) except that A has both an income in-
terest in the nonmarital trust and a power to in-
A-25 
vade corpus if needed for A's health or mainte-
nance. In addition, an independent trustee has 
power to distribute to A any portion of the corpus 
which the tru~tee determines to be desirable for 
A's happiness. Assuming the other requirements of 
525.2518 are satisified, A may make a qualified 
disclaimer of interests in the marital trust with-
out disclaiming any of A's interests in the non-
marital trust. 
Example (7). B died testate on June 1, 1980. 
B's will created both a marital trust and a non-
marital trust. The decedent's surviving spouse, 
C, is an income beneficiary of the marital trust 
and has a testamentary general power of appoint-
ment over its assets. C is an income beneficiary 
of a nonmarital trust, and additionally has a non-
cumulative right to withdraw yearly the greater of 
$5,000 or five percent of the aggregate value of 
the principal. The provisions of the will specify 
that any portion of the marital trust disclaimed 
is to be added to the nonmarital trust. C dis-
claims 50% of the marital trust corpus. Pursuant 
to the will, this amount is transferred to the 
nonmarital trust. Assuming the remaining require-
ments of §25.25l8(b) are satisfied, C is qualified 
as a qualified disclaimer. 
In Example (4), the decedent's will created marital and 
nonmarital trusts. The decedent's surviving spouse is en-
titled to the income from and has a general testamentary 
power of appointment over the marital trust and is an income 
beneficiary of the nonmarital trust. A disclaimer properly 
executed under the marital trust causes the disclaimed pro-
perty to be added to the nonmarital trust. A qualified dis-
claimer from the marital trust could be made. 
The facts in Example (5) are the same as in Example 
(4), except that the spouse has a special power of appoint-
ment over the nonmarital trust. Therefore, a qualified dis-
claimer cannot be made of an interest in the corpus of the 
marital trust, unless the spouse also disclaims the special 
power over the property passing from the marital trust to 
the nonmarital trust. The reason is that the disclaimed 
interest must pass without any direction by the spouse. 
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Example (6) is also the same as Example (4), except for 
the addition in the nonmarital trust of a power of the spouse 
to invade corpus for the spouse's health or maintenance, and 
the power of an independent trustee to distribute corpus to 
the spouse for the spouse's happiness. These powers are 
limited by an ascertainable standard. A qualified disclaimer 
of the spouse's interest in the marital trust may be made. 
Example (7) gives the spouse a $5,000 and 5% noncumula-
tive power of withdrawal over the nonmarital trust. The 
result turns out to be the same as in Example (6). While 
the spouse may choose whether or not to exercise her power 
for each year, the exercise of that discretion possibility 
is not considered a direction by the spouse even though it 
permits a part of the property subject to the power to pass 
to other beneficiaries. Apparently, this result is reached 
because an exercise of the power would not result in a trans-
fer to "another person." 
Another important issue is using disclaimers to secure 
an effective Q-TIP trust. In certain cases, a Q-TIP election 
under §2056(b) (7) is desirable for a trust which is ineligi-
ble for the election because income or principal can be dis-
tributed to someone else during the life of the spouse. If 
all the trust income is required to be distributed, the spouse 
is one of the income beneficiaries, and the "defect" is only 
that the income or principal can be distributed to another 
person also. If that is the case, then the trust can be 
converted into a "Q-TIP" trust if the other beneficiaries 
disclaim the right to receive any distributions during the 
spouse's life. 
The proposed regulations seemed to indicate that this 
procedure would be improper, at least if the disclaimer in-
volved principal, because the disclaimant was not disclaiming 
his right to receive distributions after the spouse's death 
and was therefore not disclaiming all of his interest in 
principal as required by the proposed regulations. However, 
private letter rulings approved such disclaimers despite the 
proposed regulations. Two different theories were used by 
different letter rulings, but the confusion has now been 
cleared up by the final regulations. 
Example (11) of §25.2518-3(d) indicates that the techni-
que will work under the final regulations. That example 
provides as follows: 
Example (11): Under H's will, a trust is 
created from which W is to receive all of the in-
come for life. The trustee has the power to in-
vade the trust corpus for the support or mainte-
nance of 0 during the life of W. The trust is to 
terminate at W's death, at which time the trust 
property is to be distributed to o. 0 makes a 
timely disclaimer of the right to corpus during 
W's lifetime, but does not disclaim the remainder 
interest. D's disclaimer is a qualified disclaimer 
assuming the remaining requirements of §25l8 are 
met. 
Despite the liberality of the final regulations, an 
outright legacy cannot be disclaimed into a Q-TIP marital 
trust of which the disclaimant is a remainderman. Such a 
disclaimer would violate the "pass-to-another" rule, because 
the disclaimant receives a remainder interest in the disclaimed 
proeprty. The separate interest rule will not apply to avoid 
this result where an outright bequest is involved. 
Another important point is that the "problem" benefi-
ciary of the defective Q-TIP may be a minor who is unable to 
disclaim on his own. Under §25l8 (b) (2) (d), the minor may 
disclaim himself, without a guardian, within nine months 
after reaching age 21. Distributions to a minor prior to 
age 21 will not prevent a qualified disclaimer after age 21 
nor do the final regulations appear to require that the 
amounts received by the minor beneficiary prior to age 21 be 
returned by the disclaiming beneficiary after he reaches age 
21. See 525.2518-2 (d) (3) and (d) (4), examples (9), (10) and 
(11) . 
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III. FEDERAL TAX CASES, RULINGS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Section 55--A1ternative Minimum Tax and Non-Alternative Tax 
Itemized Deductions. 
Temporary Regulation Section 1.58-3T provides that item-
ized deductions (like state and local income taxes) which 
are not alternative tax itemized deductions must be appor-
tioned among estates and trusts and their beneficiaries as 
if they were items of tax preference. The Temporary Regu-
lation confirms Internal Revenue Service news release, I.R. 
84-52, from 1984. 
Section 12 and 453--Private Annuities and Installment Sales. 
Private annuities and installment sales have different 
tax consequences. I.R.C. Section 453(b) defines an "install-
ment sale" as "a disposition of property where at least one 
payment is to be received after the close of the taxable 
year in which the disposition occurs." This definition may 
also encompass a private annuity. 
General Counsel's Memorandum 39503 provides the first 
definitive guidance for determining whether I.R.C. Section 
72 or 453 applies to the treatment of periodic payments re-
ceived by a taxpayer who has transferred property in return 
for a right to receive payments for a period not exceeding 
the remainder of his life. The G.C.M. stated: 
When the terms of a property transaction are 
structured so that there is a stated maximum payout 
that will be achieved in a period less than the 
life expectancy of the transferor (as determined 
at the time of the transaction in accordance with 
Table 1, Treasury Regulations Section 172-9), then 
the transaction will be characterized as an install-
ment sale with a contingent sales price, and will 
be treated in accordance with the installment sale 
rules. (Emphasis added.) 
The G.C.M. discussed three situations. In the first, A 
transfers property to B in return for B's promise to make 
annual payments of $10,000 to A until A's death. The G.C.M. 
states that this is a private annuity and the payments are 
governed by I.R.C. Section 72. 
A-29 
Second, A transfers property to B in return for B's 
promise to make annual payments of $10,000 to A until $100,000 
is paid or until A's death, whichever occurs first, A's 
life expectancy under Treasury Regulations Section 1.72-9 is 
9.1 years. Because there is no stated maximum payout that 
will be achieved in the period less than the life expectancy 
~ of A, the situation will be governed by I.R.C. Section 72 as 
a private annuity. 
Third, the same situation is as in situation two above, 
except that A's life expectancy is 11 years. Here, A's life 
expectancy, at the time of the sales agreement, is 11 years 
and the maximum stated sales price will be reached in 10 
years. Therefore, the transaction will be termed an install-
ment sale rather than an annuity. 
The G.C.M. also dealt with the consequences of the payee's 
death on income taxation. An installment sale which provides 
that payments cease at the seller's death generally gives 
rise to immediate income tax to the Seller at his or her 
death on the foregone income. 
Section 691--Income In Respect of a Decedent. 
The case of Apkin v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 692, involves 
accrued interest on United States savings bonds. There, the 
mother of the taxpayer purchased Series E United States Savings 
Bonds in her name and in the taxpayer's name as co-owners. 
The mother did not file income tax returns prior to her death 
because she did not have sufficient income to require filing. 
She could have elected to accrue the interest on the bonds 
annually under I.R.C.'s Section 454(a), and presumably paid 
little or no tax. After his mother's death, the son re-
deemed the bonds. The Tax Court held that the interest on 
the bonds accrued prior to the mother's death was income in 
respect of a decedent under I.R.C. Section 69l(a) (1) and 
therefore was taxable to the son when he redeemed the bonds. 
The Tax Court found that because Section 454(a) requires 
that an election under the Section be made on the taxpayer's 
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tax return, and the mother did not file a return in any year 
after the purchase of the first savings bond, she did not 
make an effective election. In short, by remaining silent, 
she made an election to have the interest included in her 
reportable income in the year or years of maturity or of 
redemption if such occurred prior to maturity. 
Section 2011--State Death Tax Credit. 
Revenue Ruling 86-38, IRB 1986-11 at 22, concerns the 
allowance of a state death tax credit when the estate elects 
to defer the payment of state death tax. The general rule, 
contained in I.R.C. Section 20ll(c) (i), allows the credit 
for "only such taxes as were actually paid and credit there-
for claimed within four years" after the estate tax return 
is filed. If the estate elects to pay the federal estate 
tax in ten annual installments, then the estate will qualify 
ultimately for the Section 2011 credit for all state death 
taxes paid during the federal deferral period. However, 
when the estate tax return is filed, only the state death 
tax actually paid at that time will qualify for the Section 
2011 credit on the estate tax return. The recomputation 
procedure described in Revenue Procedure 81-27 is used when-
ever the estate submits certification of payment of additional 
state death tax. The recomputation would allow the Section 
2011 credit that may be allowed for any state death tax in-
stallment paid by the estate. After all state death taxes 
have been paid, a claim for refund may be made, if necessary, 
for an overpayment of tax; however, such a claim may be made 
only after the federal estate tax liability has been paid in 
full. 
Section 2031-Definition of Gross Estate 
In Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1306 (1987), a decedent owned a limited partnership interest 
that, during life, included a right to force dissolution and 
liquidation of the partnership. The right expired at the 
A-3l 
-decedent's death. It was stipulated that the value of the 
partnership interest immediately before the decedent's death 
was $59,555,000; immediately after decedent's death, that 
is, after expiration of the right, the partnership interest 
was deemed to be worth $33,000,000. The Tax Court adopted 
the $33,000,000 value for Section 2031 purposes. The Court's 
rationale was that this was the total value that the decedent 
could transfer at death. The IRS stipulated that the value 
of the other partnership interests did not change by virtue 
of decedent's death, and the gift tax consequences of the 
total transaction were not involved, although the Court did 
state that the decedent received adequate consideration for 
the property he contributed to the partnership. 
Another case involving a successful planning technique 
was Doran v. United States, 86-2 U.S.T.C. ,13,701 (W.D.P.A. 
1986), in which the decedent gave options to her children 
and grandchildren which allowed them to purchase publicly 
traded stock the decedent owned. The option price was the 
fair market value of the stock at the time of the gift. The 
Court found that the clear intent was to freeze the value of 
the stock by a gift transfer of all of decedent's rights to 
the future appreciation in the stock, subject to the trans-
ferred options. Apparently, no gift tax return was ever 
filed to reflect the gift, nor was there an iHdication of 
what the value of the options would be for gift tax purposes. 
Even so, the Court found that the value of the stock for 
estate tax purposes was the option price, which was the value 
frozen at the time the option was delivered. 
Completion of Gifts. McCarthy v. U.S., 86-2 USTC, 
,13,700 (7th Cir. 1986), concerned a decedent who in the 
week before her death wrote nine $3,000 checks which she 
intended to be gifts to various relatives. The issue was 
whether the checks were includible in her estate. The Seventh 
Circuit held that the $27,000 should be included in the dece-
dent's estate because under applicable state law the gifts 
were not complete. This was because the donor had the power 
A-32 
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to stop payment on the checks up until the time the checks 
were cashed, and the checks were not cashed until after the 
decedent's death. 
Section 2032--Alternate Valuation Date. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Estate of Johnston v. United States, 
~ 779 F.2d 1123 (1986), reversed the lower court and held that 
the proceeds from oil and gas interests received between the 
date of death and the alternate valuation date will be in-
cludible in the decedent's gross estate even if, for valua-
tion purposes, the alternate valuation date election is made. 
Further, the Fifth Circuit held that the value of the oil 
and gas interests is the "in place value of that oil and gas 
on the date of its severance." The lower court had ruled 
that post-death production was excludible from value on the 
alternate valuation date. 
Section 2032A--Special Use Value. 
One of the requirements for special use value qualifica-
tion is that the farm property must have been used by the 
decedent or a member of his family for a qualified use. The 
legislative history of the Section indicates that indicates 
this requirement should be met if income from the rental of 
the property is substantially dependent upon production. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Schuneman v. United States, 783 F.2d 
694 (1986), applied this test to the following facts. The 
decedent entered into a lease under which the tenant would 
pay rent in cash of $32,600 if certain grain production and 
price levels were met. If, after the harvest, the gross 
income was below $51,600, then the annual rent would be re-
duced to $26,080. In other words, the possible income of 
the decedent could fluctuate by up to $6,520, which was ap-
proximately 20% of the maximum rental income. The court 
examined the history of the farm and determined that in the 
four years previous to the year in question the actual income 
from the farm varied by 32% of the decedent's maximum income 
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during the period. In addition, during two of the four years 
examined, the price level of $51,600 was not achieved, so 
that the rent reduction clause could come into play under 
the lease. For these reasons, the court said that the rental 
income under the lease was substantially dependent upon pro-
duction. 
In another important case concerning Section 2032A, 
Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. No. 67 (1986), the 
Tax Court held Treasury Regulation Section 2032A-8(a) (2) 
invalid to the extent it disqualified an election for special 
use evaluation because a remainder contingent disposition in 
a will named nonqua1ified beneficiaries. According to the 
Court, the will provision was added in this case to prevent 
intestacy in the unlikely event of a total failure of descen-
dants. Because the provision was unlikely to apply, the 
Court invalidated the regulation to the extent it would have 
regarded this de minimis failure to comply with the qualified 
heir requirements of Section 2032A (a) (2) and (b) (1) as fatal 
to an effective election. Two additional Tax Court cases 
have already followed Davis. See Estate of Clinard v. 
Commissioner, 86 T.C. No. 68 (1986) (qualified heirs had 
non-general powers of appointment that would permit appoint-
ment to nonqua1ified heirs); Estate of P1iske v. Commissioner, 
51 T.C.N. (CCH) 1543 (1986). 
Sections 2036 and 2038--Retained Powers in an Inter vivos 
Transfer. 
Private Letter Ruling 8606002 involved a decedent who 
created a trust and remained a "supervisor" thereunder until 
his death. As supervisor, the decedent had the right to 
direct the trustee (1) to make those distributions of income 
or principal as "necessary for the emergency needs of the 
primary beneficiary or to maintain the primary beneficiary 
in the manner and style to which she had been accustomed, 
after taking into consideration any other support and income 
[she] may have"; (2) to distribute income not needed by the 
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beneficiary to charity: (3) to allocate receipts of disburse-
ments between income and principal; and (4) to terminate the 
trust if necessary to avoid the destruction of trust property. 
The Ruling held that the retained power to control income 
and principal distributions was not limited by an ascertain-
able standard because of the reference to emergency needs. 
Unlike other cases in which distributions for "emergencies" 
related to specific needs of the beneficiary were allowed, 
in this situation the standard was emergencies or to maintain 
the beneficiary. 
Section 2036--Transfers With Retained Life Estate. The 
Tax Court, in Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 
held that a trust was includable in the grantor's gross estate 
under I.R.C. Section 2036(a) (1) where the terms of the trust 
provided that the trustees could distribute income or prin-
cipal to any person who added principal to the trust. The 
decedent and other persons contributed, subject to an under-
standing that the decedent would receive income and principal 
when he requested. Further, the decedent's creditors could 
reach his retained interest under the applicable state's 
laws, based on Section 156(2) of the Restatement of Trusts 
(Second), which states that the creditors of a grantor may 
reach the maximum amount which the trustee may distribute to 
him. 
A recent letter ruling concerned the gift tax consequences 
of a trust similar to the one in Paxton. In P.L.R. 8617006, 
the Internal Revenue Service decided that there was a com-
pleted gift of a remainder interest even though the trustee 
at his discretion could pay principal to the grantor/income 
beneficiary for her "maintenance, support and comfort, any 
of the surviving trustor's legal obligations, and the pre-
servation of her property." The trustee was authorized to 
consider other resources available to the beneficiary. The 
IRS ruled that if a grantor's own resources, when added to 
trust income, are adequate to cover his needs, then the abi-
lity of a grantor's creditors to reach trust principal may 
be ignored for gift tax purposes, and most likely estate tax 
purposes as well. 
Thus, the trust in these decisions can potentially result 
in double taxation--a completed gift for gift tax purposes, 
and full inclusion for estate tax purposes. 
Sale of Remainder Interest. Gradow v. United States, 
87-1 USTC ~13,711 (C.L. Ct. 1987) involved a community pro-
perty forced election. The deceased spouse created a trust 
that effectively settled a life estate in the decedent's 
share of community property to the surviving spouse in ex-
change for a remainder interest in the survivor's community 
property. The Court's decision did not turn on the type of 
consideration given for the transfer by the survivor of the 
remainder interest in the survivor's property. Therefore, 
it would seem that Gradow is important because it is relevant 
to all transfers of a remainder interest with retention of a 
life estate in the subject property. The taxpayer argued 
that Section 2036(a) (1) should not apply with respect to the 
retained life estate in the survivor's community property 
because the remainder was transferred for a full and accurate 
consideration in money or money's worth, thereby qualifying 
for the statutory exception to the application of Section 
2036(a) (1). The Court rejected this contention because under 
Section 2036(a) (1) full and adequate consideration is measured 
by the full fair market value of the subject property, that 
is, the fee simple interest in the property, not by the value 
of the interest transferred. The Court addressed the question 
whether Section 2036(a) (1) required that the consideration 
be paid for the interest transferred or for the interest 
which would otherwise be included in the gross estate. The 
Court failed to grasp that when the life estate is expired, 
the remainder interest remains and would be includible in 
the surviving spouse's estate were it not for this sale. 
The Court was apparently confused because the remainder in-
terest appears different when there is an intervening life 
estate standing between the remainder as seen at the death 
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of the surviving spouse and the remainder as seen at the 
time of sale; nevertheless, at the termination of the life 
estate, the remainder is all that is left. Thus, the value 
of the remainder interest determined at the surviving spouse's 
death is exactly the same amount that would be included in 
the survivor's estate if no transfer were made during life. 
The Court specifically examined a hypothetical the taxpayer 
had placed before the Court, the sale of a remainder interest 
while retaining the income interest and stated that the sale 
of a remainder interest in the conventional situation should 
be a retained interest as well. 
Control of Partnership. Letter Ruling 8611004 dealt 
with the issue of whether a donor's ongoing voting control 
of a partnership as its general partner constituted a retained 
power under Section 2036(b). If so, there would be inclusion 
of the transferred interest under Section 2036(a) (2). The 
Internal Revenue Service ruled that such was not a retained 
power. Instead, the position of the general partner was 
analogized to that of a controlling shareholder of a closely-
held corporation who would not be deemed to run afoul of 
Section 2036(b) unless voting control of the transferred 
shares was specifically retained. See also United States v. 
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972). Indirect control, by virtue of 
ownership of other shares of the corporation, will not cause 
Section 2036(b) to apply in the corporate setting and the 
Ruling establishes that such indirect, but not "retained," 
control will not cause exposure in the partnership setting 
either. 
Section 2038--Gifts Under Non-Durable Power of Attorney. 
Gifts made pursuant to a non-durable power of attorney 
by the agent while the principal was incompetent will be 
included in the gross estate of the principal-decedent. Be-
cause the transfers are avoidable as a matter of state trust 
law, they are irrevocable. Thus, I.R.C. Section 2038 will 
apply. See Letter Ruling 8623004. 
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Section 2041--General Power of Appointment. 
In Letter Ruling 8601003, a decedent established a trust 
for the benefit of his spouse and named her as trustee. The 
will provided that the trustee could invade the corpus not 
only to maintain herself in the status in which she was ac-
customed but also to "pay for any special needs she may have." 
The issue was whether the wife had a general power of appoint-
ment over the trust property under I.R.C. Section 2041. The 
Ruling stated that because the additional powers to use prin-
cipal for special needs were not limited to those standards 
of health, education, support or maintenance, as described 
in Section 2041 (b) (1) (A), the powers are general. 
A similar result was arrived at in Estate of Little v. 
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 34, in which the trustee could pay so 
much of income and principal as was necessary for the bene-
ficiary's "proper support, maintenance, welfare, health and 
general happiness in the manner to which she is accustomed." 
The Tax Court found that "general happiness" is not within 
the scope of "health, education, support or maintenance." 
It is important to remember that these decision are decided 
under the applicable state law. In other words, presumably, 
if a standard such as "general happiness" were in fact within 
the scope of the 2041 ascertainable standards under applicable 
state law, then such language would not lead to inclusion 
under Section 2041. 
In Goudy v. United States, 86-2 USTC, Paragraph 13,690 
(D. Or. 1986), the decedent was the beneficiary of a tes-
tamentary trust created by his mother. The decedent was 
entitled to the income and he had a general testamentary 
power of appointment over the trust. Within nine months 
after his mother's death, the decedent restricted his power 
so that he could not appoint to himself, his creditors, the 
creditors of his estate, but could appoint to his spouse, 
his children and any descendants of a deceased child of his 
and to charities. The District Court of Oregon held that an 
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effective disclaimer was made of the general power pursuant 
to applicable state law and Treasury Regulation 20.2041-
3(d)(6). 
Section 2053--Adainistration Expense Deduction 
~ In Letter Ruling 86361001, the Internal Revenue Service 
ruled that if a personal representative petitions the local 
probate court for approval of his fees, and the court con-
sents, the court approval will be determinative of the reason-
ableness of the fees for purposes of claiming a Section 2053 
deduction if either the court ruled on all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the fee request and the deter-
mination was made in a genuinely adversarial proceeding in-
volving those fees, or the court entered a consent decree 
that constitutes a bona fide settlement by the parties of a 
valid dispute or claim regarding fees. The Service said the 
court order will not necessarily bind the government in other 
situations, nor must the government accept a local court 
decree that is at variance with state law--if, for example, 
the awarded fees exceed statutory fees without special justi-
fication for the excess. 
A somewhat different result was reached by United States 
v. White, 87-1 USTC '113,710 (W.O. N.Y. 1987) in which the 
Court held that the Internal Revenue Service, under Treasury 
Regulations Section 20.2053-l(b) (2), must accept the state 
court determination of fees unless there is prima facie evi-
dence of fraud, over-reaching or some other reason to believe 
that the local court has not passed on the factors upon which 
deductibility depends. The Court also stated that the burden 
is on the government, particularly where the court determi-
nation considers all of the factors which the Internal Revenue 
Service would consider. The Court did not add a requirement 
that the determination be made in a genuinely adversarial 
proceeding nor that it be a bona fide settlement of a valid 
dispute regarding fees. 
39 
Section 2055--Charitable Deduction, Reformation of Defective 
Bequests 
A Section 2055 reformation and deduction case, Flanagan 
v.United States, 810 F.2n 930 (10th Cir. 1987), and Letter 
Ruling 8706014, which involved a reformation in order to 
receive the Section 2056 marital deduction, present an in-
teresting contrast. In Flanagan, the decedent created a 
non-qualified split-interest trust. The beneficiaries sought 
a court order reforming the trust in order to qualify for 
the charitable deduction. However, before the court could 
rule on the request to reform the trust, the beneficiaries 
settled the proceeding in consideration of outright distribu-
tions to both the charitable and the non-charitable bene-
ficiaries. They then claimed a charitable deduction for the 
value of the charitable distributions based on the fact that 
there were no split-interest dispositions involved. The 
Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction. In re-
jecting the Service's denial of the charitable deduction, 
the 10th Circuit stated that Congress sought to encourage 
gifts to charity through Section 2055 and that the facts in 
Flanagan did not involve the abuses to which the split-interest 
rules were directed. Thus, the Court saw no reason to deny 
deduction for the actual benefit passing outright to the 
charity. 
On the other hand, in the Letter Ruling, a lower state 
court had actually redefined the trust terms in a beneficiary's 
reformation suit so as to permit an otherwise defective trust 
to qualify for the marital deduction. Nevertheless, the 
Internal Revenue Service disallowed the claimed deduction 
because the reformation remedy available under state law was 
available only if proof of the settlor's intent was established 
by nthe clearest and most satisfactory character,n which the 
Service deemed to be missing. 
It would seem that the difference in result between the 
two situations cannot be attributed to the procedures followed 
because Flanagan involved fewer safeguards than those applied 
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in the lower state court proceeding. Perhaps, Section 2055 
entitles the beneficiaries to greater latitude because of 
Congressional intent to encourage charitable gifts. Or, 
perhaps, the Service is simply taking a more rigid position 
with respect to settlements than the case law would support. 
If so, litigation is the appropriate method to establish the 
right to reform an otherwise defective charitable or marital 
disposition. 
Section 2056--Marital Deduction. 
In Estate of William L. Reno, Jr., 51 TCM 909, the Tax 
Court considered whether under Virginia law the federal es-
tate tax on Kentucky real property was to be charged to such 
Kentucky property or to be paid from non-probate property. 
The non-probate property passed to the decedent's spouse so 
that the payment of federal estate tax on the Kentucky real 
property from the non-probate property would cause the marital 
deduction to be reduced. Under the will, the spouse retained 
a legal life estate in the Kentucky real property and the 
tax apportionment provision provided that all death taxes on 
the Kentucky real property be paid out of estate assets other 
than the property. The value of such assets was insufficient 
to satisfy all the taxes payable. 
Under the Virginia apportionment statute, all taxes are 
to be equitably apportioned. Thus, the estate argued that 
the taxes owed on the Kentucky real property should be paid 
from such property. The Tax Court rejected this argument 
because the Virginia apportionment statute provides that the 
testator may vary the statutory apportionment by will if he 
desires to do so. Therefore, the Tax Court held that the 
"provision in decedent's will directing that death duties on 
the Kentucky real estate be paid by his executrix out of 
assets other than said real estate thus overrides the Vir-
ginia apportionment statute, and causes the will to be ad-
ministered as if the apportionment statute had never been 
'enacted." 
In Letter Ruling 8638004, the Internal Revenue Service 
allowed a trust to qualify for the marital deduction where 
the decedent's will authorized the trustee of a trust which 
would otherwise qualify for the marital deduction to retain 
property notwithstanding that the property might not be in-
come producing. No provision of the will directed that the 
~ fiduciaries invest in productive property nor was the surviv-
ing spouse's consent required before the fiduciaries could 
hold unproductive property. The Service's ruling was based 
on state law that required consideration of probable income 
in making new investments and the fact that the estate con-
sisted entirely of productive property. 
Letter Ruling 8720008 considered the case of a decedent 
dying in 1986 with a will executed in 1957. The decedent 
was survived by several children and a spouse. The will 
provided that "[m]y purpose in establishing this trust is to 
take advantage of the maximum marital deduction, as that 
term is defined by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or 
similar, subsequent legislation." The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice found on the basis of the quoted language that the de-
cedent's intent was to take advantage of the changes to the 
marital deduction made after execution of the will and there-
by give his spouse the benefit of any increase in the amount 
of the deduction. Therefore, the marital deduction will not 
be unlimited and the transition rule under ERTA limiting the 
deduction to the greater of $250,000 or 50% of the adjusted 
gross estate will not apply because of a contrary testamentary 
intent. 
In Letter Rulings 8642007, 8648002 and 8649002, the 
Internal Revenue Service was asked to rule with respect to 
the qualification of residuary marital deduction estate plans. 
The Service cited Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 
415 (1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), in the first 
two rulings and held that it is harmless that deteimination 
of the final amount of the marital residue is subject to 
contingencies based on asset valuation at the date or dates 
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of distribution. Instead, date of distribution funding, 
with asset fluctuations affecting the marital residue, were 
deemed to be fair to the marital residue, if state law re-
quires impartiality for the personal representative in admini-
stration of the estate. Impartiality should be required by 
all states unless the trust instrument negates the require-
~ ment. So, while the possibilities of capital appreciation 
and depreciation, burdens and benefits taxes, and other wind-
falls and casualties are of concern to residuary legatees, 
these concerns do not rise to the level of a basis for dis-
allowance in this context. 
The third Letter Ruling stated that in Revenue Ruling 
81-20 it is recognized that a situation similar to that ad-
dressed in Revenue Procedure 64-19 could occur, namely, where 
the claimed deductible interest is a residue following a 
pecuniary bequest and the executor has broad discretionary 
power with respect to funding the pecuniary bequest. The 
Service held in this context that the deduction was allowable 
based on several factors. The first of these factors was a 
representation by the executor that in satisfying the credit 
shelter pecuniary bequest he would act in a strictly impartial 
manner. Apparently, the Service asked for such a represen-
tation based on Revenue Ruling 81-20. Also, applicable state 
law prohibited the executor from acting in any manner that 
would defeat an otherwise available marital deduction if the 
obvious and expressed intent of the testator was to take 
advantage of the marital deduction. The Service concluded 
that if the executor's broad discretionary power with respect 
to funding was exercised in a manipulative manner, the marital 
deduction would be disallowed; therefore, the state statute 
must require the executor to exercise his power in an impar-
tial manner with respect to all beneficiaries. 
Another factor was that the will in question contained 
language specifying that it was the testator's intention 
that the marital deduction be allowed and that all powers 
and authority granted in the will to the executor should be 
interpreted so that the estate would be entitled to the mari-
tal deduction. 
Finally, the Service stated that income tax generated 
by any appreciation in the value of the residue will not 
change the reality of date of death valuation and, therefore, 
the deductibility of the marital trust would not be affected. 
Section 250l--Gift Tax, Savings Clauses 
Savings Clauses Deemed Invalid. In Revenue Ruling 86-
41, 1986-12 I.R.B. 9, two different savings clauses, each 
relating to a transfer of realty, were deemed invalid. In 
the first clause, the deed of transfer purported to "reconvey" 
to the transferor that fractional share of the gifted property 
necessary to limit any gift on the original transfer to an 
amount not exceeding the gift tax annual exclusion. The 
second clause required the donee to pay the donor an amount 
equal to any excess of the value of the property transferred 
over the gift tax annual exclusion amount. Because both 
provisions were designed to prevent the transfer from consti-
tuting a gift if the government valued the transferred prop-
erty in excess of the party's estimate, the Service ruled 
that both clauses were invalid. The Service stated that the 
purpose of the adjustment clause in both cases was not to 
preserve or implement the original, bona fide intent of the 
parties as might be the case if the clause had required a 
purchase price adjustment based on an appraisal by an indepen-
dent third party retained for that purpose. Thus, perhaps 
there is an opening for planning purposes. If the object of 
a savings clause is to preserve or implement the original, 
bona fide intent of the parties in cases in which reevalua-
tion is pursuant to an independent appraisal, the savings 
clause may be valid. If so, such a provision might serve 
the intended purpose and the Ruling may represent a sufficient 
opening through which additional savings clauses might pass 
in the future. 
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Revenue Ruling 86-41 was followed by the Tax Court deci-
sion in Ward v. Commissioner, 87 Tax Court 6 (1986). There, 
a father gave 25 shares of closely-held stock to two sons, 
while reserving the power to revoke part of the gift if, for 
federal gift tax purposes, it was finally determined that 
the fair market value was greater than $10,000. The Tax 
Court concluded that because the federal gift and estate 
taxes now comprise an unified transfer tax system, unlike 
the separate systems in effect when an early case, Commis-
sioner v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944,) cert. 
denied, 323 u.s. 756 (1944), was decided, that "savings 
clauses" are no longer valid. The court said: 
When Proctor was decided, the federal gift 
and estate taxes were separate taxes, each with 
its own rate schedule. If the donor could not 
recover the excess gift or if his right to revoke 
lapsed before his death, the excess gift would 
escape both gift and estate taxation. Now, trans-
fers during life and at death are subject to a 
single unified rate schedule, and the rates are 
progressive on the basis of cumulative lifetime 
and deathtime transfers. It appears that in cal-
culating the estate tax, incorrectly valued gifts 
may be revalued in determining "adjustable taxable 
gifts" for purposes of Section 2001(b), and when 
such gifts are cumulated with the taxable estate, 
any upward adjustment in the value of the gifts 
would result in an increase in the estate tax lia-
bility. However, we are not persuaded that the 
mere possibility of estate taxation is sufficient. 
If, at death, the Commissioner fails to challenge 
the gifts valuation, the excess value of the gift 
will pass from the donor's estate without ever 
being subject to the transfer tax, and in every 
case, the payment of the tax due on the excess 
gift is deferred. 
Furthermore, a condition that causes a part 
of a gift to lapse if it is determined for federal 
gift tax purposes that the value of the gift ex-
ceeds a given amount, so as to avoid a gift tax 
deficiency, involves the same sort of "trifling 
with the judicial process" condemned in Proctor. 
If valid, such commission would compel us to issue, 
in effect, a declaratory judgment as to the stocks 
of value, while rendering the case moved as a con-
sequence. Yet, there is no assurance that the 
petitioners will actually reclaim a portion of the 
A-45 
stock previously conveyed to their sons, and our 
decision on the question evaluation in a gift tax 
J 
JI 
suit is not binding upon the sons, who were not J 
parties to this action. The sons may yet enforce 
the gifts. 
Gift Taxation of Death Benefit Only Payments. In Estate J 
of DiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. No. 39, the Service 
asserted gift tax liability that the Service alleged was 
incurred as of the date of the decedent's employment but 
that was incomplete until decedent's death, with respect to 
the full value of a survivor's death benefit that became 
payable by virtue of the decedent's death. The benefit in-
volved was an employee plan to which the decedent had made 
no contributions, had made no beneficiary designation and 
over which the decedent had no powers of any type. The bene-
fit was fixed by the terms of the plan and was totally con-
tingent on the plan being in effect at death and takers under 
the plan who survive the decedent being named. 
The Service argued that the decedent made a gift of 
this benefit by accepting employment, but that the gift was 
incapable of valuation prior to death because the benefit 
was tied to factors that would not be until to the date of 
death. The taxpayer argued that there was no gift at all 
based on the fact that no transfer was ever made, no control 
ever existed, no power was ever exercised over the benefit 
and the arrangement was totally involuntary on the part of 
the decedent. The Court sided with the taxpayer. The Court 
stated that transfers of property are not incomplete for 
gift tax purposes simply because no realistic value could be 
placed on the property, and transfers of property do not 
become complete for gift tax purposes only when the value of 
the transferred property can be easily ascertained. The 
Court agreed with the taxpayer that the decedent never made 
a taxable gift of the property interest in the survivor's 
income benefit because no act by the decedent qualified as 
an act of "transfer" of an interest in property because the 
decedent's participation in the employee benefit plan was 
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involuntary and he had no powers over the plan or the bene-
fit. Importantly, the Court expressly declined to express a 
view as to whether the survivor's income benefit was includi-
ble in the taxpayer's gross estate under Section 2039. The 
Service itself did not assert estate tax liability but rather 
argued soley that there had been a taxable gift. 
Gift Tax Impact of Stock Purchase Agreements. Private 
Letter Ruling 8612001 concerns the potential gift tax conse-
quences of a husband and wife who each owned 50% of a farming 
corporation. The spouses entered into an agreement with two 
main provisions. First, the stock could be transferred by 
will, intestacy or gift, only to spouses and descendants, 
but could be transferred by any means (e.g., sale) to any 
person approved by a majority in interest of the shareholders. 
Second, if a shareholder desired to dispose of certain shares, 
and was not able to secure majority consent, then the corpo-
ration could purchase the shares at their "reasonable" value. 
The "reasonable" value was to be determined annually by the 
corporation's board of directors. If the corporation did 
not exercise its option to purchase, then an option passed 
to the other shareholders in proportion to their interests. 
In addition to the husband and wife signing the agreement, 
their children signed the agreement and the agreement recited 
that "this agreement is binding upon our respective heirs, 
executors and assigns." According to the Letter Ruling, 
neither shareholder made a gift, because they each owned the 
same number of shares and received contract rights equal in 
value so that property rights were transferred for adequate 
and full consideration in money, or money's worth, in accord-
ance with I.R.C. Section 2512(b). The children did not make 
a gift because the promises each made were void because none 
of the children were shareholders and none of them furnished 
consideration for the agreement. 
Passing Dividends on Preferred Stock 
Technical Advice Memorandum 8723007 concerned a control-
ling shareholder of a corporation who possessed only preferred 
stock; a trust for the benefit of the shareholder's grand-
children held all of the corporation's common stock. The 
shareholder was considered to have made a gift to the common 
stock shareholders by virtue of his relinquishment of his 
right to non-cumulative preferred dividends. The Service 
~ found that by foregoing his preferred dividend, the share-
holder waived his right as a preferred shareholder to his 
fair share of earned surplus, which resulted in a steady and 
progressive shift in value from the shareholder's interest 
to the interest of the common stock shareholders. The Ser-
vice went on to say that, even if there were sufficient busi-
ness reasons not to pay dividends, the controlling shareholder 
could have taken various steps to avoid this result. First, 
he could have caused the corporation to declare and pay a 
dividend and then he could have loaned the money back to the 
corporation. Second, he could have required the corporation 
to distribute its promissory note to him. Third, he could 
have caused the corporation to declare, but not pay, the 
dividend to him. Under any of these options, the shareholder 
would have become the corporation's creditor, but, as the 
Service suggested, he could have agreed to subordinate his 
claim to other creditors so that the corporation's ability 
to borrow from others would not have been impaired by the 
debt to the shareholder. Because the shareholder did not 
demand the dividend or take any of these steps, the Service 
held that the shareholder irrevocably lost the ability to 
assert his right to at least a major part of the waived divi-
dends. Thus, the shareholder was considered to have made 
indirect gifts to the other stockholders, whose stock interests 
were enhanced in value. 
Section 25l2--Valuation Tables Use in a Grantor Retained In-
come Trust Disallowed. 
In Letter Ruling 8642028, the Internal Revenue Service 
refused to allow use of the 10% actuarial valuation tables 
in the gift tax regulations to value the grantor's retained 
interest in a trust for a specified term of years because 
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property with a long history of low-income yield was trans-
ferred to the trust, and the trust expressly relieved the 
trustee of the fiduciary duty to make all trust property 
productive. The Ruling provided as follows: 
Thus, even though yearly dividends for X Cor-
poration may increase in the coming years, the 
present value of the cash flow of dividends for 
the trust may be expected to be only a small frac-
tion of what the trust income would be in a trust 
arrangement that more closely conforms to state 
standards relating to a fair rate of return for a 
trust income beneficiary. You, as settlor of the 
trust have given away (in a special provision of 
the trust instrument) your state law right as a 
trust income beneficiary to compel the trustee to 
make the trust more fairly productive. Where pro-
visions in the trust instrument alter the value of 
an income beneficiary's interest to this extent, 
the ordinary term certain income factors from the 
regulations table cannot be used to value the donor's 
retained interest for gift tax purposes. 
The IRS also ruled that the grantor's right to receive 
the trust property if he died during his income term did not 
reduce the value of his gift. The trust included a clause 
providing that the grantor's income interest could be termi-
nated at any time by the payment to the grantor of the then 
actuarial value of his remaining income interest. The IRS 
reasoned that this commutation power would be exercised so 
as to prevent the trust from reverting to the grantor, so 
his reversion had no value. 
Section 2518--Disclaimers 
In Letter Ruling 8701001, the decedent had two minor 
grandchildren. Those grandchildren, through their parents, 
who were also their court appointed guardians, disclaimed an 
interest in certain property inherited from their deceased 
grandparent. The result was that the amount passing to the 
decedent's spouse was increased and, because of the marital 
deduction, the disclaimer created a substantial savings of 
estate tax. The central issue in the Letter Ruling concerned 
A~9 
whether the grandchildren had accepted an interest in the 
disclaimed property. The Internal Revenue Service found 
that despite significant estate tax savings resulting from 
the disclaimer, those savings did not benefit the grand-
children directly enough to constitute an acceptance of 
benefits in the disclaimed property. It was pure speculation 
by the IRS that the grandchildren would ultimately inherit 
the amount by which the estate had been increased through 
the disclaimer. 
Procedural Rulings 
1. Notice of Fiduciary Relation. By Announcement 
86-78, 1986-26 I.R.B. 35, the Internal Revenue Service revised 
Form 56, Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship, to incor-
porate the Section 6036 notice requirements for qualifi-
cation as an executor. 
2. New Form 1041S for Simple Trusts. A simplified 
version of Form 1041 (Fiduciary Income Tax Return) has been 
promulgated by Announcement 86-88, 1986-30 I.R.B. 16, for 
simple trusts that (a) have no gains or losses for the tax-
able year and (b) for which the Section 651 distribution 
deduction equals the amount of income the trust was required 
to distribute annually. Certain items of taxable income, 
other than capital gains, may be allocated to corpus under 
state law or the terms of the trust instrument, and thereby 
cause even a simple trust to be taxab1e--even if both re-
quirements for use of Form 1041S are met. Therefore, pre-
sumably the new form is not limited to use by trusts that 
owe no tax even though the form itself is entitled "U.S. 
Fiduciary Income Tax Return for Nontaxable Simple Trusts". 
The new form is available for filing for tax years beginning 
after 1985 and is optional. The traditional Form 1041 may 
still be used. 
3. Trust Not Considered an Association Taxable as a 
Corporation. In Bedell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. No. 70 (1986), 
the Tax Court found that no association which was taxable as 
a corporation existed. The case involved a testamentary 
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trust engaged in the conduct of business and was widely re-
garded as a test case for the Internal Revenue Service. While 
the Court stated that the case "should not be regarded as 
authority for the conclusion that no testamentary trust can 
be classified as an association," on these particular facts 
the Court concluded that the beneficiaries, who neither created 
nor contributed to the trust, whose interests in the trust 
were not transferrable, and only a few of whom participated 
as trustees in the trust affairs, were not associates and 
their trust is not an association. 
4. Distribution Not Properly Credited to Generate 
Deduction. In Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 
No. 14, the Tax Court denied a Section 66l(a) (2) distribution 
deduction to the estate. The decedent's estate was faced 
with significant contingent liabilities preventing it from 
concluding administration and making a final distribution of 
estate assets. The liabilities prompted the personal repre-
sentative to make what were merely bookkeeping entries on 
its annual work papers to reflect the "income distributions" 
to various beneficiaries, but no income was actually distri-
buted due to the perceived need to retain funds until all 
liabilities were settled. The Tax Court found that the 
amounts represented as credited to the beneficiaries were 
not so definitively allocated as to be beyond recall by the 
estate nor were the amounts beyond the reach of the creditors 
of the estate. The Court did say that actual physical segre-
gation or payment is not required to support the distribution 
deduction, and that in some cases book entries might be ade-
quate; the Court did not elaborate on exactly what would 
have sufficed in this particular case. 
A-51 
IV. KENTUCKY PROBATE AND TRUST CASES 
Aufenkaap v. First Kentucky Trust Co., 705 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
Decedent created a testamentary trust for the benefit 
of his wife for her lifetime. The trust provided for the 
~ remainder to pass in equal shares to the decedent's brothers, 
per stirpes, upon the death of the decedent's wife. Both 
brothers survived the decedent but predeceased decedent's 
wife. One brother was survived by a daughter and the other 
brother was survived by two sons. Both sons also predeceased 
decedent's wife. One son granted his wife (appellant) a 
life estate in his share of the estate. Upon decedent's 
wife's death, appellant filed suit for one-half of the trust 
assets. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, hold-
ing that the remainder interest to decedent's brothers vested 
upon decedent's death and only the enjoyment of the gift was 
postponed until decedent's wife's death. Therefore, appellant 
was entitled to one-half of the remaining trust due her 
through her husband's will. The Court noted that when the 
decedent's intent is not obvious from the four corners of 
the instrument, the law favors early vesting of remainder 
interests. Since no language of survivorship was evident in 
the instrument, the remainder interest vested upon decedent's 
death and was not contingent upon survivorship. 
Ball v. Arnett, 709 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
Decedent died testate with a holographic will which was 
admitted to probate. The will was recopied in error into 
the will book and the name of one of the beneficiaries, 
"Wonita" (Juanita), was transposed to Wanda. Relying upon 
the transposition, Wanda took the position that certain real 
property had been left to her. Juanita, the decedent's 
incompetent daughter, brought an action to quiet title. The 
circuit court entered judgment for decedent's daughter who 
was designated in the holographic will. Affirming the lower 
court's decision, the Court of Appeals held that appellee's 
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action to quiet title was not a collateral attack on the 
public record because the subject matter of the suit involved 
title to real estate. The Court also held that a limitation 
period of ten years had no application in an action where 
the beneficiary was an incompetent. Finally, the Court held 
that parol evidence was admissible as applied to the public 
record. Although the general rule excludes parol evidence 
when it is introduced to alter judicial documents, the Court 
noted that a record of a will could be attacked as not being 
a correct copy. 
Justice v. Conn, 724 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that a failure to 
file notice of a will contest in accordance with KRS 394.240(2) 
does not strip the circuit court of its jurisdiction over 
the case. The purpose of the filing statute is to provide 
notice to potential bona fide purchasers that a decedent's 
property is subject to litigation. Jurisdiction of a circuit 
court is invoked by filing according to Kentucky Civil Proce-
dure Rule 3 and not on whether the no~ice requirements of 
KRS 394.240(2) are met. 
Smith v. Baker, 715 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
The two principals of a closely-held corporation each 
purchased a life policy on the life of another. In addition, 
the parties allegedly entered into a stock purchase agreement 
whereby the life insurance proceeds were to be used to pur-
chase the one-half interest in the business from the other 
upon the death of either. There was no written stock pur-
chase agreement or memorandum of such. At the death of one 
principal, his widow sought to enforce the alleged agreement. 
KRS 355.8-319 requires that contracts for the sale of securi-
ties are not enforceable unless in writing. The widow argued 
that the stock in the closely-held business was not a 
"security" under the definition of KRS 355.8-102 because the 
stock was not the type of stock which would be dealt in com-
A~3 
mon1y upon security markets. The trial court held that the 
stock was a security because stock certificates in c1ose1y-
held corporations are "normally" thought of as securities 
and could be traded by a broker. 
Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
Decedent and administratrix entered into an antenuptial 
agreement. The agreement purported to be temporary until a 
permanent marriage contract could be drafted. Decedent died 
intestate 20 years later and the contemplated permanent 
marriage agreement was never drafted. The trial court held 
that the agreement was valid. The Court of Appeals disagreed. 
First, the Appellate Court found that the agreement was not 
made with full disclosure of all assets by each party. That 
alone would have invalidated the agreement. In addition, 
the Court held that the language of the agreement represented 
merely an agreement to agree in the future rather than a 
binding contract with present terms and conditions. 
Lawson v. Lawson, 34 K.L.S. 5, p. 4 (Ky. App. 1987). 
The will of decedent directed that if any of her children 
cared for her during her last years those children should be 
paid an extra mInImum wage. Decedent's son sought payment 
under the will for his service on the grounds that the payment 
was a bequest. The trial court denied the beneficiary's 
request because it was not timely filed and lacked proper 
verification. KRS 396.010(2) requires that a claim be veri-
fied by a person other than the claimant. KRS 396.025 re-
quires that claims against a decedent's estate be filed with-
in one year of the appointment of a personal representative. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the son's demand 
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for payment was in fact a claim against the estate, rather 
than a bequest, and therefore the failure to comply with KRS J 
396.025 and KRS 396.010(2) was fatal to the beneficiary's 
claim. J 
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Cruse v. Leary, 727 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. App. 1987) 
Decedent executed a will in 1977, leaving her estate to 
her son. In 1983, she executed an Irrevocable Trust Agree-
ment providing that the income be distributed to her for 
life and, at her death, for the principal to be distributed 
equally to her son and grandchildren. Several weeks after 
executing the Trust Agreement, the decedent-settlor requested 
the trustee to return the trust property to her because as 
settlor she had not been advised that the trust was irrevoc-
able. The trustee complied. Just prior to the request to 
the trustee, the decedent executed another will which pur-
ported to revoke all previous wills and which divided the 
estate among her son and grandchildren. In 1985, while in 
the hospital, the decedent executed, with appropriate legal 
formalities, a codicil reaffirming her 1977 will and revoking 
all testamentary documents executed after the 1977 will. 
After her death, an executed copy of her 1977 will could not 
be found. The 1985 codicil, and the 1977 will, as a lost 
document, were admitted to probate. The decedent's grand-
daughter filed a complaint in which she sought to establish 
the validity of the 1983 will and Trust Agreement by showing 
that the 1985 codicil was executed when decedent lacked 
testamentary capacity and that the 1977 will was not proven 
sufficiently. The trial court dismissed the granddaughter's 
complaint on summary judgment, holding that no genuine issue 
of material fact was present. The Court of Appeals reversed 
because the granddaughter raised several issues which might 
be submissible to a jury. A question of fact remained whether 
settlor-decedent could have revoked her 1983 "irrevocable" 
trust, and, the Court said, the granddaughter should be 
allowed the opportunity to present the jury with evidence on 
the issues of decedent's testamentary capacity and the exist-
ence or destruction of a lost will. 
Cecil v. Cecil, 712 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
Beneficiary filed suit against trustees to set aside an 
Agreement terminating her future interest in a trust. The 
A~5 
trial court dismissed the beneficiary's complaint because 
the action was barred under KRS 386.735. This statute pro-
vides that a beneficiary must commence an action against a 
trustee for breach of his fiduciary duty within six months 
after receipt of a final accounting, unless the final 
accounting does not fully disclose all relevant information, 
in which case the beneficiary has three years within which 
to bring an action. The trial court held that the agreement 
served as a complete final accounting, thus triggering the 
statute of limitations under KRS 386.735. The Appellate 
Court affirmed the trial court's opinion. The Court of 
Appeals also stated that because the beneficiary had an op-
portunity to read the Agreement and ascertain its contents 
before signing, she could not rely on the trustee's oral 
misrepresentations to set aside the agreement. 
Morris v. Brien, 712 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
District court ordered the removal of an estate's execu-
tor on the grounds of a conflict of interest resulting from 
the executor's excessive indebtedness to the estate. Rather 
than seeking appellate review, the executor brought a colla-
teral action in circuit court claiming that the issue of his 
removal was an adversaria1 matter beyond the jurisdiction of 
the District Court. The circuit court dismissed the ac~ion. 
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that pur-
suant to KRS 395.160(1), the District Court had jurisdiction 
to remove the executor if he was incapable of discharging 
his fiduciary obligations. The Court stated that a long 
line of Kentucky precedent supports the executor's removal 
for conflicts of interest under KRS 395.160(1). The Court 
found that there was undisputed evidence of the executor's 
indebtedness so that a conflict of interest was evident as a 
matter of law and, therefore, the District Court proceeding 
was not adversaria1. Thus, the dismissal of the original 
action filed by the executor in circuit court was upheld. 
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Watkins v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., 34 K.L.S. 4, 
p. 7 (Ky. App. 1987). 
The decedent created three trusts designating both in-
come and principal to go to his daughter and "the issue of 
her body, which embraces her children and descendants at any 
period ••• ," with the remainder over to the "heirs of her 
body." The trial court held that an adopted grandchild was 
not a beneficiary of the trusts. On appeal, the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision. The 
Court stated that given the specific language used by the 
decedent, he intended the beneficiaries of the trusts to be 
limited to his natural descendants, with any adopted children 
excluded. The Court noted that Kentucky law presumes an 
adopted child should be included as a beneficiary under a 
will or trust unless a contrary intention is apparent from 
the language of the instrument. Here, the decedent in crea-
ting the trust instruments clearly intended to exclude adopted 
children by way of using the language "issue of the body" 
and "heirs of the body." The Court further noted, had tes-
tator used the words "issue" or "lawful heirs" by themselves, 
the adopted child would have qualified as a beneficiary. 
Cabinet for Human Resources v. SRJ, 706 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
Expenses incurred by a guardian ad litem in preparing a 
future negligence action were not recoverable during an unre-
lated proceeding. The Court stated that the powers of a 
guardian ad litem are not as broad as those of a general 
guardian. The limited role of a guardian ad litem is to 
represent the child in the litigation at hand, not incur 
expenses in preparation of future unrelated actions. 
A-57 
v. KENTUCKY ESTATE TAX 
KRS 140.130 creates an estate tax in Kentucky in addition 
to the usual inheritance tax. If an estate is required to 
file a federal estate tax return and the allowable credit 
for state death taxes exceeds the inheritance tax, then the 
statute provides that the difference between the allowable 
credit and the inheritance tax must be paid to Kentucky as 
an estate tax. 
At issue in a recent Indiana case was the meaning of 
Indiana's estate tax statute. The case of Estate of Andrea 
v. Eberbach v. State of Indiana, Department of Revenue, 
Indiana Tax Court Dec. No. 87-09995, April 24, 1987, consi-
dered the issue of whether the Indiana estate tax equals the 
maximum credit permitted under I.R.C. Section 20ll(b) or 
only such amount as is actually used by the estate. 
The decedent's will left a formula minimum marital 
bequest, equal to the least amount necessary to reduce federal 
estate tax to zero, after taking into account available 
credits. The formula further provided that the state death 
tax credit was not to be used to the extent its use increased 
state death taxes payable. The court held that the Indiana 
estate tax applied only to that part of the credit for state 
death taxes as provided by Section 2011 as may be finally 
allowed against the federal estate tax, to the extent same 
exceeds the total of the state death taxes actually paid as 
a result of the decedent's death. Since the formula clause 
here operated to use the federal estate death tax credit 
only to the extent of Indiana inheritance tax, no Indiana 
estate tax was payable. 
The same result should be obtained under the Kentucky 
state tax statute, KRS 140.130. 
A-58 
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ESTATE PLANNING FOR S CORPORATIONS 
By 
Sheldon G. Gilman 
t 
I. EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986. 
A. General. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 makes several 
fundamental changes in the income taxation of businesses and 
individuals. Although the Act makes few direct changes to the S 
corporation rules, contained in Code Sections 1361-1379, many of 
the Act's provisions have a substantial indirect effect on S 
corporations and their shareholders. 
1. Rate Reductions. 
a. For taxable years beginning in 1988, there 
will nominally be only two rates for individuals, 15% 
and 28%. At certain income levels, the new law phases 
out the benefit of the 15% tax bracket, and the 
personal exemption by imposing a 5% surtax on income 
above certain amounts. 
b. The top marginal rate for C corporations is 
reduced from 46% to 34% for taxable years beginning 
after June 30, 1987. The revised rate schedule taxes 
corporate income of up to $50,000 at 15%: taxable 
income exceeding $50,000, but less than $75,000 at 25%: 
and taxable income exceeding $75,000 at 34%. The 15% 
rates and the reduction of the highest individual 
marginal rate to below the highest corporate marginal 
rate. 
2. Use of Calendar Year. The 1986 Act requires that 
all partnerships, S corporations and personal service 
corporations conform their taxable years to the taxable 
years of their owners unless they have established to the 
satisfaction of the IRS a business purpose for having a 
different taxable year. 
B. Repeal of "General Utilities" Doctrine. 
_ 1. Application of New Rule. The 1986 TRA overturns 
the long-standing doctrine of General Uti1it~es and 
Operating Co. vs. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1939), and 
pre-1986 TRA Code Section 336 that a liquidating corporation 
recognizes no gain or loss on its distribution of assets in 
liquidation. Generally, the new law provides that gain and 
losses on assets distributed by a liquidating corporation 
are to be recognized by the liquidating corporation as if 
B-1 
those assets had been sold to the distributee shareholders 
at their fair market value. Accordingly, distributions of 
appreciated property by C corporations in either liquidation 
or redemption will be subject to double taxation. 
a. Transi tiona1 relief from the effect of the 
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine for 
"qualified" corporations that completely liquidate 
before January 1, 1989, is available. 
b. Distributions by S corporations, provided 
they are not covered by the new special rule taxing 
"built-in gains" of former C corporations, will be 
taxed only once because the gain is passed through to 
the shareholders, whose bases are increased pursuant to 
Section 1367 (a) (1) by the amount of the gain 
recognized. 
2 . "Built-In Gains" of S Corporations. In order to 
prevent shareholders of closely held C corporations from 
circumventing the corporate tax on liquidating distributions 
by converting their corporations to S corporation status, 
waiting three years, and then liquidating, TRA 1986 revises 
Section 1374 to impose a tax on the "built-in gain" of 
former C corporations during the first 10 years a£ter the S 
corporation election is made. 
a. Under Section 1374, a tax equal to the highest 
rate of corporate tax is imposed on the taxable sale, 
exchange or disposition within 10 years after electing 
S corporation status for any asset held by the 
corporation on the election date to the extent of the 
appreciation in value of such asset as of the election 
date. 
b. The amount of recognized built-in gain subject 
to this tax is limited by the amount of taxable income 
that the corporation would have had during the taxable 
year of disposition if it had been a C corporation. 
Thus, losses from other acti vi ties and transactions 
during the year can prevent the imposition of this tax. 
The amount of built-in gain subject to this tax can 
also be reduced by NOL carryforwards from the 
corporation's C corporation years. 
c. The tax does not apply to corporations that 
have been S corporations during each of their taxable 
years. 
C. Alternative Minimum Tax. S corporations, as 
pass-through entities, are not subject to the alternative minimum 
tax; however, changes in the alternative minimum tax may affect 
the decision to make or continue an S corporation election. The 
"book income/earnings and profits" adjustment in the revised AMT 
computation for C corporations effectively requires such 
B-2 
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corporations to keep two separate sets of records for tax 
purposes; accordingly, the S corporation becomes more attractive. 
D. Preference For S Corporations. Although some of the 
provisions of the TRA, such as the restrictions on fisc~l year 
selection, have a negative impact on S corporations a~ their 
sharJho1ders, the TRA's general effect is to make the S 
corpo~ation an attractive form of doing business in more 
situations than under pre-1986 TRA law. As a result of rate 
changes, the repeal of the nGenera1 Utilities" doctrine, and the 
imposition of the alternative minimum tax, many taxpayers may 
find that doing business through a pass-through entity such as an 
S corporation will be more attractive than before the TRA. 
E. Preference For C Corporations. The S election is not 
warranted for highly profitable personal service organizations 
with a substantial number of shareholders where most of the 
profi ts are passed through to the employee-shareholders in the 
form of compensation and retirement benefits. Also, it is 
inappropriate where the loss of fringe benefits to two percent or 
greater shareholders exceed any other tax savings. Also, it may 
not be appropriate in corporations where the income before any 
compensation to employee-shareholders is less than $100,000 per 
year, or where the corporation has significant net operating 
losses which cannot be used against S corporation earnings. 
II. THE S CORPORATION. 
A. The Subchapter S Corporation. Subchapter S was enacted 
into law in 1958, and Congress, rather than just applying the 
rules of partnership taxation to eligible corporations, devised a 
unique scheme for eliminating the double taxation of corporate 
income. An electing small business corporation was generally 
exempt from all corporate income taxes, but its income was taxed 
currently at the shareholder level whether or not distributed. 
The amounts included in income by the shareholders generally were 
taxed as ordinary dividend income. Capital gains and net 
operating losses retained their character and flowed through 
directly to shareholders. 
1. Problems of Subchapter S Corporation. 
subchapter S corporation was burdened with a 
ntraps" for the unwary; including the following. 
The former 
number of 
a. Precise technical requirements for making a 
valid election. 
b. Investment credit recapture at the corporate 
level when making a former subchapter S election unless 
the corporation and its shareholders agree to share the 
liability for any recapture for subsequent 
dispositions of assets. 
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c. Excessive passive investment income terminated 
the corporation's former subchapter S status 
retroactively. 
d. Net operating loss in excess of shareholder 
stock bases was lost without any carryforward. 
e. Undistributed taxable income was in effect 
"locked in" the former subchapter S corporation if not 
distributed on a current basis. 
f. Inadvertent termination of former subchapter S 
status by violating one of the technical requirements 
to retain status. 
2. New Subchapter S Enacted. Congress enacted the 
Subchapter S Revision Act in 1982, and repealed the former 
subchapter S corporation rules. The new provisions 
simplified S corporation taxation by eliminating some 
unintended tax traps and benefits, and by eliminating some 
unwarranted differences between the subchapter Sand 
partnership provisions. The S corporation is a flow-through 
enti ty similar to the partnership, it is still a 
corporation, and therefore, a hybrid entity for tax 
purposes. 
B. Qualification as a Small Business Corporation. 
1. Domestic Corporation Requirement. A corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction cannot qualify as an S corporation even though 
all of its business activities are conducted in the United 
States. The term "corporation" includes associations that 
are taxable as corporations; accordingly, an unincorporated 
enterprise, such as a limited partnership, that is treated 
as an "association" for tax purposes could elect S 
corporation status if it is otherwise eligible. 
2. Ineligible Corporations. Certain types of 
corporations are "ineligible" for S corporation status 
regardless of whether they would otherwise qualify as "small 
business corporations." 
a. Members of an Affiliated Group. A corporation 
may not elect S corporation status if it is a member of 
an affiliated group as determined under Section 1504. 
Although Code Section 1504 defines the term "affiliated 
group" primarily for determining eligibility to file 
consolidated returns, the filing (or lack of filing) of 
such returns is irrelevant for purposes of the S 
corporation affiliated group rules. The affiliated 
group restriction generally prevents an S corporation 
from owning 80% or more of the stock of another 
corporation: however, the two exceptions to this rule 
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are: (1) the subsidiary has not begun business and 
does not have gross income, and (2) a subchapter S 
corporation's momentary ownership of all the stock of 
another corporation, i.e., a transitory subsidiary, 
does not cause a termination of the subchapter S 
election. Although an S corporation cannot be tmember 
of an affiliated group, nothing precludes-· an S 
corporation from being in a "controlled group" under 
Code Section 1563. Also, the affiliated group rules 
can be avoided by shifting ownership of second classes 
of stock and by shifting stock values. 
b. Other excluded corporations are: financial 
institutions, insurance companies, possessions 
corporations, DISCs or former DISCs. 
3. No More Than 35 Shareholders. 
a. General. The 35 shareholder limit corresponds 
to the private placement exception under Federal 
Securities Law. An S corporation does not exceed the 
35 shareholder limit unless it has more than 35 
shareholders "at any particular time" during the 
taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 78-390, 1978-2 CB 220. 
Forming separate corporations to avoid the 35 
shareholder limit is not be permitted. In Rev. Rul. 
77-220, 1977-1 CB 263, the IRS ruled that three 
separate corporations, which formed a partnership-for 
the operation of a single business, would not be 
eligible to elect S corporation treatment. 
b. Rules for Counting Shareholders. The stock 
attribution rules do not apply in determining the 
number of shareholders. Therefore, except for husbands 
and wives, and their estates, related individuals 
owning stock are each counted separately. See Rev. 
Rul. 59-187:, 1959-1 CB 224. Reg. Section 
1.137l-l(d)(1) provides that if stock in a corporation 
is held by a nominee, agent, guardian, or custodian, 
the person or persons for whom the stock is held, and 
not the nominee, agent, guardian or custodian is 
considered to be the shareholder. Therefore, if a 
custodian holds shares for two or more minors, each 
minor is counted as a shareholder. In the case where 
an estate is the shareholder, the number of the 
estate's beneficiaries will not affect the treatment of 
the estate as one shareholder for determining the 
number of S corporation shareholders. -
4. Eligible Shareholders. 
a. General. The former rules provided that a 
subchapter S corporation could not have as a 
shareholder a person (other than an estate) who is not 
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an individual. 
partnership or 
shareholder. 
substantially; 
following: 
It was not possible for a corporation, 
trust to qualify as an eligible 
The rules have been modified 
eligible trust shareholders include the 
(1 ) 
citizen 
671-678; 
Trusts treated as owned by 
or resident individual under 
a u.s. 
Sections 
(2) Trusts whose deemed owners have died are 
eligible shareholders for 60 days, and trusts 
entirely included in the deemed owner's gross 
estate are eligible for a maximum of two years; 
(3) Trusts to which stock has been 
transferred by a will, but only for 60 days; 
(4) Voting trusts; and 
(5) Qualified subchapter S trusts under 
Section l36l(d)(QSSTs). 
b. ESOP Exclusion. An ESOP is not an eligible 
shareholder of an S corporation. Section l36l(c) and 
(d) sets forth the rules regarding eligible 
shareholders, and because the ESOP cannot meet these 
definitional rules, its status as an S corporation 
shareholder would terminate the corporation's election. 
c. Grantor and Section 678 Trusts. Section 
l36l(c) (2) (A) provides that a trust all of which is 
owned by an individual grantor or beneficiary under 
Section 671 through 679 may be a shareholder of an S 
corporation. The deemed owner of the trust, and not 
the trust itself, is treated as the S corporation 
shareholder for purposes of the eligible shareholder 
rules. Another type of eligible trust is one in which 
the deemed owner of the grantor or Section 678 trust 
dies. In this situation, the trust is permitted to 
remain as an eligible shareholder for 60 days after the 
deemed owner's death. If the entire corpus of the 
trust is included in the deemed owner's estate, then 
the trust can remain a shareholder for up to two years; 
however, this provision applies only if the trust's 
status as a grantor trust terminates as a result of the 
death of the grantor. It does not apply if such status 
is terminated as a result of the relinquishment by the 
grantor of the powers which caused the trust to be a 
grantor trust. 
(1) The IRS has issued many private letter 
rulings where it approved certain trusts as 
qualifying under Section l36l(c)(2)(A)(i), 
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including: PLR 8613054, in which identical 
irrevocable trusts, all of which allow the 
trustees to accumulate income, and provided the 
beneficiaries with a Crummey withdrawal power, 
qualified as S corporation shareholders: in PLR 
8425067, the IRS ruled that a testamentarf trust 
qualified where the trust's beneficiary -had an 
income interest during life and the power to 
appoint the remainder. 
(2) Under Section l36l(c)(2)(A)(iii) any 
trust may be a shareholder in an S corporation 
where it acquires the stock in the corporation 
pursuant to the terms of a will: however, the 
eligibility of the trust extends for a period of 
only 60 days after the trust acquires the stock. 
Thereafter, the trust becomes an ineligible 
shareholder, and retention of the stock beyond the 
60-day period will cause a termination of S 
corporation status. In Fulk & Needham, Inc. vs. 
U.S. 411 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1969), a corporation 
was found not to qualify for subchapter S status 
because one of its shareholders was a testamentary 
trust, even though the trustees and beneficiaries 
disregarded the existence of the trust. 
d. Voting trusts. A trust created primarily to 
exercise the voting power of stock transferred to it 
may be a shareholder of an S corporation. Section 
l36l(c)(2)(A)«iv). Proposed regulations provide that 
the voting trust must be represented by a written 
agreement which: (i) delegates to one or more trustees 
the right to vote, (ii) requires all distributions with 
respect to the stock of the corporation to be paid to, 
or on behalf of, the beneficial owners of the stock, 
(iii) requires title and possession of the stock to be 
delivered to the beneficial owners upon termination of 
the trust, and (iv) must terminate, under its terms or 
by State law, on or before a specific date or event. 
e. Qualified Subchapter S Trust (QSST). 
(1) Defined. Under Section l36l(d)(3)(A) a 
QSST is a trust that requires: 
(a) There can only be one income 
beneficiary at a time (a spray trust for 
multiple beneficiaries does not qualify): 
(b) Principal distributions during the 
current income beneficiary's life can only be 
made to that beneficiary: 
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(c) The current income beneficiary's 
income interest must terminate on the 
earliest of the beneficiary's death or the 
termination of the trust; 
(d) 
current 
trust's 
current 
If the trust terminates during the 
income beneficiary's life, the 
assets are all distributed to the 
income beneficiary; and 
(e) All of the trust's income must be 
either distributed, or required to be 
distributed, currently to only one individual 
who is a citizen or resident of the United 
States. 
(2) Election. The current income 
beneficiary of a QSST must make a separate 
election for each corporation in which the trust 
owns S corporation stock. The beneficiary of the 
trust will be treated as the deemed owner under 
Section 678(a) of that portion of the trust 
consisting of S corporation stock for which an 
election is made; therefore, the rule implies that 
a QSST can own stock in other corporations (not 
just S corporations) and other property. The 
election may be made up to 2-1/2 months after the 
trust becomes a shareholder or 2-1/2 months after 
the beginning of the first taxable year in which 
the S corporation election is to be effective. 
Problems could arise for an S corporation with a 
QSST because the S corporation election must be 
filed before making the QSST election. If the 
QSST election is made before the S corporation 
election, the S corporation's election would be 
invalid, because the trust would not be qualified. 
If the election is not made within the prescribed 
2-1/2 month period, an extension of time to do so 
cannot be granted by the IRS. 
(a) In PLR 8506029, two beneficiaries 
of QSSTs failed to make the election to treat 
the trusts as QSSTs. The Service ruled that 
the S corporation election was invalid even 
though both beneficiaries had signed the 
corporation's Form 2553 and they had argued 
substantial compliance with the Section 
136l(d)(2) election requirement. 
(b) In PLR 8608006, where QSST 
elections were not filed, the Service ruled, 
under Section 1362(f) that an inadvertent 
termination had occurred and it reinstated S 
corporation status under its waiver 
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authority; however, the problem with this 
ruling is that the S corporation election may 
never have been valid because the "QSSTs" 
were initial shareholders. The effect of 
this ruling is a retroactive validation of an 
ineffective S corporation election. f 
(3) Successive Income Beneficiaries. Successive 
beneficiaries of an QSST are treated as consenting to 
the original trust election; however, a successive 
income beneficiary can affirmatively refuse to consent 
to the election within 60 days of becoming the income 
beneficiary. Under Section 1362(d)(1)(B) shareholders 
holding more than one-half of the shares of stock of an 
S corporation must consent to revocation of the S 
corporation status. Affirmative refusal to consent to 
the election on the part of a new shareholder will not 
terminate the corporation's status. However, a 
successive income beneficiary, whether or not a more 
than 50% shareholder, can effectively terminate the 
corporation's status by affirmatively refusing to 
consent to the QSST's status. 
(4) Revocation. A QSST election is irrevocable 
unless the revocation of the trust's status is made 
with IRS consent. 
(5) Planning; QSSTs can be used to shift income 
in the appreciating value in an S corporation without 
vesting control in junior shareholders. The IRS has 
issued a number of QSST private letter rulings. Some 
of the more interesting are summarized below: 
(a) PLR 8613054 - trusts with Crummey powers 
qualified as QSSTs. 
(b) PLR 8529060 - a marital deduction trust 
and a residual trust created under a will 
qualified as QSSTs. 
(c) PLR 8527081 - the IRS ruled that each 
separate share of a trust qualified as a QSST. 
(d) PLR 8435153 - the IRS ruled that the 
provision to pay income and principal to the 
current beneficiary's court-appointed guardian, 
for the use and benefit of the beneficiary if the 
beneficiary was disabled, did not disqualify the 
trust as a QSST. 
(e) PLR 8336018 - the IRS ruled that a trust 
did not qualify as a QSST because the income 
beneficiary with a Crummey power was treated as 
owning a portion of, and not the entire, 
principal. 
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f. Estates. An "estate" is an eligible 
shareholder of an S corporation. Section 1361 (b) (2) • 
An estate can make an initial S corporation election. 
In PLR 7951131, the IRS ruled that an estate, which 
owned two apartment complexes, could form a separate 
corporation for each complex, and then have the 
corporations elect subchapter S status with the consent 
of the estate as the sole shareholder. An S 
corporation election could provide a means of getting 
cash out of a corporation without double taxation; 
also, if the estate has income from other sources, an S 
corporation election for its closely held corporation 
will allow any net operating losses to offset other 
income. 
5. Single Class of Stock. 
a. General. A corporation having more than one 
class of stock does not qualify as an S corporation. 
Section 1361 (b) (1) (D) . In determining whether a 
corporation has more than one class of stock, only 
stock which is issued and outstanding is considered; 
therefore, treasury stock and unissued stock of a 
different class will not disqualify a corporation. A 
corporation will be considered to have more than one 
class of stock if the outstanding shares of stock of 
the corporation are not identical with respect to the 
rights and interest which they convey in the control, 
profits, and assets of the corporation. Thus, a 
difference as to dividend rights or liquidation 
preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a 
corporation. 
b. Stock Purchase Agreements. The Service has 
ruled that a stock purchase agreement between an S 
corporation and one of its shareholders does not create 
a second class of stock where the agreement does not 
affect the shareholder's rights to the corporation's 
profi ts and assets. In the ruling, an S corporation 
had two classes of common stock which were identical in 
all respects except for voting rights and a restriction 
on the non-voting shareholder's right to dispose of the 
stock. The shareholder was allowed to transfer his 
stock only with the consent of the owners of the voting 
shares; without this consent, he could only sell the 
stock to the corporation or to the other shareholders 
at book value. Upon the non-voting shareholder's 
death, disability, or termination of employment, the 
corporation or the other shareholders had the right to 
purchase his stock. The Service explained that since 
the agreement restricting the transfer of the stock 
does not affect the shareholder's interest in corporate 
profits or assets while he is a shareholder, the 
corporation did not have more than one class of stock. 
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Rev. Rul 85-161, 1985-41 IRB 22. Buy-sell agreements 
that impose restrictions on stock generally do not 
create a second class of stock. See PLR 8506114 and 
8528049. 
c. Voting Rights. An S corporation may h~ve only 
one class of stock; however, Section l36'l (c)( 4) 
specifically provides that an S corporation will not be 
treated as having more than one class of stock solely 
because there are differences in voting rights between 
shares of common stock. With differences in voting 
rights now permitted, a senior generation can retain 
control of an S corporation while shifting appreciation 
in non-voting stock to a junior generation. Further, 
some shares may be eligible to vote only for Class A 
directors, while all other shares are entitled to vote 
for Class B directors, or some shares might have two 
votes while others have only one. 
d. Disproportionate Distributions. S corporation 
income and loss items must be allocated on a pro rata 
basis to shareholders as required by Section l377(a). 
However, there is nothing in the statute that literally 
requires distributions to be made on a proportionate 
basis to shareholders. Reg. Section 1.137l-l(g) 
requires that disproportionate distributions not be 
made. 
e. Debt as a Second Class of Stock. If debt can 
be reclassified ·as a second class of stock, S 
corporation status terminates. 
(1) Straight-Debt Safe Harbor. Under the 
safe harbor rule of Section l36l(c)(5) a debt 
instrument without equity characteristics will not 
be treated as a second class of stock. To qualify 
as straight debt, the following requirements must 
be met: 
(a) A written unconditional promise to 
pay on demand, or on a specified date, a sum 
certain in money; 
(b) An interest rate and interest 
payment dates not contingent on profits, the 
borrower's discretion, or similar factors; 
(c) The debt instrument cannot be 
convertible, directly or indirectly, into 
stock; and 
(d) The creditor must be an individual, 
estate, or trust which would be eligible to 
hold stock in an S corporation. 
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(2) General Debt vs. Equity Rule. In a 
subchapter S case, the Tax Court held that where 
the debt obligations were in the same proportion 
as the stock as to face amount and ownership, such 
obligations constituted stock, but not a second 
class of stock. See Gamman vs. Comr., T.C. Memo 
1966-159, 25 T.C.M. 844. 
C. Electing S Corporation Status. 
1. Corporate and Shareholder Action. The corporation 
must timely file a proper election form and all the 
shareholders must consent in writing to such election. 
These consents must be filed with the IRS. Consents are 
required by beneficial owners of an S corporation, as well 
as any person treated as a shareholder by virtue of the 
shareholder trust rules. The Code and Regulations are 
silent as to whether a consent form signed by a designated 
representative under a power of attorney is valid. The S 
corporation election must be filed on a timely basis, no 
later than during the first two months and 15 days of the 
election year. An extension of time for filing cannot be 
obtained. Rev. Rul. 60-183, 1960-1 CB 625. 
2. New Election After Termination. I f an S 
corporation's status is terminated, the corporation, or any 
successor corporation, cannot reelect S corporation status 
until completion of four taxable years after the taxable 
year of termination, unless the IRS grants permission to do 
so under Section l362(g). 
3. Loss of The S Election. Under prior law a new 
shareholder could affirmatively refuse to consent to the 
election and cause the loss of the S election. The new law 
revises the election process to require that all 
shareholders consent to the initial election; thereafter, 
the holders of more than 50% of the stock must consent to a 
revocation of the election. The revocation of the election 
must be distinguished, however, from a termination of the 
election which occurs whenever the conditions for 
qualification are no longer met. 
a. Example: If a one-percent shareholder in an S 
corporation which has 34 shareholders transfers his 
stock to his two children, with the result that the 
corporation then has 36 shareholders, the election is 
terminated automatically. 
b. To protect shareholders from an inadvertent or 
unwanted loss of the S election, it may be desirable to 
require the shareholders to enter into a contract among 
themselves and with the corporation. See Article VI of 
this outline. 
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III. TAXATION OF THE S CORPORATION. 
A. General. The S corporation is treated as a pass-through 
entity similar to the partnership. The corporation is not 
subject. to any taxes; however, the S corporation may pay special 
taxes on its income in four situations; (1) if the cor~oration 
has .ubchapter C earnings and profits, and 25 percent .of its 
grosse receipts consti tute passive investment income; (2) to the 
extent net capital gain of the corporation exceeds $25,000; (3) 
if the S corporation is subject to the capital gains tax, it may 
also be subject to the add-on tax for preference income; and (4) 
if investment credit property is disposed of prematurely and 
credit was allowed prior to the S corporation's election, 
investment tax credit recapture may apply. 
1. Passive Income Problems. S corporations that do 
not have any accumulative earnings and profits from prior C 
corporation existence are not subject to any passive income 
1imi tations; therefore, these corporations do not need to 
monitor their receipt of passive income to retain S 
corporation status. Under former Section 1372(e)(5), a 
subchapter S corporation could not receive more than 20% of 
its gross receipts from passive income without terminating 
its subchapter S status. Although the passive income test 
has been eliminated for most S corporations, existing 
corporations with subchapter C earnings and profits that 
elect S corporation status are subject to different passive 
income rules, unless they are able to strip out their 
subchapter C earnings and profits. These S corporations 
need to monitor their passive income because: (1) if 
passive income for a taxable year exceeds 25 percent of 
gross receipts for the year, a tax on "excess net passive 
income" will be imposed; and (2) if the 25 percent limit is 
exceeded for three consecutive years, the S corporation's 
status will be terminated with the beginning of the next tax 
year. The passive income tax is at the highest corporate 
rate. 
2. Capital Gains. In limited situations capital gains 
are taxed at the corporate level. Section 1374(a) imposes 
on an S corporation a tax at the corporate level if in any 
taxable year (1) its "net capital gain" exceeds $25,000 and 
also exceeds 50 percent of its taxable income for such year, 
and (2) if the taxable income of such corporation for such 
year exceeds $25,000. The sale of corporate assets could be 
structured as installment sales to help avoid the net 
capital gains tax. By limiting reportable net capital gain 
to $25,000, or to less than 50 percent of taxable income 
during the three-year exception period for existing S 
corporations the capital gains tax could be avoided. 
B. Allocation of Income and Losses to Shareholders. 
corporation income, deduction, loss and credit items, 
separate treatment of which could affect a shareholder's 
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S 
the 
tax 
liability, pass through separately to shareholders on a pro rata 
basis and they retain their character. Because the S corporation 
rules allocate income and loss items on a pro rata basis to all 
shareholders who held stock during the corporation's taxable 
year, no matter if they actually hold stock on the last day of 
the corporation's taxable year, the transfer of stock between 
family members will not need to be as closely scrutinized as 
under the former subchapter S rules. 
1. Prior Law. Losses were passed through to the 
shareholders on a per share, per day basis, while the 
corporation's income was passed through on a per share basis 
to those persons who owned the shares on the last day of the 
corporation's fiscal year. 
2. New Law. Income and losses are passed through to 
shareholders on a per share, per day basis, sometimes 
referred to as the "full year's allocation n method. Under 
Section l377(a), in the case of a shareholder who terminates 
his interest by sale, exchange, gift or death and all 
persons who are shareholders during the taxable year agree, 
the corporation's items may be allocated among the 
shareholders as if the corporation closed its books at the 
time of termination (the "interim closing of the books" 
method) . This election applies to an allocation only n as 
if" the taxable year consisted of two taxable years, the 
first of which ends on the date the interest is terminated. 
This election does not require two corporate returns for the 
normal tax year, nor does it accelerate the time for filing 
a corporate or individual return. 
c. Shareholder Basis in Stock. The initial basis of an S 
corporation shareholder in his stock is determined in the same 
manner as the basis of stock in a subchapter C corporation. The 
stock basis of each shareholder is increased by his pro rata 
share of each item of separately stated income. It does not make 
a difference whether the particular item is an item of ordinary 
income or of capital gain. The shareholder's basis is reduced by 
distributions by the corporation which are not includible in 
income; separately stated loss and deduction items, nonseparately 
computed loss; any expense of the corporation which is not 
deductible in computing taxable income and not proper ly 
chargeable to capital account. In any event, stock basis cannot 
be reduced below zero. 
1. Basis and Indebtedness. The basis of a 
shareholder's loan to an S corporation will be the face 
amount of the loan; as principal payments are made on the 
loan the basis of the indebtedness will be decreased. After 
stock basis has been decreased to zero, the basis in loans 
can be reduced by loss and deduction items flowed through to 
shareholders. If there are subsequent increases in earnings 
after the basis and indebtedness has been reduced to zero, 
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these increases will first restore basis in the loans before 
basis in stock. See Section l367(b)(2). 
2. Basis Limitation and Carryover Period. The 
deductibili ty of excess loss and deduction items at the 
. shareholder level is limited to the shareholder's ~justed 
basis in stock plus any adjusted basis in any corporation 
indebtedness to the shareholder. The S corporation rules, 
in comparison to the former subs chapter S rules, change the 
basis limitation rule as it applies to the deductibility of 
net operating losses at the shareholder level. Unlike the 
former rules, losses that are not useable in the current 
year can be carried forward indefinitely and are allowed in 
any subsequent year in which the shareholder has adequate 
basis in stock or debt. Basis in stock or in indebtedness 
can be intentionally reduced to suspend losses indefinitely 
to years where there is sufficient other income to utilize 
the losses. 
EXAMPLE (1) The sole shareholder of an S corporation 
owns stock at the beginning of the taxable year which 
has a basis of zero. At the end of the year 
non-separately stated items yield net income of 
$50,000. There were long-term capital gains of $20,000 
and a section 1231 loss of $75,000 as separately stated 
items. The basis of this stock is first adjusted 
upward to $70,000; then the $75,00 item is applied. 
Only $70,000 of the loss item is allowable. The 
remaining $5,000 would be carried over by the 
shareholder. 
(2) If the corporation distributed $10,000 to 
its sole shareholder, the extent to which such 
distribution is includible in income under Section 1368 
depends on the shareholder's adjusted basis in his 
stock. After applying the $75,000 loss item, the 
shareholder's adjusted basis is reduced to zero. Thus, 
all of the $10,000 distribution is includible in in 
income as gain from the sale or exchange of a capital 
asset (assuming no accumulated earnings in profits). 
(3) If, in addi tion to his stock, the 
shareholder held corporate debt having a basis of 
$20,000, the $5000 which could not be absorbed by stock 
basis would have been allowed to this indebtedness. 
Thus, the $5000 loss is fully allowed, reducing the 
basis of the indebtedness to $15,000. This ,:::has no 
effect on the inc1udibility of the $10,000 distribution 
in the shareholder's income. 
3. Restoration of Basis in Indebtedness. Under the 
former subchapter S rules, if net operating losses reduced a 
shareholder's basis of a corporation's indebtedness to the 
shareholder, any repayments of the debt by the corporation 
automatically resulted in taxable gain to the shareholder. 
The S corporation rules partially alleviate this problem by 
restoring basis in indebtedness with subsequent S 
corporation earnings. Where the shareholder's basis in 
indebtedness has been reduced, any of the items requiring an 
increase in the basis of stock that are passed through in a 
subsequent year will be applied first to restore basis in 
indebtedness. Only when the basis in indebtedness has been 
restored are items applied to increase basis in stock. 
a. Gain Recognized On Repayment. When an S 
corporation repays its indebtedness to shareholders, 
generally it will not recognize any gain if the 
repayment is in cash. Repayments with appreciated 
property could, however, result in gain or loss at the 
'corporate level. However, if the corporation repays 
low-basis indebtedness, the shareholders can recognize 
income; each loan payment is allocated partly to return 
of basis and partly to income when the basis of the 
note has not been reduced to zero. The character of 
the income recognized on a low-basis loan's repayment 
depends on the nature of the loan asset in the hands of 
the shareholders. Generally, only the "sale or 
exchange" of a capital asset results in capital gain. 
b. New Shareholder Loans. New loans by 
shareholders to the corporation in the same year that 
earlier loans are repaid cannot be taken into account 
in determining basis on the repayment of earlier loans 
as long as there are separately identifiable notes. 
4. Creating Basis. There are a number of ways to 
create basis in an S corporation to assure that shareholders 
have adequate basis to utilize losses flowed through to 
them. For example, the shareholder could (1) contribute 
cash or property to the corporation: (2) loan additional 
cash; (3) make a payment on the corporation's debt which was 
guaranteed by the shareholder: (4) substitute his note for 
guaranteed corporate debt: (5) borrow from lenders and 
relend the proceeds to the corporation, i.e., back-to-back 
loans; (6) acquire property which is totally mortgaged and 
then sell the property to the corporation under a 
wrap-around mortgage transaction; or (7) accelerate 
corporate income or defer corporate deductions. 
a. Shareholder Guarantees. Under the former 
subchaper S rules, a shareholder could not guarantee 
corporate level debt and obtain an increase in the 
adjusted basis of corporate indebtedness owned to the 
shareholder; a mere guarantee is not considered to 
create indebtedness between the shareholder and the 
corporation. However, if the shareholder makes payment 
on indebtedness in satisfaction of the guarantee, then 
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the shareholder is subrogated for the third party 
creditor and direct indebtedness is created between the 
shareholder and the corporation. See Rev. Rul. 70-50 
1970-1 CB 178. 
b. Lack of Investment. No basis is acquired in 
t an S corporation where there is no actual contribution 
of capital in the form of cash or property. 
IV. TREATMENT OF S CORPORATION DISTRIBUTIONS. 
A. Corporations With No Earnings and Profits. When an S 
corporation has no accumulated earnings and profits, its 
distributions to shareholders are nontaxable to the shareholders, 
but require downward adjustments in stock basis (and not 
corporate indebtedness) in the amount of the distributions. 
Distributions received after stock basis has been reduced to zero 
are treated as capital gain. Downward adjustments in stock basis 
for distributions will serve to neutralize upward adjustments 
made when the shareholders include S corporation income on their 
individual returns. S corporations having no accumulated 
earnings and profits are not required to maintain an accumulated 
adjustments (AA) account. 
B. Corporations With Earnings and Profits. Distribution 
rules are considerably more complicated if the S corporation has 
accumulated earnings and profits. The rules ensure that 
distributions of accumulated earnings and profits will be taxed 
as dividends, but that distributions of income already taxed to 
shareholders either under the new S corporation rules or the 
former subchapter S corporation provisions will be recovered 
tax-free. Accumulated earnings and profits can be decreased for: 
(1) distributions to the extent made out of accumulated earnings 
and profits; (2) distributions resulting from redemptions, 
liquidations, and reorganizations; and (3) any investment credit 
recapture tax paid by the S corporation. 
1. Accumulated Adjustments Account. For S 
corporations with accumulated earnings and profits, the 
accumulated adjustment (AA) account is key to making 
tax-free distributions to shareholders. The AA account 
represents all the earnings of the corporation for S 
corporation years which have been previously taxed to 
shareholders, less any amounts already distributed, i. e. , 
the AA account is the accumulation of previously taxed, but 
undistributed, earnings of the S corporation. Accordingly, 
to the extent the corporation has a positive balance in the 
AA account, tax-free distributions can be made to 
shareholders. 
a. Tax-exempt income, and deductions related 
thereto do not increase, or decrease the AA accounts; 
therefore, if the S corporation distributes all of its 
earnings, the shareholders will receive a dividend out 
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of any accumulated earnings and profits to the extent 
of the tax-exempt income. This rule assures that 
subchapter C corporations electing S corporation status 
will not be able to use their tax-exempt investments to 
bailout accumulated earnings and profits. 
Accordingly, S corporations with accumulated earnings 
and profits should avoid owning tax-exempt obligations. 
b. Nondeductible items reduce the AA account. 
This results in more distributions being taxable as 
dividends to shareholders if the S corporation has 
accumulated earnings and profits because the AA account 
will reflect lower balances. 
c. The AA account is an S corporation concept 
similar to earnings and profits of a regular 
corporation; therefore, it cannot be directly 
transferred to a new shareholder. However, unlike PTI 
of a former subchapter S corporation, it is not lost 
when a shareholder transfers his shares in an S 
corporation. In effect, the tax-free benefits of the 
AA account can be inherited by the new shareholders. 
2. Dividends, Return of Capital, Capital Gain. Any 
amounts distributed in excess of the AA account will be 
treated as a dividend to the extent it does not exceed the 
corporation's accumulated earnings and profits, unless the 
corporation was a subchapter S corporation for its 1982 tax 
year, and has previously taxed income (PTI ) • After all 
accumulated earnings and profits have been distributed, any 
excess distributions are treated as a return of capital 
reducing stock basis, and if any excess, taxed as capital 
gain. 
3. Distributions of Previously Taxed Income (PTI). If 
the corporation has previously undistributed taxable income 
(PTI) and distributions are made in cash, the amounts 
distributed in excess of the AA account will be treated as 
first coming out of PTI and then any excess distributions 
will be treated as coming out of accumulated earnings and 
profits. PTI can be distributed out only if the corporation 
was a subchapter S corporation for its last taxable year 
beginning before 1983, i.e., the year before the effective 
date of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982. Any problems 
with distributing out PTI from former subchapter S years on 
a tax-free basis have been minimized under the S corporation 
rules. A "locked in" problem exists, however, to the extent 
the corporation cannot make cash distributions to carry out 
the PTI. If the corporation is limited to property 
distributions, then PTI must remain in the corporation until 
cash can be distributed. 
4. Election to Distribute Accumulated Earnings and 
Profits Before AA Account. An S corporation can elect, with 
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the consent of all its "affected" shareholders, not to make 
distributions out of its AA account. Paying out accumulated 
earnings and profits can help a corporation avoid the 
passive income tax or the passive income termination rule. 
Also, where the S corporation was a regular corporation 
. during the immediately preceding year, and has enco~ntered 
pn accumulated earnings tax or a personal holding ~company 
problem, the election may facilitate a post-C corporation 
year distribution under Section 563 and serve to eliminate 
these problems. The election may not be necessary, however, 
if the corporation can qualify for the consent dividends 
procedure under Section 565. 
5. Summary of Distribution Rules. 
corporation with accumulated earnings 
ordering and treatment of distributions 
as follows. 
In the case of an S 
and profits, the 
to shareholders is 
a. A tax-free distribution to the extent of any 
undistributed taxable income earned in an immediately 
preceding former subchapter S year, but only if made in 
cash within 2-1/2 months after the close of that year. 
b. A tax-free distribution to the extent of 
the S corporation's AA account determined under Section 
l368(e). If the distribution exceeds stock basis, but 
not the AA account, capital gain will generally result. 
c. A tax-free distribution to the extent of any 
previously taxed income earned in former subchapter S 
years, but only if made in cash. 
d. A dividend to the extent of the corporation's 
accumulated earnings and profits. 
e. A reduction in stock basis. 
f. After stock basis is exhausted, taxation is 
capital gain. 
C. Property Distributions. 
1. Comparison of Prior Law and New Law. Under prior 
law, only cash distributions were considered to carry out 
PTI to the shareholders ~ distributions in kind did not do 
so. The new law permits PTI to be passed to shareholders by 
a distribution of corporate property in kind. 
2. Effect on Corporation. Distributions of 
appreciated property by an S corporation result in gain 
recognized by the corporation in the same manner as if the 
property had been sold to the shareholders at its fair 
market value, and the gain recognized flows through to 
shareholders like other S corporation gain. The gain 
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recognized by the corporation will reflect the property's 
character in the hands of the corporation. S corporations 
do not recognize gain for distributions of property in 
complete liquidation or in reorganizations where the receipt 
of. corporate stock is tax-free to shareholders. 
v. DISPOSITION OF S CORPORATION STOCK. 
A. General. The proper disposition of S corporation stock 
is essential to avoid inadvertent termination of the election. 
In addition, consideration should be given to the income tax 
consequences to the beneficiaries of the S corporation stock, as 
well as to the postmortem control and management of an S 
corporation. 
B. Transfers During Life. Lifetime gifts of S corporation 
stock can be effective in shifting income among family members 
because the S corporation's net income is taxed to the 
shareholders on a pro rata basis. The gift of S corporation 
stock must be a bona fide transaction, and the donee must be the 
real owner of the stock after the gift; otherwise, the IRS may 
reallocate the corporation's income back to the donor. In 
addition, the new law added Section 1366(e) which allows the IRS 
to adjust items of income, deduction, loss or credit among family 
members who are S corporation shareholders if a family· member 
renders services for or furnishes capital to the corporation 
without receiving reasonable compensation. 
1. A110catipn of Income. As the corporation's items 
of income, loss, deduction and credit are allocated on a per 
share, per day basis, the donor of S corporation stock is 
taxed on his pro rata share of the corporation's income 
before the gift, with the donee being taxed on his pro rata 
share of the income after the gift. Accordingly, a 
shareho1er can no longer shift undistributed taxable income 
to lower bracket taxpayers by making gifts immediately prior 
to the end of the S corporation's taxable year. 
2. Transfer of Shareholder's Basis. A shareholder's 
basis should be considered in making gifts of S corporation 
stock, because a shareholder cannot deduct his pro rata 
share of the corporation's losses and deductions in excess 
of the total of his adjusted basis in the S corporation 
stock plus any indebtedness of the corporation to him, 
although the losses and deductions may be carried forward. 
While a donee will acquire the donor's adjusted basis in the 
stock as of the date of the gift, the donee will not 
normally receive the donor's interest in the corporation's 
indebtedness to the donor shareholder. Accordingly, if the 
donor has a low basis in the shares and losses are 
anticipated, lifetime gifts of the stock may not be 
desirable. The donor should consider holding on to the 
stock until death, and then transferring it because the low 
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basis stock will receive a step-up to its fair market value 
for Federal estate tax purposes. 
c. Outright Bequest of Stock. An outright bequest of S 
corporation stock should not jeopardize the election as long as 
the'~Umber of shareholders after the gift does not exceed f3S. 
D. Bequest To Marital Trust. A bequest of S corporation 
stock-to a trust will terminate the election unless the the trust 
is an eligible shareholder. A qualified subchapter S trust 
(QSST) and a Section 678 trust may hold S corporation stock for 
an indef ini te period of time, and either of these types of S 
corporation trusts can also qualify as a marital deduction trust 
under Section 20S6. 
1. QTIP Trust as a QSST. A QTIP trust requires that 
the surviving spouse be entitled to receive all the income 
from the property, payable annually or more frequently. 
This meets the QSST requirement that only one income 
beneficiary exist at any time and that all the income be 
distributed to that beneficiary. The QTIP trust requires 
that no person have a power of appointment over any part of 
the property other than the surviving spouse. The QSST 
trust provides that principal may be distributed only to the 
then current income beneficiary. 
2. Elections for QTIP and QSST. If a trust qualifies 
both as a QTIP trust and a QSST trust,' two separate 
elections must be made in connection with the trust. The 
executor must make the election under Section 20S6(b)(7) to 
have the property treated as QTIP property. That election 
must be made on the estate tax return, and once made, it is 
irrevocable. In addition, the trust's income beneficiary 
must make the election under Section 1361(d)(2) to have the 
trust treated as a QSST. Once made, that election is 
revocable only with IRS consent. 
3. Power of Appointment Trust. A power of 
appointment marital trust which meets the requirements of 
Section 20S6(b)(S) can also qualify as a Section 678 trust 
eligible to hold S corporation stock. The surviving spouse 
must be given an inter vivos general power of appointment or 
right of withdrawal or other power which would cause the 
spouse to be treated as the deemed owner of the trust under 
Section 678. Such a power must be exercisable solely by the 
spouse to vest the principal and income in the spouse. 
4. Marital Deduction Estate Trust. The estatejnarita1 
deduction trust would not qualify either as a QSST or as a 
Section 678 trust eligible to hold S corporation stock 
because the estate trust is not required to make current 
distributions of income to the trust's beneficiary. 
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5. Income Requirement of Marital Trust. A qualifying 
marital deduction trust must have assets that are either 
income producing or give the surviving spouse the power to 
make the assets income producing. In the typical S 
corporation, dividends might not be paid on a regular basis, 
an'd the surviving spouse's right that the stock be made 
income producing may not be feasible. 
E. Suggested Administrative Provisions. A will or trust 
which disposes of S corporation stock should contain certain 
administrati ve provisions to facilitate the executor's exercise 
of authority in discretion in dealing with the stock. The rights 
of the beneficiaries of such stock should be clearly set forth in 
the dispositive instrument. 
1. Non-Pro Rata Distributions. The executor should be 
given the authorit;y to make non-pro rata distributions in 
kind to avoid the possibility that the executor must 
distribute S corporation stock pro rata to all 
beneficiaries, with the result that the S corporation's 
eligibility might be jeopardized. While non-pro rata 
distributions could be made with the consent of all 
benef iciaries, the distribution may be deemed a taxable 
exchange among all of the beneficiaries. See Rev. Rul. 
69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159. 
2. Disposition of Stock. The executor should be given 
specific authority to allocate S corporation stock away from 
a disqualifying trust, and make the distribution to a 
qualified trust or to an individual beneficiary outright. 
Because a disqualified testamentary trust can hold S 
corporation stock for up to 60 days, the power should 
include the authority to divest a funded trust. If a 
beneficiary of a trust holding S corporation stock is given 
a power of appointment, that power should be limited so that 
the beneficiary cannot unilaterlly terminate the 
corporation's S election by exercising the power of 
appointment in such a manner so as to exceed the 35 
shareholder limit. If stock is to be distributed to a QSST, 
consideration should be given to putting language in the 
-document directing the income beneficiary to make the QSST 
election. However, if the QSST is also intended to qualify 
as a marital deduction trust, the direction to the spouse to 
make the QSST election must be precatory and not a condition 
to the spouse's interest in the trust. Otherwise, the 
interest may not qualify for the marital deduction. 
3. Income and Principal Distributions. If the S 
corporation stock is to be held by the estate for an 
extended period of time, or if the stock is to be 
distributed to a trust, consideration should be given to 
def ining accounting "income" and "principal" to eliminate 
potential conflicts among beneficiaries and inadvertent 
termination of the election. For example, distributions 
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~ A. General. When designing a Buy and Sell Agree¥nt for 
sharqholders of an S corporation, there are numerous points that 
should be considered by the shareholders. The Agreement should 
include the following: 
(l) A prohibition against the sale or transfer of 
shares which would increase the number of shareholders 
to more than 35; 
(2) A prohibition against the sale or transfer of 
shares to a nonresident alien, corporation, partnership 
or any other person or entity disqualified as an S 
corporation shareholder; and 
(3) The imposition of an affirmative duty upon the 
personal representatives of deceased shareholders to 
take no action to terminate the election without the 
unanimous consent of all of the shareholders. 
B. Preserving The Election. The Agreement should require 
that the person contemplating a transfer to an ineligible 
shareholder (or other person) notify the corporation and the 
other shareholders, who then have the right of first refusal to 
purchase these shares. In lieu of first refusal, a mandatory 
buy-sell requirement upon the death of a shareholder can prevent 
a transfer to an ineligible shareholder. Further, the agreement 
could provide that any transfer to an ineligible shareholder is 
ineffective, and that title to the shares will automatically vest 
in the corporation upon the attempted transfer. When stock is 
owned by a QSST, the agreement should provide that if the 
beneficiary does not properly make the appropriate election 
within a stated time period, then either the other shareholders, 
or the corporation, should have the right to acquire the shares. 
c. Action To Protect Shareholders. 
1. Enforcement of SElection. Protection for the 
remaining shareholders from a violation of the prohibition 
mentioned above should include the right to specific 
enforcement. This would probably be better then a 
liquidated damages provision, which could invite termination 
of the S election, if the price was right. Accordingly, the 
a~reement should address the precise reasons for making the 
S election, such as to pass through anticipated operating 
losses to the shareholders, avoid double taxation on 
su stantial shareholder distributions, etc. 
2. Required Distributions. 
pr vented from terminating the 
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If shareholders are to be 
Selection, the agreement 
should provide for adequate distributions to assist the 
shareholders in meeting tax liabilities on the net earnings 
passed through to them. Otherwise, the S election could be 
used by controlling shareholders to force other shareholders 
to. sell their shares. Such a provision is useful on the 
death of a shareholder, when survivors might be cut off from 
the usual earnings of a shareholder. The required 
distributions formula should take into consideration federal 
and state income tax rates. The agreement should provide 
that distributions in respect of the S year be made no later 
than a date early in the calendar year following the close 
of the S year. 
D. Cross Purchase vs. Stock Redemption. In a cross 
purchase, the consideration paid for the selling shareholder's 
shares will establish a new basis for the acquired shares. The 
benefit of basis increase is not available to the continuing 
shareholders in a redemption buy-out. However, to compare fairly 
the cross purchase and the redemption, it must be assumed that 
the shareholders' funds for a cross purchase came from the 
corporation. Because these funds are distributed to the 
continuing shareholders as a reduction in stock basis or as 
income to them, the basis of the purchased shares would not be 
acquired without economic consideration. 
1. Affects of Life Insurance. If life insurance is 
used to fund a redemption agreement, the premiums paid for 
the insurance by the corporation would not be deductible 
and, because the premiums would not be an expense "properly 
chargeable to capital account" in whole or in part, their 
payment or accrual would decrease shareholder basis under 
Section l367(a)(2)(D). Upon the death of the insured 
shareholder the life insurance proceeds would be received 
tax free, and would result in a pro rata increase in each 
shareholder's stock basis. An allocation of part of the 
basis increase would also be made to the shares owned by the 
estate of the deceased shareholder, if the estate owns an 
interest in the shares in the year in which the insurance 
proceeds are received (full year's allocation method) or 
part of such year (interim closing of books method). This 
basis increase to the estate will largely be wasted, in part 
because the step-up basis rules would have given a 
comparable increase. Therefore, when the redemption 
approach is used, the shares should be purchased in a year 
prior to the receipt of the insurance proceeds (if the full 
year's allocation method is used) or in that part of the 
year prior to such receipt (if the interim closing of books 
method is used), and the premium and proceeds should be 
accounted for under the cash method as permitted by Section 
1377 (a) (2) • A comparable problem of wasted basis is not 
presented under the cross purchase method when life 
insurance proceeds are received by the continuing 
shareholders and used to purchase the stock. 
B-24 
-
i 
.J 
J 
j 
I ~' 
-
, 
J 
J 
1i 
-
.J 
, 
J 
I 
-
J 
i 
..... 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
·r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
t 
2. Affects on AA Account and Earnings and Profits. 
a. Redemption. A redemption requires a downward 
adjustment of the accumulated adjustments account. In 
the case of S corporations with accumulated earnings 
and profits this reduction in the AA acco~t will 
accelerate the time when later distributions-to the 
continuing shareholders will be deemed out of 
accumulated earnings and profits and, therefore, be 
treated as a dividend. However, part of the 
accumulated earnings and profits is also decreased by 
an exchange redemption. Thus, an exchange redemption 
may be useful in reducing accumulated earnings and 
profits and its potential for dividend treatment to the 
continuing shareholders from future distributions. 
Such a redemption may be useful in accelerating the 
time when, being without accumulated earnings and 
profits, the S corporation will be free of any 
restraints regarding passive investment income. In a 
redemption on the death of a shareholder, a step-up in 
basis under Section 1014 may relieve the deceased 
shareholder's estate from an offsetting income tax 
impact of the redemption. 
b. Cross Purchase. A cross purchase arrangement 
will not affect the AA account or accumulated earnings 
and profits. 
E. Special Valuation Factors. The method of establishing a 
price for the stock, such as an earnings multiple or book value 
approach will depend upon shareholder preference. If the value 
is to be determined by a multiple of earnings, then those 
earnings should be reduced by estimated corporate income taxes 
which would have been paid by a C corporation, and increased by 
the S corporation's taxes on capital gain and on excessive 
passive income. If book value is used, no such adjustments are 
justified. 
1. Distributions. If the corporation at the time of 
the distribution has a positive AA account, reduction of the 
sales price by the amount of any distributions after the 
determination of the formula valuation, and prior to 
closing, will normally make the seller's gain the same as if 
no distribution had been made, because the distribution will 
have decreased the shareholder's basis of his stock to him. 
These alternatives will not give the same tax result if the 
distribution is covered by a Section l368(e)(3) election to 
bypass the AA account. If the AA account bypass election is 
made, then it might be appropriate to compensate the selling 
shareholder for being taxed on accumulated earnings and 
profits which otherwise would be left behind. 
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2. Accumulated Adjustments Account. In a cross 
purchase arrangement, the corporation level AA account is 
not reduced, as it is in an exchange redemption. Therefore, 
in such transactions the selling shareholder's undivided 
"s.hare" of AA account may be a benefit to the continuing 
shareholders if there are subsequent distributions. Should 
the seller be entitled to be paid extra for any "share" of 
the AA account that he left behind? Probably not. The AA 
account left behind by a seller will not benefit the 
continuing shareholders if it must be distributed to the 
buyers in order for them to pay for the stock. 
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r R~PRESENTING THE AGED AND lNCAPACITATED CLIENT 
r 
r Introduction: The purpose o~ this paper is to discuSS a ~.w 
p~ \he common problems encountered by the planner pr r draftsman in oonnection with the estates of persons who are, 
r or may be claimed to be, mentally impaired, as well as to 
discuSS what teohniques may be employed to meet their special 
r needs. All powers diScussed in thiS paper are Hseneral H in 
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nature, as opposed to Hspeoial H powers, whioh are sometimes 
aranted for limited, speoifio purposes, and not as an aspect 
of estate planning. 
I. The-Durable Power o~ Attorney· 
A. The power of attorney is a device which has eXisted at 
common law for hundreds of years. Actually, it is but a 
more ~ormalized version of a prinoipal-agent 
relationship. The baSiC elements of the relationship 
may be summarized as follows: 
c- 1 
1. A voluntary delegation to the agent (frequently 
referred to as the attorneY-in-fact) of certain 
rights, powers and/or duties held by the principal. 
2. The creation of fiduciary duties including th~se of 
loyalty, accounting, segregation of assets and the 
utmost good faith, allowed by the agent to the 
principal. 
3. The right in the principal to control and direct tAe 
agent's oonduct of hiS activities in the scope of the 
agency. 
4. The power in the agent to affect the principal's 
legal rights and duties vis-a-vis third parties. 
B. Since one. of the elements of the relationship at 
common law waS the absolute right of the principal 
to control the agent's activities, it was the univers~l 
rule that the principal's death or mental incapacity 
terminated the agent's authority, even if he had no 
actual notice of the matter. Thus the traditional form 
of the power attorney had the distinct disadvantage of 
becoming ineffectual just when it waS most sorely 
needed, i.e., when the principal became unable to act 
for himself. Furthermore, in caSes of severe phySical 
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c. 
disability, suoh as stroke, where one'S ability to 
speak or write may be limited or even lost alto.ether, 
questions may arise as to mental oapaoity which, even 
if not in fact involved, accordingly cast doubt upon 
the oontinued viability of the power, of attorney. 
Largely in response to these sorts of problema, a 
power of attorney whioh would remain in effeot 
regardless of the mental disability of the prinoipal. 
Hence, the word, -durable- beoame attaohed to the 
nomenclature. Kentucky adopted a statute providing for 
the durable power of attorney in 1972, namely 
KRS 386.083, a oopy of whioh is prOVided in the 
appendiX. 
D. Among the salient featureS of the Kentuoky version 
are the follOWing: 
1. It provides not Just the ability to oreate a 
-durable- power, but a ·stand-by· one as well. 
That is, a prinoipal may oreate a power whioh 
first beoomes effeotive in the event of disability 
as well as one whioh is effective at onoe and 
oontinues to be so if di~ability ensues. 
C~ 
J 
2. All acts performed by the agent during a period J 
of disability ~ well ~ ~ period ~ uncertainty J 
~ ~ the principal's death are binding. Thus not 
only is the common law rule abrogated as to mental J 
disability, but also as to death where the agent 
lacks actual knowledge of it. 
! 
J 
3. If a fiduciary, (a guardian, conservator or 
curator) is subsequently appOinted by a court o£ J 
competent jurisdiction, the power or attorney is 
terminated and the agent must account to the J 
fiduciary for the principal's assets in his hands. J 
J 
E. Problems frequently encountered. 
1. Choice of agent. 
a. The most usual candidates to serve as age~t are, i 
..J 
of course, the principal's family members and 
close friends. There is generally little problem J 
with a married couple with children. The spouse is 
the obviouS first choice, unless he or she is for 
some reason unsuitable. Frequently married couples ;, 
J 
fail to realize that a power of attorney may be a 
vital part of their personal planning because they J 
hold all of their assets jointly. However, one 
J 
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r Joint tenant of real estate or registered 
r seourities has no authority to sell or transfer 
: 
:' suoh assets, for one eKample. Thus a power m~y 
r still be advisable. If for any reaSon the spouse 
r is not seleoted, one of the ohi.ldren may be deemed sUitable for the task. Or, the power may 
r appoint an alternate or suooessor agent However, 
the power should be oarefully drafted so that the 
r suocession of power is unambiguouS. For eKample, 
r the death of the first agent is a olearly def~ned event triggering the effeotiveness of the 
r aPPointment of the alternate or succeSSor. 
However, the disability of the agent may be a 
r matter of faotual dispute. The power should state 
! 
r the specific oriteria ·for the suooession, e.g., a dootor's oertifioate, an adjudioation of inoomp-
r eteno., eto. Even then, the additional oriteria 
I 
may oomplioate use of the power, in that third 
r parties dealing with the suooeSSor may doubt the 
'r 
fulfillment of the oonditions granting power to 
I the sucoeSSor. Another alternative is to grant 
r powers to more than one person by separate 
doouments; however that may also pose diffioulties 
r as discussed below. 
r b. An individual without olose family members or 
r olose friends, or who Simply does not choose to 
r c- 5 
select them to serve may ask the attorney to take 
on the task. While there is nothing inherently 
wrong with doing so, the attorney must weigh the 
request carefully. In most caSeS of principals 
with average means, the work required may not 
be compensable at the rate usually charged for 
straight legal work, lest it be an excessive dra~n 
on the principal's monthly income. Furthermore, 
almost all of the work will consist of book-
keeping and banking. Unless the attorney has 
office staff capable of performing such tasks, or 
is willing to do it himself, the job may quickly 
become tedious. 
c. Joint ~ conflicting appointments. There is no 
reason why one theoretically may not have as many 
attorneys-in-fact as one pleases. A later power 
unlike a will, does not automatically revoke 
former oneS. As a practical matter, however, it 
is obviouS that such conflicting appOintments 
should be avoided. Joint appOintments merit a 
Similar caveat. What if the co-agents do not 
agree? In either case stalemate, or confu~ion may 
prevent third parties from honoring such powers. 
d. The final choice in selecting the agent is, of 
course, the client's. But he or she deserves 
C-s 
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to know the possible problems disoussed above. 
Needless to say, the agent should be a trustworthy 
person who wi 11 observe hiS fiduoiary dut ies. If 
the olient oannot locate any suitable person 
willing to serve, then, despite all its 
advantages, the power of attorney is not the 
right choioe 
2. AbuSe of the power. Sinoe the agent is not under 
the supervision of any oourt in the performance of 
hiS duties, the potential for abuse is great, 
especially given the frequently weakened oondition 
of the principal. Also, Sinoe the agent will have 
possession of all doouments and reoords, he oan 
·oover hiS tracks· with ease, even should he come 
under scrutiny_ 
3. Triggering events for stand-by powers. As in the oase 
of powers containing proviSions for sucoeSsor agents, 
stand-by powers may also oause problems if the agent 
deems the oonditions suffioient to invoke the power, 
and the prinoipal does not. Even a doctor's statement 
may not be oonclusive unless oarefully worded to 
conform to the precise oriteria in the document. If 
the principal attempts to oountermand or revoke the 
power, the result may be stalemate as discussed in 
the following seotion. 
C-7 
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4. Disputed revooation. A oompetent prinoipal may revoke 1 
.J 
a power of attorney at any time for any reason. But 
one who is in faot inoompetent neoessarily laoks 
.J 
oapaoity to revoke a durable power .. Again, suoh 
oapaoity is a matter of faotual dispute, and most 
parties with notioe of revooation will refuse to 
honor a power absent a judioial determination that 
the prinoipal laoks oapaoity to revoke. 
5. Disputed oreation. Although one may oreate a power 
whioh survives one's disability, one who is already 
mentally incapacitated oannot oreate a power. Hence, 
a person who objects to a power or its use can often J 
deter third parties from honoring it by olaiming that 
it is ineffeotive. 
8. Use or powers to make gifts of the principal's 
property. 
a. Self-dealing and transfers to the agent. The IE$w 
casts upon an agent a nearly total prohibition 
against USing a power to transfer the principal's 
property to himself, and against transactions 
generally between the agent personally and himself 
as agent fo.r the pr i no i pa l. See Beas 1 ey ~ Trontz 
Ky.App.,677 SW2d 891 (1884), holding suoh trans-
C-8 
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aotionS voidable at the eleotion of the prinoipal, 
and Deaton ~ Hale, Ky., 692 SW2d 127 (1878) whioh 
holds that the burden of aooounting for and 
explaining any questionable transactions is on the 
agent. 
b. Transfers to others. ASide from ciroumstanoes like 
those above desoribed where the agent's motives 
may be inherently suspeot, there are other 
instances in which transfers of the principal's 
property for little or no conSideration may be 
attempted for reasons which are not at all 
nefariOUS or larcenous, and might well meet 
with the prinoipal's wishes were he able to 
express them. Examples might be utilization of 
the annual Sift tax exolusion, to aSSist ill or 
distressed family members, or to make oharitable 
gifts for personal as well as taxation reasons. 
Hay an agent in the above or similar oiroumstances 
exeoute gifts of the principal's property? The 
answer appears generally to be no. The olosest 
Kentucky case in point is Clinton v. Hibbs' Ex'r 
202 Ky.304, 258 SW 356 (1824) holding that a 
power of attorney authorizing a Wife to conduct 
all of her husband's business did not authorize 
her to obligate him as a surety on a note. However 
the follOWing reoent cases from other 
C-8 
Jurisdictions re-affirm the traditional view that 
the power to Sive away the prinoipal's property 
must be express, and will not be implied: 
--Estate of Rolater, 642 P2d 219 (Okla. 1976), 
holding a power ineffective to make Sifts of 
stock to the principal's brother. 
--Johnson ~ Fraccacreta, 348 S02d 570 (Fla. App. 
1877) holding a power ineffective to convey the 
principal's real property to the principal and 
her spouse as tenants by the entirety. 
c. Use of ~ power for estate planning. Clearly, a 
power cannot be utilized to write a will for the 
principal. Frequently an attempt is made, however, 
by an agent to establish a revocable trust for his 
principal. Clearly insofar as third parties are 
made beneficiaries as to either income or 
principal , no such authority eXists unless 
expressed clearly in the power. However, where the 
sole beneficiary is the principal, and the 
corpus at hiS death reverts to hiS estate, the 
agent has done little more than arrange for 
profeSSional management of hiS principal's assets. 
Hence, though no case has been located to 
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expressly approve the praotioe, it would seem 
within the soope of a normal general power. An 
express authorization to do so, however would 
remove any doubt. 
II. Curatorship--KRS 387.320. (See appendix) 
A. Comparison with power of attorney. 
1. Curatorship is like a power of attorney in the 
following respeots: 
a. It is a voluntary undertaking by the prinoipal. 
b. It remainS in foroe regardless of subsequent 
disability. 
o. It requires suffioient mental oapaoity at the 
time of appointment 
d. the ourator stands in a fiduoiary relationship 
as to the prinoipal and hiS property. 
2. Curatorship differs from a power in the follOWing 
r respeots: 
r 
i 
r C-l1 
a. It is a court appointed and court supervised 
relationship. 
b. The powers of the curator are limited to those 
of other court appointed fiduciaries. 
c. It is uncertain whether a curator can be removed 
solely at the pleasure of the principal, or only _ 
for cause, as in the case of other statutory 
fiduciaries. No case law or statutory proviSion 
j 
Seems to address the iSSue. Presumably the Court 
if confronted with the problem has the right to 
use its discretion. ..J 
d. the curator is bonded and must make regular 
settlements. 
e. A curator clearly lackS authority to make gifts 
of the principal's property under any oiroum-
J 
stances. 
, 
J 
8. Comments. Curatorship is rarely invoked. If an 
individual is aware of his need for some one else to 
look after his affairs. it is much Simpler, quicker, 
easier and oheaper to appoint an attorney in faot. In 
addition, the curatorship is far less fleXible in J 
... 
terms of the powers whioh the ourator may eXeroiSe. 
C-12 
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Also, the curatorship is a matter of public record, 
a~d many elderly people obj~ct to the open disclosure 
of their financial affairs, and the fact that they 
have admitted publicly tha~ they are unable to manage 
their business. 
III. The Stand-By Trust. 
A. Description. A stand-by trust is merely a buzz word 
for an inter vivos revocable trust established by a 
settlor primarily for the management of hiS finances. 
The only real distinction between it and any other 
-living trust- is that it generally contains more 
closely defined duties for the trustee to perform in 
the event that the settlor becomes disabled. That is, 
rather than merely mandate a direct payout of income 
and corpus to the settlor, or at hiS direotion, it 
authorizes the trustee, upon a finding of disability 
or impairment, to distribute funds directly to the 
settlor's creditors, or persons dependent on him for 
support. In essence, the trustee acts just as an 
attorney in fact would in managing the settlor's 
assets and paying hiS bills. 
B. A specimen stand-by clause is prOVided in the 
appendix. 
C-13 
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C. Comments. Obviously the stand-by trust is a devioe for ~ 
persons of above average means. It is an exoellent 
tool to provide for management of the affairs of 
elderly or infirm single people who are not really 
interested in handling their money before they become 
incapacitated. It can also be a planning device in 
that distribution on death provisions can be made 
directly to beneficiaries, thus avoiding probate. The 
only drawbacks are the amount of assets which must be 
transferred in trust to make it practical, the trustee 
fees which will be incurred, and the start-up eXpense 
in terms of attorney fees. 
IV. Statutory Disability Proceedings. 
A. When a person has beoome mentally incapacitated 
J 
J 
J 
f 
.J 
i! 
without deSignating anyone to manage his/her affairS ~ 
in such event, the only remaining mechanism is to 
institute disability proceedings under the provisions 
of KRS 387.500 to 387.770. (See appendiX) f 
... 
B. Definition of disability. Disability is a legal, not J 
a medical term and refers to a functional inability 
to make informed deciSions to such an extent that 
one's personal or financial needs are unmet. The 
statute recognizes the pOSSibility that one can meet 
c- 14 
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s~me b~t not all of such needs, and, hence permits 
r a finding of partial disability. KRS 387.610 (8) and 
(9). 
r 
r C. A disability proceeding is commenced by the filin8 of a Petitton to determine disability alons with a 
r Petition for appointment as guardian.KRS 387.530. 
r D. Emergency Appointments. If there is a serious danger 
r 
of impairment of health or safety, or of damage or 
diSSipation of property, the Court may make an 
emergency appo~ntment before the hearing in chief. 
KRS 387.740. 
:r 
I 
E. The statute requires that the Respondent be eXamined by 
a three person interdisciplinary team, conSisting of 
a psychiatrist, psychologist and a social worker. 
KRS 387.540. Their report, and the required 
recommendations, are usually the heart of the case. 
r 
r F. Trial 
r 1. At the trial, the Commonwealth has the burden of 
proving the disability by clear and convinoing 
proof. KRS 387.570 (5). 
r 
r C-15 
i 
..II 
I 
2.The Respondent has the right to counsel, lncluding ~ 
Court-appointed counsel, if he cannot afford pther-
wise. KRS 387.680. 
3. The case must be tried to a jury.; it cannot be 
waived. KRS 387.570 (1). 
4. The jury must find, separately with respeot to both 
personal matters and finanoial affairs, whether the 
Respondent is totally disabled, partially disabled, 
or not diSabled at all. KRS 387.580 (1). 
5. After the Jury's verdiot, if the Respondent is 
found to be disabled in any respeot, the Court 
determines the type of fiduoiary and the powers 
to be exeroised by him/her. KRS 387.580. 
a. A guardian is appointed if the Respondent is 
totally disabled, both finanoially and 
persona 1 1 Y • 
b. A limited guardian is appointed if the Reapon-
dent is found partially diSabled in both 
respeots, or only as to personal affairs. 
J 
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o. A conservator is appointed if the diSability is J 
total as to finances only. 
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d. A limited conservator is appointed if the 
disability is partial as to finances only. 
e. The statute does not admit of. the POSSibility 
that the Respondent oan be found totally unable 
to handle personal affairs, but not disabled ~s 
to finanoial ones. 
G. The Court then appoints a suttable person for the 
appropriate required role. The fiduoiary is bonded, 
and must make two types of periodioal reports: 
1. An annual report on the ward's physioal, sooial 
and medical oondition; and 
2. A biennial finanoial report, similar to a 
periodioal settlement required of other 
fiduciaries. 
H. Comments. It should be obvious from the foregoing 
description of the disability statute, that it is a 
oumbersome, slow and relatively expensive way to 
provide for the management of one's affairs in case 
of incapacity. The lesson, of oourse, is to make 
appropriate plans in advanoe. The usual answer is to 
have some form of durable power of attorney 
C-17 
prep~red before the onset of mental deoline. 
V. Pla~ning To Avoid Will Contests. 
A. Introduction. In a will cont_est case, the most 
important potential witness is already dead. The 
contestants are therefore able to attempt to make 
out a caSe of inoapacity, undue influence, improper 
execution or the li~e without the possibility of 
rebuttal by the testator himself. The sorivener of the 
will, or the attesting witnesses, if any, may not 
always be convinoing, or even available. Hence, it may 
be advisable to oonsider some special approaohes or 
teohniques when preparing a will which may appear 
likely to be ohallenged because of its terms, the 
condition of the testator, or the temperament of 
potentially disgruntled beneficiaries. Such approaches 
may be clasSified as (a) defensive techniques whereby 
the integrity and validity of the process of 
preparation and execution of the will are seoured, 
and (b) affirmative teohniques deSigned to diSarm 
or encumber potential oontestants proSpeotively. 
B. DefenSive techniques. 
1. Making the attorne¥/sorivener a iood witness ~ 
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the will. In most oases the preparer should be in 
the best POSition to verify the testator's 
so~ndness of mind, and therefore sho~ld be a very 
effeotive witness, unless he has done or omitted 
to do something in oonneotion with the will, The 
at~orney-olient privilege does not bar the 
attorney from so testifying. Stegman ~. Hiller, 
'Ky., 515 SW2d 244 (1974), Sinoe it is presumed that 
the testator would oonsent, and sinoe the privilege 
expires at death. However, the sorivener must be on 
guard to avoid aotions, suoh as desoribed below 
whioh may detraot from the strength of the 
sorivener's testimony: 
a. Representing the estate ~ the propounders ~ 
.trial. Dtsoiplionary Rule 5-101(8) of the Code 
of ProfeSSional Responsibility forbids 
.aoceptance of employment in cases where the 
attorney knows that he will be c~lled as a 
witness unless the testimony is as to 
uncontested matters, is as to mere formalities, 
pertains to the value of legal servioeS, or if 
absence of the testimony would work a hardship 
on the client because of the partioular value 
of the lawyer's servioes. Rule 3.7 of the 
proposed Hodel Rules of ProfeSSional Conduct 
(not yet adopted in Kentuoky) retains the same 
C-19 
b. 
~Ssential postur~. How~ver, th~r~ is authority 
to th~ contrary in Kentuoky oas~ law. Adams v. 
-
Flora, Ky., 445 SW2d420 (1969); 
Ky., 451 SW2d 626 (1970). 
Duncan v. 
-
O'nan 
Nevertheless, even i~ the ethical oonsideration 
qid not eXist, one must think v~ry oare~ully 
about opening the door to the opponent's 
argument that th~ attorn~y/witn~ss's testimony 
must be slanted in ~avor o~ his olient's 
<and hiS wall~t's) point ~t vi~w. 
Taking instruotions ~rom someone oth~r than 
the testator. Obviously the scrivener's 
testimony has very little value to the parties 
seeking to uphold the Will, if he has to admit 
that another (most likely a b~n~fioiary) was 
in whole or in part the souroe ot the 
instructions about th~ oontents of the will. 
ThiS would hold true even i~ th~ testator 
$ 
J 
J 
.1 
! 
... 
j j 
J 
I 
.J 
j 
I 
... 
assents to the terms. ... 
o. B~nefioiary ~ souroe of attorn~y's fe~ for t~e 
will. Clearly an equally embarrassing admission- J 
the jury is left to wonder who really waS the 
client, and whose will was being expreSSed in I ... 
the dooument. 
c- 20 J 
r 
d. Scrivener as beneficiary. Due to the 
confldential nature of the attorney client 
relationship, undye influence is nearly 
presumed in such cases 
'. 
e.' Fai lure to supervise execution. The attorney 
.-
I loses any ability to testify about what happened 
when the will waS actually signed. 
f. Failure to retain notes, drafts or correS-
pondence. Some of the most important eVidence 
in favor of a will can be the contemporaneoys 
documents prepared by the scrivener in the 
- course of preparation. Their absence may be 
seen as a sign of a hurried or careless effort, 
The scrivener may even want the testator to 
provide him with a statement in hiS own hand 
, 
'- as to his wishes. 
-
g. Failure to discuss the contents of the will. 
- One of the defenses to a claim of undue 
-
influence is the theory of -independent advice-
which holds that the chain of causation of prior 
- coercion may be broken if it is shown that the 
testator discussed the will with an independent 
- party, and after sych diScussion, still 
-
proceeded to make out the will. That is, the 
-
C-21 
b. Creatins a record of the testator's condition. 
(1) Presence of the witnesSes throughout the 
entire conference, rather than merely at 
the time of signing. 
(2) Questioning the testator in the presence of 
the witnesses as to orientation, purpose of 
the meeting, family members' identities, 
etc. Note that less mental capaoity is 
needed to execute a will than to make a 
oontract or perform other inter vivos aots. 
CreaSon v. Creason, Ky., S92 SW2d 69 (1965). 
The olear cut testimony of the attesting 
witnesses that the testator appeared to be 
in possession of his faculties at the time 
of execution permits the propounders to 
avail themselves of the "lucid interval-
theory, whioh holds that even evidence of 
general senility or insanity does not 
invalidate a will if it appears to have been 
Signed during a period when the testator 
was in fact lucid. See Warnick v. ChilQers, 
Ky., 282 SW2d 603 (19SS) 
(S) Making sure that the testator reads the will 
J 
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-
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( or has it read to him) 
(4) No drygs, medioation or aloohol. 
c. Creating a record against a claim of undue 
d. 
influence. 
(1) Absence of parties in conf~dential 
relationship or who may be asserted to have 
exercised control over the testator. One of 
the most commonly asserted elements of 
undue influence is the participation by t~e 
benefitted party in the preparation and 
execytion of the will See Hollon's Ex'r v. 
Graham, Ky., 280 SW2d 544 (1855). 
(2) Establish independent advice as to will's 
contents and testator's wishes as being 
correctly expressed in the will. The fact of 
independent advice has been held admiss~ble 
as eVidence against undue influence. See 
section 8.1.g., supra. 
Safeguarding the executed will. The best option 
is for either the eXecytor or attorney to 
retain the instrument. Host trust companies 
are more than happy to do so. If the testator 
C-25 
deSireS to keep his will, the best location 
for it is his own safe deposit box. Despite the 
opinion of some commentators to the contrary, 
the difficulty of retrieving the will from the 
box after death is minor compared to the risk 
of inadvertent loss or destruction if kept 
elsewhere. In any event, the scrivener should 
always keep a copy of the dooument for hiS 
files in order to be able to prove the will's 
contents if it is lost or destroyed. 
C. ~ffirmative techniques to deter will contests. 
1. The in terrorem clause. The Hno contest" olause is 
not against, public poliCY and is enforoeable in 
Kentucky. Andrews' Ex'r ~ Sprutll,Ky.,112 SW2d 
402 (1838). The effect of such ~ cl~uae is not to 
deprive the potential contestant of hiS day in 
court, but merely to increase the cost of lOSing 
the case. However, the clause does not apply So 
as to Jeopardize one's inheritance by bringing 
a construction action. 
beneficiary can prevent a will contest by 
depriving collateral heirs of standing to 
maintain the action. One must normally be either 
C-26 
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one of the testator's heirs, or take more ~nder 
r a prior will in order to have standinS. Esbert v. i -
r 
Esb,rt, 186 Ky. 486, 217 SW 365 (1820). AdoptionS 
of adults are valid if with the consent of the 
r adoptee. KRS 405.380. However such an adopt.on i$ ineffective to q~alify an adult adoptee as a 
r remainderman under an existing trust. Hinary ~ 
Citizens Fidelity Bank, Ky., 418 SW2d 340 (1967). 
r However compare Harper'y":" Hartin, Ky., 552 SW2d 
r 690 (1877). 
r 3. Inter vivos transfers. A will contest only affects 
property which passes through the decedent'e 
r probatable estate. Accordingly, it is pos~ible to 
r arrange transfers which essentially take effect at death, b~t which remove the given property from 
r the estate, thus req~iring the contestant to 
overcome a double hurdle: not only must he 
r s~cceed in setting aSide the inter vivos trans-
r 
action, but also must successfully contest the 
, Will, which, presumably vests the same beneficiary 
r with the same or Similar benefits. The drawpacks 
of such planning are that such transactionS 
r require careful draftsmanship to avoid disrupting 
estate plans or other unintended results. However, 
r such transactions generally have the further 
r benefit of creatins additional sets of witnesses 
r C-27 
to atte$t to the oapaoity of the deoeased. 
4. ~ £! reoording devioes. It is sometimes 
deSirable to memorialize either a message of the 
testator's oonoerning hiS wishes as expressed in 
hiS Will, or to tape the exeoution prooeSS as 
evidenoe of oapaoity, dye exeoution or laok of 
ooeroion or undue influenoe. Suoh eVidenoe, if 
available oan be powerful proof in favor of the 
will. Care must be taken, however that Umistakes· 
not be eimilarly memorialized. It is also 
suggested that taping, onoe done, oannot be 
ethioally oonoealed or altered. Suoh tampering, 
aSide from the oriminal aspeot, would, if 
disoovered have just the oppOSite of the intended 
effeot. ThiS teohnique, being thus relatively 
volatile, should be utilized only i~ oases where 
the ohanoe of -goof-ups· by the testator is 
min 1ma 1 • 
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r APPEND D( 
r 
r A. KRS 386.09:3 
r B. KRS 387.320 
r C. "STAND-BY " TRUST CLAUSE 
r 
D. KRS 387.500-387.770 
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KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
388.093. ~eD ~ower 01 attomey Dot affected by dlaabUity. _ 
When a princIpal ~slgnatea another his attorney in tact or apnt by a power 
of attorney in wrItIng and the writing contains the words "This wer or 
attomey shall not be affected by the disability or the principal, It :. "This 
power ot ~tom.y shall become .ffective upon the diaabilfty oltha Princiu1. It 
or similar words showing the intent ot the principal that the authority 
conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding his disability, then the 
authority or the attomey·in tact or agent is exercisable by him as provided 
in the power on behalC oC the principal notwithstanding later disability or 
incapacity oC the principal at law or later uncertainty as to whether the 
principal is dead or alive. All acts done by the attomey in Cact or apnt, 
pursuant to the power during any period or disability or incompetence or 
uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or alive, have the sam. effect 
and inure to the benetit oC and bind the principal or hi' hein, d.vi .... and 
penonal representative as iC the principal were aliv., competent and not 
disabled. It a tiduciary is thereafter appointed by ~. court tor the principal 
the power oC the attorney in Cact ,hall thereupon terminate and he shall 
account to the court', appointed fiduciary. (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 168, I 1.) 
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KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
387.320. Curator for property of aged or bifirm persOll, appobited 
when - Bond. - (1) Whenever any person deems himself unfit by.: reason 
of advanced age or physical disability and weakness to properly and 
prudently manage or care for his real or personal property or manage his 
business with p!lldence and understanding, the district court may, upon hii 
verified petition without notice or public hearing, appoint a curator to 
assume charge and management of his real or personal property or business, 
subject to the direction of the court. 
(2) The court shall take bond with good surety from the person appointed 
curator for the full and faithful performance of the trust confided in him. 
(Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 253, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 200, § 5; 1976 (Ex. Seas.), ch. 
14, § 346, effective January 2, 1978.) 
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STAND-BY TRUST CLAUSE j 
In the event of the Grantor's incapacity, 
as determined by the Trustee in its sole and 
absolute discretion, the Trustee may use so J 
much of the net income and principal as the 
Trustee may deem advisable to provide adequately 
and properly for his health, support, and main-
tenance and that of his wife and children. 
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GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP FOR DISABLED PERSONS 
, Lell.lattv. Releareh Commilslon Note. wal repealed by 1982 Acta Chapter 141. Sec· 
Although 1980 Acta Chapter _. which tion 148. the latter il lubatantially the same 
would have become operative on July 1. 1982. bill and became operative on July 1. 1982. 
387.500. Declaration of JeJislative purpose. - (1) It ia the intent and 
purpose of the General Aaaembly to recognize that dil8blecl penona have 
varying degreea of dil8bility. 
(2) PerlOns who are only partially disabled must ,be legally protected 
without a determinatioll of total incompetency and without the attendant 
deprivation of civil and le,al ri,ht. that such a determination requires. 
(3) To this end. guardianship and conservatorship for dil8bled penons 
shall be utilized only as is necessary'to promote their well-being, including 
protection from neglect, exploitation, and abuse; shall be designed to encour-
age the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in each 
person; and shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by each person's 
actual mental and adaptive limitations. 
(4) If the court determines that some form of guardianship or 
conservatorship is neceuary. partial guardianship. or partial 
conservatorship shall be the preferred form of protection and auistance for 
a disabled person. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141. § I, effective July I, 1982.) 
387.510. Definitions. - As used in KRS 387.500 to 387.770 and 
387.990: 
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387.510 TRUSTS AND ESTATES-PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY 
(1) "Conservator" means an individual, agency, or corporation appointed 
by the court to manage the financial resources of a disabled person. 
(2) "Limited conservator" means an individual, agency, or corporation 
H ppointed by the court to assist in managing the financial resources of a 
partially disabled person and whose powers and duties have been 
specifically enumerated by court order. 
(3) '''Guardian'' means an intUvidual, agency, or corporation appointed by 
the court to have full care, custody, and control of a disabled person and to . 
manage his financial resources. 
(4) "Limited guardian" means a guardian who possesses fewer than all of 
tile legal powers and duties-of a full guardian, and whose powers and duties 
have been specifically enumerated by court order. 
(5) "Standby" guardian or conservator means a person or entity desig-
nated by the court to assume the powers and duties assigned to a limited 
guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator upon his death, 
resignation. removal, or incapacity. 
(6) "Testamentary" guardian or conservator means an individual. 
agency, or corporation nominated in the will of a limited guardian, guard-
ian, limited conservator. or conservator to succeed the testator in that capac-
ity upon his death. 
(7) "Developmental disability" means a severe, chronic disability of a 
person which: 
(a) Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of 
mental and physical impairments; 
(b) Is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two (22); 
(e) Is likely to continue indefinitely; 
(d) Results in substantial functional limitations in three (3) or more of the 
following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care; (ii) receptive and 
expressive language: (iii) learning; (iv) mobility; (v) self-direction; (vi) 
capacity for independent living; and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; and 
(e) Reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special 
in terdisciplinary or generic care, treatment or other services. which are of 
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated . 
• (8) "Disabled" means a legal, not a medical disability. and is measured by 
functional inabilities. It refers to any person fourteen (14) years of age or 
older who is: 
(a) Unable to make informed decisions with respect to his personal affairs 
to such an extent that he lacks the capacity to provide for his physical health 
and safety, including but not limited to health care, food. shelter, clothing. 
or personal hygiene; or 
(b) Unable to make informed decisions with respect to his financial 
resources to such an extent that he lacks the capacity to manage his property 
effectively by those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of 
both real and personal property. 
Such inability shall be evidenced by acts or occurrences within six (6) 
months prior to the filing of the petition for guardianship or conservatorship 
and shall not be evidenced solely by isolated instances of negligence. improv-
idence. or other behavior. 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.520 
(9) "Partially disabled" refers to an individual who lacks the capacity to 
manage some of his personal affairs and/or financial resources as provided 
in subsection (8) of this section, but who cannot be found to be fully disabled 
as provided therein. 
(10) "Mentally ill person" means a person with substantially impaired 
capacity to use self-control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of his 
affairs and social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or 
recognized emotional symptoms where impaired capacity, maladaptive 
behavior, or emotional symptoms can be related to physiological, psycholog-
ical, or social factors. . 
(11) "Interdisciplinary evaluation report" means a report of an evaluation 
of a respondent performed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 387.640 to 
determine whether he is partially disabled or disabled as defined herein. 
(12) "Interested person or entity" means an adult relative or friend of the 
respondent or ward, an official or representative of a public or private 
agency, corporation, or association concerned with that person's welfare, or 
any other person found suitable by the court. 
(13) "Petitioner" means a person who institutes a proceeding under KRS 
387.530. 
(14) "Respondent" means an individual alleged to be a partially disabled 
or disabled person. 
(15) "WM'rl" means a person for whom a limited guardian, guardian, lim-
ited conservator, or conservator has been appointed. 
(16) "Committee" means a person appointed by the court prior to July 1, 
1982, to have full care, custody, and control of a disabled person and his 
estate. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.520. Jurisdiction of district courts - Venue. - (1) The district 
courts shall have exclusive jurisdicti(;m over all proceedings involving a 
determination of partial disability or disability, the modification of orders, 
the appointment and removal of guardians and conservators, and the 
management and settlement of their accounts. 
(2) If the respondent. or ward is a resident of this state, the venue for all 
proceedings under KRS 387.500 to 387.770 shall be: 
(a) In the county where the respondent or ward resides; 
(b) In the county of domicile of the respondent or ward; or 
(c) In the county where the parent of the respondent or ward is domiciled 
if the respondent or ward is a minor. Nothing in this section shall preclude 
transfer of venue for good cause shown. 
(3) Ifno local conservator has been appointed and no petition in a disabil-
ity proceeding is pending in this state, a domiciliary foreign conservator may 
file with a court in this state in a county in which property belonging to the 
disabled person is located, authenticated copies of his appointment and of 
any official bond he has given. Thereafter, he may exercise as to assets in 
this state all powers of a local conservator and may maintain actions and 
proceedings in this state subject to any conditions imposed upon nonresident 
parties generally. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 3, effective July 1, 1982.) 
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387.530. Filing of petition - Contents - Application of perlon or 
entity desiring appointment. - (1) A petition for a determination of 
partial disability or disability and the appointment of a limited guardian, 
guardian, limited conservator, or conservator may be filed by any interested 
per~on or by an individual needing guardianship or conservatorship. The 
petition shall set forth the following: 
(a) The name and address of the respondent; 
(b) The date of birth of the respondent, if known; 
(c) The nature and degree of the alleged disability of the respondent; 
(d) The facts lind reasons supporting the need for guardianship or 
conservatorship; 
(e) A description and approximation of the value of the respondent's 
financial resources, including government benefits, insurance entitlements, 
and anticipated yearly income, if known; 
(0 The names and addresses of the respondent's next of kin, if known; 
(g) The name and address of the individual or facility, if any, having 
custody of the respondent; 
(h) The name, address and interest of the petitioner; and 
(i) The name and address of the petitioner's attorney, if any. 
(2) The petition shall be accompanied by a verified application of the 
person or entity desiring appointment as limited guardian, guardian, lim-
ited conservator, or conservator. The application shall state the name, 
addres.:; and qualifications of the applicant and his relationship to the 
respondent. If it is proposed that a standby limited guardian, guardian, 
limited conservator, or conservator be designated, the petition shall also be 
accompanied by the application of the person or entity desiring to be so 
designated. Additional petitions may be filed prior to the date of the hearing 
by other persons desiring appointment. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 4, 
effective July 1, 1982.) 
Opinions of Attorney General. There is mination of partial disability or disability. 
no statute imposing upon the county attorney OAG 83·474. 
a positive duty to file the petition for deter· 
387.540. Interdisciplinary evaluation report. - (1) Prior to a hearing 
on a petition for a determination of partial disability or disability and the 
appointment of a limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or 
conservator, an interdisciplinary evaluation report shall be filed with the 
court. The report shall be compiled by at least three (3) individuals, includ-
ing a physician, a psychologist licensed or certified under the provisions of 
KRS Chapter 319, and a person licensed or certified as a social worker or an 
employe of the cabinet for human resources who meets the qualifications of 
KRS 335.080(1)(a), (b) and (c) or 335.090(1)(a), (b) and (c). The social worker 
shall, whenever possible, be chosen from among employes of the cabinet for 
human resources residing or working in the area, and there shall be no 
additional compensation for their service on the interdisciplinary evaluation 
team. 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.640 
(2) At least one (1) person participating in the compilation of the report 
shall have knowledge of the particular disability which the respondent is 
alleged to have or knowledge orthe skills required of the respondent to care 
for himself and his estate. 
(3) If the respondent is alleged to be partially disabled or disabled due to 
mental illness, at least one (1) person participating in the compilation of the 
interdisciplinary evaluation report shall be a qualified mental health profes-
sional as defined in KRS 202A.Oll(11). If the respondent is alleged to be 
partially disabled or disabled due to mental retardation, at least one (1) 
person participating in the compilation of the evaluation report shall be a 
qualified mental retardation professional as defined in KRS 202B.010(3). 
(4) The interdisciplinary evaluation report shall contain: 
(a) A description of the nature and extent of the respondent's disabilities, 
if any; 
(b) Current evaluations of the respondent's social, intellectual, physical, 
and educational condition, adaptive behavior, and social skills. Such evalua-
tions may be based on prior evaluations not more than three (3) months old, 
except that evaluations of the respondent's intellectual condition may be 
based on individual intelligence test scores not more than one (1) year old; 
(c) An opinion as to whether guardianship or conservatorship is needed, 
the type of guardianship or conservatorship needed, if any, and the reasons 
therefor; 
(d) An opinion as to the length of time guardianship or conservatorship 
will be needed by the respondent, if at all, and the reasons therefor; 
(e) If limited guardianship or conservatorship is recommended, a further 
recommendation as to the scope of the guardianship or conservatorship, 
specifying particularly the rights to be limited and the corresponding powers 
and duties of the limited guardian or limited conservator; 
<0 A description of the social, educational, medical, and rehabilitative 
services currently being utilized by the respondent, if any; 
(g) A determination whether alternatives to guardianship or 
conservatorship are available; 
(h) A recommendation is to the most appropriate treatment or rehabilita-
tion plan and living arrangement for the respondent and the reasons 
therefor; 
(i) A listing of all medications the respondent is receiving, the dosage, and 
a description of the impact of the medication upon the respondent's mental 
and physical condition and behavior; 
(j) An opinion whether attending a hearing on a petition med under KRS 
387.530 would subject the respondent to serious risk of harm; 
(k) The names and addresses of all individuals who examined or inter-
viewed the respondent or otherwise participated in the evaluation; and 
(l) Any dissenting opinions or other comments by the evaluators. 
(5) The evaluation report may be compiled by a community mental 
health-mental retardation center, a licensed facility for mentally ill or 
developmentally disabled persons, if the respondent is a resident of such 
facility, or a similar agency. 
C-37 
387.550 TRUSTS AND ESTATES-PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY 
(6) In all cases where the respondent is a resident of a licensed facility for 
mentally ill or developmentally disabled persons and the petition is filed by 
an employe of that facility, the petition shall be accompanied by an 
interdisciplinary evaluation report prepared by the facility. 
(7) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, the court shall 
order appropriate evaluations to be performed by qualified persons or a 
qualified agency. The report shall be prepared and filed with the court and 
copies mailed to the attorneys for both parties at least ten (10) days prior to· 
the hearing. All items specified in subsection (4) of this section shall be 
included in the report . 
. (8) If the person evaluated is a poor person as defined in KRS 453.190, the 
examiners shall be paid by the county in which the petition is filed upon an 
order of allowance entered by the court. Payment shall be in an amount 
which is reasonable as determined by the court, except no payment shall be 
required of the county for an evaluation performed by a salaried employe of 
a state agency for an evaluation performed within the course of his employ-
'nent. Additionally, no payment shall be required of the county for an eval-
aation performed by a salaried employe of a community mental 
health-mental retardation center or private facility or agency where the 
,'osts incurred by the center, facility, or agency are reimbursable through 
1 hird-party payors. Affidavits or other competent evidence are admissible to 
prove the services rendered but not to prove their value. 
(9) The respondent may file a response to the evaluation report no later 
than five (5) days prior to the hearing. 
(10) The respondent may secure an independent evaluation. If the 
respondent is unable to pay-for such evaluation, compensation for the inde-
pendent evaluation may be paid by the county in an amount which is reason-
able as determined by the court. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 5, effective 
July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 18, § I, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. Ill, f 155, 
effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 395, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.) 
Legislative Research Commission Note. 
This section was amended by three Ul84 acts 
which do not appear to be in conflict and have 
been compiled together. 
Opinions of Attorney General. The 
examiners' fees under subsection (8) of this 
section must be paid by the county in which 
the petition is filed, regardless of the wealth of 
the disabled person. OAG 83·328. 
The term "third'party payors," in subsec· 
tion (8) of this section refers to medical 
insurers. OAG 83·328. 
The county is responsible for payment of the 
examiners' fees where a respondent dies after 
an examination is completed but prior to trial, 
and in cases where a jury determinea the 
respondent not to be disabled ainee the 
mandatory language of subsection (8) of this 
section requires payment of the examiners' 
fees by the county in all caaes. OAG 83·328. 
387.550. Hearing date and place - Notice. - (1) If the petit.ion is 
accompanied by an interdisciplinary evaluation report when filed, the court 
shall fix a date and a place for a hearing to be held within thirty (30) days 
dter the filing of the petition. If no interdisciplinary evaluation report 
accompanies the petition when filed, the court shall fix a date and a place 
[')r a hearing to be held within sixty (60) days after the filing of the petition. 
The time for a hearing may be extended by the court, on motion of either 
party, for cause. 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.570 
(2) Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given not less than 
fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing to the attorneys for both parties, all 
persons named in the petition, and the person proposed for appointment as 
limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator. (Enact. 
Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 6, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 395, § 3, effective 
July 13, 1984.) 
387.560. Appointment of counsel for respondent - Compensation 
- Duty of county attorney. - (1) Unless an appearance has been entered 
on behalf. of the respondent, the court shall appoint counsel for the 
respondent within one (1) week of the filing ofa petition for determination 
of disability under KRS 387.500 to 387.770. 
(2) Appointed counsel shall be entitled to compensation for services. If 
counsel is appointed for a poor person as defined in KRS 453.190, the court 
shall prescribe reasonable compensation to be paid by the county in which 
the proceeding is held in accordance with the complexity of the issues, the 
time involved, and other relevant considerations, except that appointed 
counsel shall not be compensated at a rate higher than thirty-five dollars 
($35.00) an hour for time spent in court and no higher than twenty-five 
dollars ($25.00) an hour for time spent out of court. If the petition is found 
to be frivolous or not brought in good faith, counsel fees shall be charged to 
the petitioner. 
(3) In all proceedings under KRS 387.500 to 387.770, it shall be the duty 
of the county attorney to assist the petitioner, to represent the interest of the 
Commonwealth, and to assist the court in its inquiry by the presentation of 
evidence. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 7, effective July 1, 1982.) 
Opinions of Attorney General. Based 
upon the provisions of KRS 387.600 and sub· 
section (3) of this section, it is not the respon· 
sibility of the county attorney to advocate on 
behalf of the appointment of any person who 
has applied for appointment as guardian or 
conservator; subsection (3) of this section does 
not require the county attorney to represent 
any petitioner within the f:onnotation of an 
adversary proceeding, but merely requires 
the county attorney to assist tile petitioner in 
the preparation and filing of the petition. 
OAG 83-419. 
There is no statute imposing upon the 
county attorney a positive duty to file the petie 
tion for determination of partial disability or 
. disability. OAG 83-474. 
The central role of the county attorney in 
disability determination proceedings is to rep· 
resent the commonwealth and, should the 
interest of the commonwealth conflict with 
the interest of the petitioner at some stage of 
the proceedings, the county attorney must 
pursue the interest of the commonwealth. 
OAG 83-474. 
387.570. Hearing - Burden of proof. - (1) At a hearing convened 
pursuant to KRS 387.500 to 387.770 for the purpose of determining the 
disability of a respondent, the respondent shall have a jury trial and shall 
have the right to present evidence and to confront and cross-examine all 
witnesses. 
(2) The hearing may be closed to the public on request of the respondent 
or his counsel. 
(3) The respondent shall be present at the hearing, and his presence may 
be waived only upon a determination of the court that his attendance would 
subject him to serious risk of harm. Such determination shall be evidence 
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only of the respondent's inability to attend the hearing and shall not be 
considered in determining the need for guardianship or conservatorship. 
(4) The court may remove itself to the place of residence of the respondent 
to conduct the hearing in the presence of the respondent. 
(5) The burden of proof shall be on the Commonwealth to prove the dis-
ability or partial disability of the respondent by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
(6) The respondent w.ill not be determined partially disabled or disabled 
unless at least one (1) of the persons who participated in the 
interdisciplinary evaluation required by KRS 387.540 testifies in person at 
the hearing. This section shall not be interpreted to preclude the respondent 
from requiring the testimony of more than one (1) person participating in 
the preparation of the evaluation report. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 8, 
effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 395, § 2, effective July 13, 1984,) 
DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW 
ANALYSIS 
1. Instructions. 
2. Verdict. 
1. Instructions. 
In inquest to determine mental capacity oC 
alleged incompetent, instructions following 
the language of KRS 387.010 are sufficiently 
specific to guide jury. Sabin v. Common-
wealth, 233 Ky. 636, 26 S.W.2d 506 (19301. 
See Downing v. Siddens, 247 Ky. 311, 57 
S.W.2d 1 (1933), overruled on other grounds, 
Vitali v. Nolloth, 268 S.W.2d 950 (Ky. Ct. 
App.1954). 
2. Verdict. 
Where only issue in inquest was whether 
defendant was incompetent due to infirmity 
and old age, verdict finding deCendant incom-
petent without specifying cause was 
erroneous but not void and could be corrected 
by trial court on motion to specify cause. 
Higdon v. Commonwealth. 257 Ky. 69, 77 
S.W.2d 400 (1934). 
To give court jurisdiction to take Crom a per-
son his estate upon the ground that he is 
incompetent to manage it, the reason or cause 
of the infirmity, as well as what is owned by 
the subject of the inquest, must be made to 
appear by the verdict. Menefee v. Ends, 97 
Ky. 388, 17 K.L.R. 280,30 S.W. 881 (1895). 
387.580. Responsibilities of jury during a hearing - Court deter-
minations upon finding of disability or partial disability. - (1) At a 
hearing convened under KRS 387.500 to 387.770 for a determination of 
partial disability or disability, the jury shall: 
(a) Inquire into the nature and extent of the general intellectual 
functioning of the respondent; 
(b) Inquire into the respondent's capacity to make informed decisions 
concerning his personal affairs and financial resources; 
(c) Determine whether the respondent is disabled, partially disabled, or 
has no disability in relation to the management of his financial resources; 
and 
(d) Determine whether the respondent is disabled, partially disabled, or 
has no disability in relation to the management of his personal affairs. 
(2) If the respondent is found not to be disabled or partially disabled, the 
petition shall be dismissed. 
(3) If the respondent is found to be disabled or partially disabled, the court 
shall, at the same hearing, without a jury, determine: 
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(a) The type of guardian or conservator to be appointed; 
(b) The specific legal disabilities to which the respondent is subject, if the 
respondent has been determined to be partially disabled; 
(c) The corresponding powers and duties of the limited guardian or lim-
ited conservator, if the respondent has been determined to be partially 
disaJ?led; 
(d) The individual or entity to be appointed by the court as limited guard~ 
ian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator; 
(e) The individual or entity, if any, to be appointed as standby guardian 
or conservato'rj and 
(0 The duration of the term of guardianship or conservatorship. (Enact. 
Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 9, effective July I, 1982.) 
387.590. Types of guardians and conservatonJ to be appointed-
Order of appointment - Filing of judgment and order - Legal 
disabilities. - (1) If the respondent is found partially disabled in managing 
his personal affairs, but not partially disabled or disabled in managing his 
financial resources, a limited guardian shall be appointed. 
(2) If the respondent is found partially disabled in managing his financial 
resources, but not partially disabled or disabled in managing his personal 
affairs, a limited conservator shall be appointed. 
(3) If the respondent is found partially disabled in managing both his 
personal affairs and financial resources, a limited guardian shall be 
appointed, unless the court considers it in the best interest of the ward to 
appoint both a limited guardian and a limited conservator. 
(4) If the respondent is found disabled in managing his financial 
resources, but not partially disabled or disabled in managing his personal 
affairs, a conservator shall be appointed. 
(5) If the respondent is found disabled in managing both his personal 
affairs and financial resources, a guardian shall be appointed, unless the 
court considers it in the best interest of the ward to appoint both a limited 
guardian and a conservator. 
(6) The order of appointment of a limited guardian, guardian, limited 
conservator, or conservator shall specify: 
• (a) The type of guardianship or conservatorship to which the ward is 
subject; 
(b) The name and address of the limited guardian, guardian, limited 
conservator, or conservator; 
(c) The name and address of the standby guardian or conservator, if a 
standby guardian or conservator is designated; 
(d) The specific legal disabilities to which the respondent is subject, if the 
respondent has been determined to be partially disabled; 
(e) The corresponding powers and duties of the limited guardian or lim-
ited conservator, if the respondent has been determined to be partially 
disabled; and 
(0 The duration of the term of guardianship or conservatorship. 
(7) A limited guardian or limited conservator shall not be appointed for 
a term greater than five (5) years and may be appointed for a lesser period. 
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A guardian or conservator may be appointed for a period of unlimited dura-
tion. 
(8) The judgment of partial disability or disability and· the order of 
appointment shall be filed in the district court. The judgment shall be 
indexed by the county clerk in the book in which notices of actions and 
encumbrances are indexed. Unless such judgment is filed and indexed, it 
shall not constitute notice to any subsequent bona fide purchaser for value, 
mortgagee, or encumbrancer. 
(9) If the respondent is determined to be disabled or partially disabled but 
no, limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator is 
appointed at the hearing, the determination shall have no legal effect. 
(10) The rights of which a ward is legally deprived upon a determination 
of disability in managing his personal affairs and financial resources 
include, but are not limited to, the right to vote, dispose of property, execute 
instruments, enter into contractual relationships, determine his living 
arrangements, consent to medical procedures, and obtain a motor vehicle 
operator's license. 
(11) A partially disabled or disabled person for whom a limited guardian, 
limited conservator, or conservator has been appointed retains all legal and 
civil rights except those which have by court order been designated as legal 
disabilities or which have been specifically granted to the limited guardian, 
limited conservator, or conservator. A person who is partially disabled may 
be subject to some but not all of the disabilities specified in subsection (10) 
of this section. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 10, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, 
ch. 206, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.) . 
Opinions of Attorney General. By the 
repeal of KRS Chapter 203, the General 
Assembly intended to place the filing of dis-
ability judgments and the indexing of same 88 
a responsibility of the circuit clerk, instead of 
the county clerk. Thus on and after July 1, 
1982, there is no statutory basis for filing dis-
ability judgments and indexing them in the 
county clerk's office. OAG 82-486. 
The effect of subsection (8) of this fection is 
that the judgment of disability or partial dis-
ability must be filed in the district court. 111us 
the circuit court-district court clerk must see 
to it that luch judgments are filed in the 
clerk's office; and the circuit clerk must estab-
lish, on and after July 1, 1982, an index IYI-
tem covering such judgments collected in a 
book identifiable as involving noticell of 
actions and encumbrancel. OAG 82-486. 
DECISIONS UNDE/t PRIOR LAW 
[ . Action to Set Aside Deed. 
In action to set aside deed to bona fide pur-
'hasers on grounds of fraud, grantor mUlt not 
, nly plead the judgment declaring him incom-
petent but must plead its filing and indexing 
with county clerk. Powell v. Winchelter 
Bank, 551 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. Ct"App. 1977). 
387.600. Appointment Consideration of preference of 
respondent. - (1) The court may appoint as limited guardian, guardian, 
limited conservator, or conservator any suitable person or any entity, public 
or private, capable of conducting an active guardianship or conservatorship 
program. The court shall not ordinarily or customarily appoint the depart-
ment for human resources or any other person or entity, public or private, 
that is directly providing services to the respondent unless no other suitable 
C-42 
I 
"., 
..J 
j 
I 
..J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
,. 
I 
r 
r 
r 
r 
GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.620 
person or entity is available and willing to be appointed. Appointment of the 
department for human resources shall be consistent with the provisions of 
KRS 210.290. 
(2) Prior to the appointment. the court shall make a reasonable effort to 
question the respondent concerning his preference regarding the person or 
entity to be appointed limited guardian. guardian. limited conservator. or 
conserv.ator, and any preference indicated shall be given due consideration. 
The court shall appoint the person or entity best qualified and willing to 
serve. (Enact. Acts 1982. ch. 141. § 11. effective July 1. 1982.) 
Opinion. of Attorney General. Baaed 
upon the provisions of KRS 387.560(8) and 
this section, it is not the responsibility of the 
county attorney to advocate on behalf of the 
appointment of any person who has applied 
for appointment .as guardian or conservator; . 
KRS 387.560(3) does not require the county 
attorney to repreaent any petition'r wit·hin 
the connotation of an adversary proceedilli. 
but merely requires the county attorney to 
assist the petitioner in the preparation and 
filing of the petition. OAG 88-419. 
387.605. Qualifications for couri to consider when appointing a 
guardian or conservator. - The court shall give preference to people who 
meet the following qualifications when appointing a person as guardian or 
conservator: 
(1) Kinship to respondent; 
(2) Education and business experience of applicant; 
(3) Capability to handle financial affairs; and 
(4) Ability to carry out the requirements set forth in KRS 387.660 to 
387.710 and 387.750. (Enact. Acts 1984. ch. 20, § 1, effective July 13.1984.) 
387~610. Petition for renewal of appointment - Accompanying 
affidavits. - Prior to the expiration of a term of guardianship or 
conservatorship, the limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator. or 
conservator may petition. pursuant to KRS 387.620 •. for a renewal of his 
appointment for a period not to exceed five (5) years. The petition shall be 
accompanied by verified affidavits of a physician, a psychologist licensed or 
certified under the provisions of KRS Chapter 319, and a person liCensed or 
certified as a social worker or an employe of the cabinet for human resources 
who meets the qualifications of KRS 335.080(1)(a). (b) and (c) or 
335.090(1)(a), (b) and (c) supporting the neec:. for the continuation of the 
guardianship or conservatorship. (Enact. Acts 1982. ch. 141. § 12. effective 
July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 395, § 4, effective·July 13, 1984.) 
387.620. Petition for relief - Hearing on petition -- Judgment or 
modification. - (1) A partially disabled or disabled person, his limited 
guardian. guardian, limited conservator. or conservator, or any"other inter-
ested person may petition the court for: . 
(a) Termination or modification of an order of partial disability or disabil-
ity; 
(b) Removal and/or replacement of a limited guardian. guardian, limited 
conservator or conservator; or 
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(c) Renewal of the appointment of a limited guardian, guardian, limited 
conservator, or conservator. 
(2) Petitions pursuant to this section shall set forth: 
(a) The name and address of the ward; 
(b) The name and address of the limited guardian, guardian, limited 
conservator, or conservator; 
(c) The name, address, and interest of the petitioner; 
(d) The names and addresses of the ward's next of kin, if known; 
(e) The name and address of the individual or facility, if any, having 
custody of the ward; 
(0 The relief requested; and 
(g) The facts and reasons supporting the request. 
(3) A request under subsection (1) of this section, if made by the ward, 
may be communicated to the court by any means, including but not limited 
to oral communication or informal letter. If such a request is communicated 
by means other than a petition, the court shall appoint a suitable person who 
may, but need not be, an employe of the state, county, or court to prepare 
a written petition to be filed with the court within seven (7) days following 
the appointment. 
(4) Within thirty (30) days after the filing of a petition, the court shall ' 
conduct a hearing at which the ward shall be entitled to counsel. The time 
for a hearing may be extended by the court, on motion of either party, for 
cause. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given not less than 
fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing to both parties and all persons named 
in the petition. 
(5) At the request of any party or on its own initiative, the court may order 
an interdisciplinary evaluation of the ward. The time period in which the 
court must review a petition may be extended for an appropriate period of 
time if such an evaluation is ordered by the court. 
(6) Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall enter a written order 
setting forth the factual basis for its finding and may do any of the following: 
(a) Dismiss the petition; 
(b) Remove the guardian or conservator and dissolve the guardianship or 
conservatorship order; 
(c) Remove the limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or 
conservator and appoint a successor; 
(d) Modify the original guardianship or conservatorship order; or 
(e) Make any other order which the court deems appropriate and in the 
best interest of the ward. 
(7) If the original order is dissolved and no further order is issued, the 
ward shall be relieved of all legal disabilities. The court shall enter an order 
and judgment restoring to the person all of the rights and privileges of a 
citizen. The clerk shall note such judgment or modification in the book in 
which notices of actions and encumbrances are indexed. 
(8) The clerk of the court shall transmit a certified copy of the restoration 
judgment or modification to the originating court, ifthe'judgment or modifi-
cation is ordered by a court other than the court in which the original 
judgment was entered. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 13, effective July 1, 
1982; 1984; ch. 395, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.) 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.660 
387.680. Com1l1ittee to assume duties of guardian - Powers- Nul-
lification of adjudication oftncompetency. - (1) Any person appointed 
committee for an incompetent person prior to July I, 1982, shall assume the 
duties ,of a guardian and shall be subject to all of the provisions of KRS 
387.500 to 387.770 pertaining to guardians, including all reporting require-
ments .. The committee shall, within one (1) year from July 1,1982, petition 
for modification of the original order if a less restrictive guardianship or 
conservatorship would be more appropriate. 
(2) In all instances where an adjudication of incompetency was entered 
prior to July 1, 1982, and no committee has been appointed or is serving on 
that date, the a<ljudication ofincompetency shall be considered null and void 
ifno guardian or conservator is appointed within one (1) year of July 1, 1982. 
(Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 14, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.640. Duties of limited guardian or guardian. -It shall be the 
general'duty of the limited guardian or guardian to carry out diligently and 
in good faith the specific duties and powers assigned by the court and to: 
(1) Assure that the personal, civil, and human rights of the ward are 
protected; and 
(2) Encourage the ward to: 
(a) Participate to the maximum extent of his abilities in all decisions 
which affect him; 
(b) Act in his own behalf on all matters in which he is able to do so; and 
(c) Develop or regain, to the maximum extent possible, his capacity to 
meet the essential requirements for his physical health or safety, and, if 
impaired, his capacity to manage his financial resources. (Enact. Acts 1982, 
ch. 141, § 15, effective July I, 1982.) 
387.650. Assignment of powers and duties to limited guardian by 
court - Reporting requirements. - The court may assign to a limited 
guardian any portion of the powers and duties specified in KRS 387.660. The 
court may assign other duties as are necessary to enhance the ward's safety 
and well being. A limited guardian shall comply with the reporting require-
ments specified by KRS 387.670 which pertain to his powers and duties as 
specified by the court, provided that all reports submitted shall include the 
information required by paragraphs (d) and (f) of KRS 387.670(1). (Enact. 
Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 16, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.660. Specific powers and duties of guardian. - A guardian of a 
disabled person shall have the following powers and duties, except as 
modified by order of the court: 
(1) To take custody of the ward and to establish his place of abode within 
the state, except that, if at any time a guardian places a ward in a licensed 
residential facility for developmentally disabled persons, the guardian shall, 
within thirty (30) days of such placement, file with the court notice of the 
placement, stating with specificity the reasons for such placement, and an 
interdisciplinary evaluation report detailing the social, psychological, medi-
calor other considerations on which such placement is predicated, a 
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description of the treatment or habilitation programs whi~h will benefit the 
ward as a result of such placement, and a determination that such placement 
will provide appropriate treatment in the least restrictive available 
treatment and residential program. For purposes of this subsection, the 
interdisciplinary evaluation report may be one performed within two (2) 
months prior to the placement for purposes of determining whether such 
placement is necessary and appropriate, or may be an evaluation and as-
sessment provided by the residential facility immediately after placement. 
Notice to the court shall not be required where the ward is transferred from 
one licensed residential facility to another. 
(2) To make provision for the ward's care, comfort, and maintenance and 
arrange for such educational, social, vocational, and rehabilitation services 
as are appropriate and as will assist the ward in the development of maxi-
mum self-reliance and independence. 
(3) To give any necessary consent or approval to enable the ward to 
receive medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service, 
except that a guardian may not consent on behalf of a ward to an abortion, 
sterilization, psychosurgery, removal of a bodily organ, or amputation of a 
limb unless the procedure is first approved by order of the court or is neces-
sary, in an emergency situation, to preserve the life or prevent serious 
impairment of the physical health of the ward. 
(4) To act with respect to the ward in a manner which limits the depriva-
tion of civil rights and restricts his personal freedom only to the extent 
necessary to provide needed care and services to him. 
(5) To expend sums from the financial resources of the ward reasonable 
and necessary to carry out the powers and duties assigned to him by the 
court and, unless a separate conservator has been appointed, to manage the 
financial resources of this ward. 
If a separate limited conservator or conservator has been appointed for the 
ward, the expenditure of funds by the limited guardian shall be consistent 
with the duties assigned to and procedures and policies established by such 
limited conservator or conservator. Conflicts arising between a limited 
guardian and a limited conservator or conservator regarding the expendi-
ture of funds which are unallie to be otherwise resolved shall be submitted 
to the court for resolution. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 17, effective July I, 
1982.) 
387.670. Annual report of guardian. - (1) A guardian shall file with 
the court at least annually a verified report stating: 
(a) The ward's current mental, physical, and social condition; 
(b) The address of every residence of the ward during the reporting period 
and length of stay at each residence; 
(c) A summary of the medical, social, educational, vocational, and other 
professional services received by the ward during the reporting period; 
(d) An outline of the guardian's visits with and activities on behalf of the 
ward; 
(e) A recommendation as to the need for continued guardianship; 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.690 
(0 A statement signed by the standby guardian, if one has been 
appointed, that the standby guardian continues to be willing to serve in the 
event of the death, resignation, removal, or incapacity of the guardian; and 
(g) Other information requested by the court or useful in the opinion of 
the guardian. 
(2) .For the purpose of filing the report required by subsection (1) of this 
section, the guardian shall be given access to records pertaining to the ward 
held by public or private agencies which contain information necessary for 
the guardian to perform his duties. 
'(3) The court shall review the report required in subsection (1) of this 
section and take whatever action it considers necessary to enhance the 
well-being of the ward. 
(4) In addition to the requirements of this section, a guardian shall com-
ply with the reporting requirements of KRS 387.710 unless a separate 
conservator has been appointed. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch, 141, § 18, effective 
July 1, 1982.) 
38'7 6~,·' 1 ,ut;.c~. of limited conservator or conservator. - It shall be , 
n", g>:>!'HiJ.;:!\j7y of the limited conservator or conservator to carry out, 
~Ui;:.emi.v and in good faith, the specific duties and powers assigned by the 
"Qm t, a"ld to: 
(1) Manage or assist in managing those financial resources placed under 
his supervision and/or control as would a prudent person managing his own 
resources and, if a conservator has special skills or is named conservator on 
the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, he shall use those 
skills; and 
(2) Encourage the ward to: 
(a) Participate, to the maximum extent of his abilities, in all decisions 
which affect him; 
(b) Act on his own behalf on all matters in which he is able to do so; and 
(c) Develop or regain, to the maximum extent possible, his capacity to 
manage his financial resources and, if impaired, his capacity to meet the 
essential requirements for his physical health or safety. (Enact. Acts 1982, 
ch. 141, § 19, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.690. Specific duties of limited conservator or conservator. -
(1) A limited conservator or conservator shall expend or distribute, or autho-
rize the expenditure or distribution of, or assist in the expenditure or distri-
bution of, the principal or income trom the financial resources placed under 
his supervision and control to assure that: 
(a) The essential requirements for the physical health or safety of the 
ward are met; 
(b) The rights of the ward are protected; 
(c) The financial resources of the ward which are subject to the 
conservatorship are prudently managed; 
(d) The ward has the opportunity to develop or regain the capacity to 
perform the functions listed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of subsection (2) 
of KRS 387.680; and 
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(e) The limited guardian or guardian for the ward, if any, is able to carry 
out the duties and powers assigned to him by the court. 
(2) In performing his duties, the limited conservator or conservator shall 
consider: 
(a) The size of the financial resources under the limited conservator's or 
conservator's supervision or control; 
(b) The probable duration of the conservatorship; 
(c) The likelihood that the ward may be able to manage his financial 
resources in the future; 
, (d) The accustomed standard of living of the ward; 
(e) Other funds or resources used for the support of the ward which have 
not been placed under the control or supervision of the limited conservator 
or conservator; and 
(0 The requests ofthe ward and the ward's limited guardian or guardian, 
if any. 
(3) In addition to the duties and powers listed in subsection (1) of this 
section, the court may assign to a limited conservator any of the duties and 
powers listed in KRS 387.700 which the partially disabled person lacks the 
ability to perform. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 20, effective July 1, 1982.) 
:j87.700. Specific powers and duties of conservator. - (1) A 
conservator has all of the powers conferred herein and any additional powers 
conferred by law on trustees in this state. The conservator may take pos-
session of the ward's real and personal property, and of all rents, incomes, 
and benefits therefrom, whether accruing before or after his appointment, 
arid of the proceeds arising from the sale, mortgage, lease or exchange 
thereof. Subject to such possession the title of all such estate and to the 
increment and proceeds thereof shall be to the ward and not to the 
conservator. It is the duty of the conservator to protect and preserve the 
estate, to retain, sell and invest it as hereinafter provided, prosecute or 
defend actions, claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection 
of the estate's assets, to account for it faithfully, to perform all other duties 
required of him by law, and, a\ the termination of the conservatorship, to 
deliver the assets of the ward to the persons lawfully entitled thereto. 
(2) The conservator shall apply the money and property for the payments 
of debts, taxes, claims, charges and expenses of the conservatorship and for 
the support, care, maintenance and education of the ward or his dependents. 
(3) Any sale of realty ofa ward shall be as provided in KRS Chapter 389A. 
(Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 21, effective July 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 277, § 3, 
effective July 15, 1982.) 
Legillative Research Commission Note. which do not appear to be in conflict and have 
'This section was amended by two 1982 Acts been compiled together. 
387.710. Filing of inventory by limited conservator or conservator 
- Biennial report - Final report and account. - (1) Within sixty (60) 
days of appointment, the limited conservator or conservator shall file with 
the court a verified inventory of all the property of the ward which has come 
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to his possession or knowledge, including a statement of all encumbrances, 
liens, and other secured claims on any item, any claims against the estate 
of the ward, and any cause of action accruing to the ward. The limited 
conservator or conservator shall provide a copy thereof to the ward if he has 
sufficient mental capacity to understand it. 
(2) 'A limited conservator or conservator shall file with the court a verified 
report and account biennially within sixty (60) days after the anniversary 
date of his appointment. Said report shall contain: 
,(a) The present personal status of the ward whose estate is managed by 
the conservator; 
(b) The conservator's plan for preserving and maintaining the estate of 
which he has control or supervision; 
(c) The need for continuation or cessation of the conservatorship; and 
(d) The need for any alteration in the powers of the conservatorship. 
The biennial report shall specify the amount and type of real and personal 
property received by the conservator and remaining in his control or 
invested by him, the nature of such investment, and expenditures made 
during the preceding year. Upon request of the court, the conservator shall 
produce for examination any information or documentation which the court 
may consider relevant to the accounting of the financial and property 
transactions of the estate. 
(3) Upon the resignation, removal, or death of a limited conservator or 
conservator, or on the termination of the conservatorship, the limited 
conservator or conservator, or his personal representative, shall forthwith 
submit a final report and account to the court and to the former ward and 
to the successor limited conservator or conservator, or, if the ward is 
deceased, to his personal representative, and shall pay over the trust estate 
to the person entitled thereto. Upon approval of the report and account, the 
limited conservator or conservator shall be discharged and his surety, ifany, 
released. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 22, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.720. Surety oflinrited conservator or conservator. - The court 
may require a limited conservator or conservator to provide surety on his 
bond consistent with the provisions of KRS 395.130. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 
141, § 23, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.730. Testamentary guardian or conservator nomination -
Review of nomination by court. - A parent, spouse or child of a partially 
disabled or disabled person who has been appointed as limited guardian, 
guardian, limited conservator, or conservator of that person may, by will, 
nominate an individual to succeed in that capacity upon the testator's death. 
Such nomination shall be reviewed by the court pursuant to KRS 387.620 
upon admitting the will to probate if no other person is serving in that 
capacity at the time of the testator's death and no standby guardian or 
conservator has been appointed. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 24, effective 
July 1, 1982.) 
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387.740 TRUSTS AND ESTATES-PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY 
387.740. Emergency powers of court - Petition and hearing on 
emer,gency appointment. - (1) The court may exercise the powers of a 
limited guardian or limited conservator or may appoint an individual or 
agency to exercise such powers if, during the pendency of a proceeding for 
a determination of partial disability or disability or an appeal therefrom, it 
appears that there is danger of serious impairment to the health or safety 
of tlie respondent or damage or dissipation to his property if immediate 
action is not taken. 
(2) Prior to a hearing on .the need for an emergency appointment of a 
limited guardian or limited conservator, a petition shall be filed which sets 
forth the following: 
(a) Thu name, age, and address of the respondent; 
(b) The danger alleged to be imminent; 
(c) The type of appointment and the protection and assistance requested; 
(d) The facts and reasons supporting the request; 
(e) The name, address, and qualifications of the proposed limited guard-
ian or limited conservator, if any; 
(f) The name, addrE;lss, and interest of the petitioner; 
(g) The names and addresses of the respondent's next of kin, if known; 
(h) The name and address of the individual or facility, if any, having 
custody of the respondent; and 
(i) The date of filing of the petition for determination of disability or 
partial disability. 
(3) Within one (1) week of the filing of a petition pursuant to this section, 
the court shall conduct a hearing at which the respondent shall be entitled 
to counsel. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given not less 
than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the hearing to all persons named in the 
petition and to the county attorney. 
(4) The burden shall be on the Commonwealth to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence the need for the emergency appointment of a limited 
guardian or conservator. 
(5) If the court exercises the powers of a limited guardian or limited 
conservator or appoints another to do so in an emergency situation as set 
forth in subsection (1) orthis section, the court shall state on the record 
findings of fact as to the danger determined to be imminent, the sources 
relied on in arriving at such determination, the type of assistance to be 
provided, and the powers and duties of the emergency guardian or 
conservator. The authority of the guardian or conservator shall expire upon 
resolution of the appeal or action. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 25, effective 
July I, 1982.) 
387.750. Standby appointee - Powers and duties. - (·1) On appoint-
ment of a limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator, 
or at any time thereafter, the court may designate another suitable person 
or entity to assume the powers and duties assigned to the limited guardian, 
guardian, limited conservator, or conservator upon his death, resignation, 
removal, or incapacity. Prior to such designation, the individual or entity to 
be designated shall file with the court a written application stating the 
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GUARDIANS-CONSERVATORS-CURATORS OF CONVICTS 387.770 
name, address, and qualifications of the applicant and his relationship, if 
any, to the respondent. . 
(2) The individual so designated shall file an acceptance with the court 
within ten (10) days of the death, resignation, or incapacity of his predeces-
sor. Notice shall also be given to the ward and his nearest adult relative. An 
individual serving on a standby basis may exercise all the powers and duties 
assigned to his predecessor upon filing of his acceptance unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. 
(3) In an emergency situation and in the absence and unavailability of the 
initially appointed guardian or conservator, the standby guardian or 
conservator may temporarily assume the powers and duties of the initially 
appointed guardian or conservator. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 26, effec-
tive July 1, 1982.) 
387.760. Court costs - Compensation and reimbursement for 
expenses. - (1) No court costs shall be charged to a respondent or ward in 
any proceeding under KRS 387.500 to 387.770, if the respondent or ward is 
a poor person as defined in KRS 453.190. 
(2) Limited guardians, guardians, limited conservators and conservators 
are entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered and to 
reimbursement for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the exer-
cise of their assigned guardianship or conservatorship duties and powers .. 
Such compensation and reimbursement shall be paid from the financial 
resources oCthe ward. Compensation and reimbursement of guardians, lim-
ited conservators and conservators shall not exceed that provided for in KRS 
386.180. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 27, effective July 1, 1982.) 
387.770. Confidentiality of records - Expungement of records-
Disclosure of information, log. - (1) All determinations of disability and 
orders of appointment, modification, and termination shall be filed as public 
records with the clerk of the court. All other court records of a respondent 
made in all proceedings under KRS 387.500 to 387.770 shall be confidential 
and shall not be open to the general public except as provided in subsection 
(3) of this section. 
(2) Following the dismissal or withdrawal of a petition filed under this 
chapter or a determination that a respondent is no longer disabled, the 
respondent may at any time move to have all court records pertaining to the 
proceedings expunged from the files of the court, providf>d that he submits 
a full release of all claims arising from the proceedings. 
(3) Any person seeking to obtain confidential information contained in 
the court files or the court records of pr~ceedings under KRS 387.500 to 
387.770 may file a written motion stating why the information is needed. 
The court may issue an order to disclose such information upon a showing 
that the disclosure is appropriate under the circumstances and in the best 
interest of the person or the public. The court shall maintain a log of the 
individuals and entities granted access to the file or records. (Enact. Acts 
1982, ch. 141, § 28, effective July 1, 1982.) 
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ESTATE PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT AND RETIREES 
EDWARD A. ROTHSCHILD, Attorney at Law 
Washer, Kaplan, Rothschild, Aberson & Miller 
725 Marion E. Taylor Building 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 587-0541 
The determination of when and how to receive payments from 
qualified plans and social security benefits often are the most 
important estate and income tax planning decisions the about to be 
and the retired professional and business executive will make. I 
will discuss many alternatives and opportunities that many retirees 
should consider with their large and most complex investment. 
I. PLANNING FOR PAYMENTS OF QUALIFIED PLAN BENEFITS: 
A. Types of Plans 
B. 
1. 
2. 
Qualified Plans: 
(a) Pension Plans 
(b) Profit Sharing Plans 
(c) Stock Bonus Plans 
(d) Annuity Plans 
other Forms of Qualified and Similar Tax Advantaged 
Plans 
(a) Thrift or Savings Plans 
(b) 401-K Plans 
(c) Individual Retirement Plans (IRAs) 
(d) Simplified Employee Pensions (SEPs) 
(e) HR 10 (Keogh) Plans 
(f) ESOPS, PAYSOPS and TRASOPS 
Income Tax Considerations 
1. Qualified and other Tax Advantage Plans 
(a) Annuity Payments 
(b) Lump-sum Distributions 
(c) Constructive Receipt Rules 
(d) Ro1lovers 
(i) Employee 
(ii) Spouse 
0-1 
C. Joint and Survivor Annuities 
D. 
1. Spouse's guaranteed interest. The Retirement Equity 
Act of 1984 contains provisions designed to guarantee 
that a surviving spouse will receive benefits from 
most qualified plans. 
2. Plans Affected. The joint and Survivor Annuity 
,requirements apply to Pension Plans (including 
defined contribution plans) and HR 10 Plans that are 
pension plans as well as profit sharing and stock 
bonus plans. They do not apply to lBAs even if the 
IRA has receiveq a rollover contribution from a plan 
that itself is af(ected by the mandatory provisions; 
nor do they apply to SEPs. 
Waiver by Participant - consent QY Spouse. A participant 
may elect a form of benefit for his spouse other than a 
qualified joint survivor annuity or qualified 
preretirement survivor annuity, hereinafter referred to as 
QJSA and QPSA, or elect a beneficiary other than the 
spouse (such as a trust) to receive some or all of the 
benefits. 
1. Applicable Election Period. 
Ca) QPSA may be waived from the 1st day of the Plan 
Year in which participant is 35 until his death. 
(b) QJSA may be waived only during the 90 days prior 
to the annuity starting date (417(f) (2». 
2. consent by Spouse. 
(a) The Participant's election is revocable during 
the election period. 
(b) And either: 
(i) The Participant's election must designate a 
beneficiary (or a form of benefit) which 
may not be changed without spousal consent; 
or 
(ii) The spouse's consent permits designations 
by the Participant without any requirement 
of further consent by the spouse. 
(c) Spouse consents in writing and consent is 
witnessed by a Plan Representative or a notary 
public. 
(d) When a participant dies, unless the spouse 
expressly relinquishes that right, there are 
fixed right and will take precedent over any 
D- 2 
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other option that may be more favorable to the 
family unless action is taken before the 
annuities start to change the form of benefit. 
(i) The accrued benefit payable to a vested 
Participant who does not die before the 
annuity starting date must be in the form 
of a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" 
(QJSA) Sect. 407(a) (11) (A) and Sect. 
417(b). 
(ii) If a vested Participant dies before the 
annuity starting date and has a surviving 
spouse, the spouse is to receive a 
"qualified preretirement survivor annuity" 
(QPSA) . 
3. Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity is one in which 
the survivor's annuity is no less than 50% and not 
more than 100% of the annuity payable during the 
joint lives of the participant and spouse. Sect. 
417(b). 
4. Spouse may be limited by a plan provision to those 
persons who are married to the employee for at least 
one year before the annuity starting date (QJSA) or 
the employee's death (QPSA). Sect. 417(d). 
5. Existing beneficiary designations (made before 
8-23-84) that name a beneficiary other than the 
spouse are no longer valid in the eyes of the IRS. 
6. A written explanation of the QJSA or QPSA of the 
spouse's rights is provided to the Participant. 
7. Such waiver shall not be treated as a transfer of 
property by gift. 
8. Disclaimer by Wife. 
E. Minimum Distribution Rules. 
1. The Employee's entire interest must be distributed 
either: 
(a) outright not later than the required beginning 
date. 
(b) In Installments not later than the required 
beginning date and over a period of time that 
is: 
0- 3 
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3. 
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(i) The employee's life; 
(ii) The lives of the employee and a designated j 
beneficiary; or 
(iii) A term of years not longer than (i) or J 
(ii) . 
Required beginning date means April 1, of the 
calendar year following the later of: 
4 
.J 
(a) The calendar year in which the employee attains 
70-1/2; or J 
(b) The calendar year in which the employee retires. ! 
(i) Except that the rule in (b) above does not ~ 
apply to an employee who is a 5% owner with 
respect to the plan year ending in the Jt 
calendar year in which the Employee attaips 
70-1/2. 
(ii) Rule (a) applies to most everybody. 
Distributions that begin after age 59-1/2 but before 
the later of the employee's retirement or age 70-1/2 
do not have to comply with the minimum distribution 
rules. 
J 
1 
.J 
F. Death of Employee before Entire Interest is Distributed j 
-
1. 
2. 
Installment payments that began before the Employee's 
death must be distributed at least as fast as under 
the method of distribution being used at date of 
death. 
(a) The distribution may be accelerated if the 
spouse or other beneficiary chooses a shorter 
payment period or a lump-sum distribution. 
(b) If the employee dies before reaching age 70-1/2, 
no payments are deemed to have been made before 
death and the rules described below in 2. are to 
apply. 
No payments before death - the entire interest must 
be distributed within 5 years after death unless: 
1 
J 
J 
J 
(a) A portion of the employee's interest is payable , 
to or for the benefit of a designated J 
beneficiary; and 
(b) ~~~;fl~~;~~~sw~iieb~rd!S~~~~~~e~Oor~~9;~ethan J 
the beneficiary's life expectancy; and 
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(c) The distributions begin within 1 year after the 
Employee's death. 
3. surviving Spouse. The rules in F. 2. are mtdified if 
the designated beneficiary is the spouse: 
(a) Distributions to the spouse do not have to begin 
until the date on which the emplQy.ee would have 
been 70-1/2; and 
(b) If the spouse dies before the distributions 
begin, the rules described in F. 2. apply as 
though the spouse was the employee. 
New 15% Tax on Excess Distributions from Qualified 
Retirement Plans, section 4981A. 
1. TRA of 1986 added an entirely new tax in an effort to 
continue to limit the perceived discriminatory 
aspects of qualified plans. This tax is applied at 
either retirement (an income tax) or upon death (a 
Federal estate tax). 
(a) The 1986 Tax Act imposes an additional 15% 
penalty tax to the Federal estate tax on an 
individual's excess retirement accumulations, 
IRe 4981(d) as added by Sect. 1133 of the 1986 
Act at death. It applies to estate's of 
decedents who die after 1986. 
(b) The unified credit cannot be used to offset this 
tax. Sect. 4981 (d) (2) . 
(c) There is no marital deduction available to 
eliminate the tax - it will be payable even in 
estates whose estate tax has been reduced to 
zero by a formula. 
(d) The tax is assessed if there is an excess 
retirement accumulation of the value of the 
decedent's interest in all qualified employer's 
plans and IRAs is greater than the present value 
of an annuity payable for a period of years 
equal to the decedent's life expectancy 
immediately before his death. The amount of the 
annual annuity used to make this calculation 
will vary, but in many cases, it will probably 
be at least $112,500 and may be at least 
$150,000. 
D - 5 
(e) A distribution from a qualified plan for which a 
lump-sum election is made will include an excess 
distribution if it exceeds 5 times the annual 
limit. For example, 5 multiplied by $112,500 = 
$562,500. For individuals dying after 12/31/86, 
new Code section 4~83 also imposes an additional 
estate tax of 15% of the individual's "e~cess 
retirement accumulation" defined in Sub-Section 
4981 A (d) (3). However, Sub-Section (c) (5) 
provides a grandfather clause for accrued 
benefits as of August 1, 1986, as follows: 
(i) In general, if the employee elects on a 
return filed for a taxable year ending 
before 1-1-89, to have this paragraph 
apply, the portion of any retirement 
distribution which is attributable (as 
determined under rules prescribed by the 
Secretary) to the accrued benefit of an 
employee as of 8/1/86 shall be taken into 
account. However, no tax shall be imposed 
under this section with respect to such 
portion of said distribution. 
(ii) Limitation - An employee may not make an 
election under Sub~paragraph (i) unless the 
accrued benefit of such employee as of 
August 1, 1986, exceeds $562,500. 
(iii)Taxpayer not making election - if an 
employee does not make the election, then 
$150,000 will be ~ubstituted for the 
$112,500 relative to the limitation or 
$750,000 on lump-sum distributions. It 
appears one must make the 5-year (or 
10-year) averaging election to obtain the 
five times exclusion. There is some 
question as to whether the above election 
applies to Federal estate tax. 
H. 10% Penalty Tax on Early Distribution 
2. 
What is referred to as the "too early" penalty is the 
10% tax that before 1987 applied only to 
distributions made prior to age 59-1/2 from IRAs and 
certain 5% owners under section 408(f) and 
72(M) (5) (A) (i). The early penalty tax now also 
applies to all qualified plans and annuities, 
including 401(k) Plans. 
This 10% tax applied to the taxable portion of the 
distribution which includes: 
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(a) The amount attributable to Employer 
contributions; 
(b) Income attributable to Employer and after tax 
Employee contributions to qualified plans; and 
(c) For tax sheltered annuities, the amount 
attributable to those contributions. 
3. Some early distributions however are not subject to 
the additional tax including: 
Ca) A payment to an employee who has attained age 
55, terminated employment and met the plan's 
requirements for early retirement; 
(b) A payment that is part of a scheduled series of 
substantially equal periodic payments (an 
annuity) for the life of the beneficiary; 
(c) A payment for medical expenses which exceeds 
7-1/2% of the employee's adjusted gross income; 
or 
Cd) A payment to a disabled employee. Sect. 
72(M) (9) (F) 408(F) as amended by TRA 1986 • 
I. Lump-Sum Distributions 
1. Qualifications: 
Ca) A lump sum need not be made in one payment, but 
it must be the payment of the entire plan 
balance to the credit of the employee within one 
taxable year of the recipient. 
(b) The recipient may be someone other than the 
employee; for example, the employee's estate or 
chosen beneficiary may receive the proceeds. 
(c) All trusts and annuities forming part of an 
employer's plan must be aggregated for purposes 
of determining the balance to the credit of the 
employee. 
Cd) In order to qualify as a lump sum, the 
distribution must be made on account of 
employee's death, separation from service, 
disability or after employee has attained the 
age of 59-1/2. Sect. 402(e) (4) (A). 
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2. 
2. 
computation of Tax for Employees who Attained Age 50 
prior t9 January 1, 1986: 
(a) The recipient can elect any of 3 different 
options: 
(i) The portion of the distribution 
attributable to the employee's 
participation in the plan before 1974 can 
be treated as long-term capital gains 
402(a) (2). However, under 1986 Tax Act, in 
1987, the entire amount attributable to 
pre-1974 participation is treated as 
long-term capital gain taxable at 20% rate; 
1988, 95% of pre-1974 amount is taxable at 
20%; 1989, 75% taxable at 20%; 1990, 50% 
taxable at 20%; and 1991, 25% taxable at 
20%. Sect. 1122(a). 
(ii) The portion attributable to participation 
after 1973 is taxable as ordinary income 
but at a special rate which allows for 10 
year averaging. Sect. 402(e) (1). The tax 
used in this computation is at the single 
individual income tax rates in effect in 
1986. 
(iii) The portion of the distribution eligible 
for capital gains treatment is found by 
multiplying the total taxable amount by ~ 
fraction whose numerator is the number 
calendar years of active participation in 
the plan before 1974 and whose denominator 
is the total number of years of active 
participation. 
(iv) The recipient may elect to forego capital 
gains treatment on pre-1974 amounts and 
subject the entire amount to the 10 year 
averaging method instead. 
(v) Under the new transition rule of the TRA of 
1986, the recipient may elect to use the 
new 5 year forward averaging under the 
current tax rates in effect at time of 
election rather than the 10 year averaging 
under the tax rate in effect in 1986. 
computation for employees who had not attained age 50 
by January 1, 1986, is limited only to a 5 year 
forward averaging under the current tax rates at date 
o"{ eleotion. 
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II. PLANNING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: 
The Social Security Act (the Act) provides a broad range of 
,.:dsh and health benefits, including old age (retirement) survivor 
i\lld disability insurance benefits (OASDI). 
A. Old Age Benefits - Worker and Spouse - When and to Whom 
Paid 
1. Workers retiring at age 65 are paid full benefits or 
if retiring at age 62, he will receive 80% of 
benefits to be received at age 65. Wage earner's 
benefits are increased by 5/9 of 1% for each month of 
early retirement that is postponed between ages 62 
and 65. 
2. Spouse is entitled to benefits if married to worker 
for one year or is natural parent of worker's child 
and is age 62 or cares for child entitled to 
benefits. 
3. 
(a) Spouse receives 1/2 the amount paid to the 
retired worker, or 
(b) A person already entitled to old age or 
disability benefits which are larger than the 
proposed spousal benefits will continue or may 
elect to receive those larger benefits. 
Unmarried Divorced Spouse - A divorced spouse whose 
marriage to the worker lasted 10 years and who is 
currently unmarried, becomes eligible for benefits on 
the worker's record at age 62, regardless of whether 
the worker is remarried or how long ago their 
marriage ended. But the divorced spouse loses these 
benefits if he or she remarries. 
4. Worker's children are entitled to benefits if 
dependent on worker, unmarried and under 18, or over 
19 and disabled. Child may be natural, illegitimate 
and acknowledged, step-child or adopted. 
(a) Child benefits end with the month before the 
month in which one of the following events first 
occurs: 
(i) The child becomes 18 years old and is not 
disabled nor a full-time student; 
D - 9 
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5. 
(ii) The child dies or remarries. However, the 
benefits of a disabled child who is age 18 
or older do not terminate if the child 
marries a person independently entitled to 
social security benefits. 
(iii) The insured's entitlement to old age or 
retirement benefits ends for a reason other 
than death or attainment of age 65. 
(iv) Children over 1B were formerly eligible for 
child benefits until age 22 if they were 
full-time students. This provision was 
phased out completely by August 19B5, and 
no new benefits are payable to stUdents who 
are over lB. 42 USC Sect. 402 (d) (1) (B); 
20 CFR Sect. 404.369. 
survivor Benefits - A surviving spouse of a worker 
who was fully insured when he or she died, is 
entitled to benefits under the following conditions: 
(a) The spouse is the insured's widow or widower 
according to the criteria set forth for a 
spouse: 
(i) The spousal relationship to the insured 
lasted for at least 9 months immediately 
before the worker died. 
(ii) The spouse and the worker were natural 
parents of a child. 
(iii) The spouse was already entitled or could 
have been entitled to social security or 
railroad retirement benefits in the month 
before the spouse married the insured. 
(iv) The surviving spouse is at least 60 years 
old or is at least 50 years old and 
disabled. 
Payments ot Benefits 
1. Lump Sum Death Benefit: 
Ca) $255 is payable to surviving spouse living with 
worker at death; or 
(b) The person who was entitled to widow's or 
widower's benefits or mother's or father's 
benefits on the worker's record for the month of 
the worker's death. 
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(c) Application for this payment must be filed 
within 2 years of worker's death . 
2. Disability Benefits: 
(a) A worker is entitled to disability benefits 
under the following conditions: 
(i) The worker must be under 65; 
(ii) The worker has insured status for 
disability; 
(iii) The worker currently has a disability 
or had one that ended less than 12 months 
before the month in which the application 
was filed; 
(iv) The worker has established a period of 
disability of 5 consecutive months, 
beginning with a month in which the worker 
was both insured for disability and 
disabled . 
(b) There is a waiting period of 5 consecutive 
months before the person can begin to receive 
disability payments . 
(c) The period cannot begin more than 17 months 
prior to applying for benefits • 
3. Decreases in Benefits: 
(a) Early Retirement - wage earner's benefit is 
reduced by 5/9 of 1% for each month of early 
retirement between 62 and 65 • 
(b) Benefits prior to age 70: 
(i) A worker under 65 might earn in 1987 up to 
a maximum of $6,000 ($500 per month) 
without affecting his or her own benefits. 
(ii) A worker over 65 but under 70 might earn 
$8,160 ($680 per month) without affecting 
his or her benefits • 
(iii) If earnings exceed the above, then the 
benefits will be reduced by $1 for every $2 
earned over the annual amount until 1990. 
In 1990, only $1 in $3 will be deducted 
from the benefit . 
D- 11 
c. Income Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
1. A portion of social security benefits may be subject 
to income taxation. The benefits will be included in 
the gross income of the person who has the legal 
right to receive the benefits. The amount includable 
in a payable year will be the lesser of: 
(a) 1/2 of the amount of social security benefits 
(SSB) received; or 
(b) 1/2 of the difference between the sum of the 
taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income (MGI) 
plus 1/2 of the amount of the SSB received minus 
the base amount (BA). Expressed as a formula, 
this alternative reads 1/2 (MGI + 1/2 SSB) - BA 
= amount includable in gross income. 
(i) SSB will include medicare Part B premiums 
withheld from SSB. 
(ii) Modified adjusted gross income (MGI) is the 
taxpayer's adjusted gross income plus any 
deduction taken for foreign income and tax 
exempt interest. 
(iii) The base amount is $32,000 for married 
individuals filing a joint return or 
$25,000 for single individuals and married 
persons who live apart from their spouses 
for the entire year and who file separate 
returns and zero for married individual who 
does not live apart from the spouse for the 
entire year and who does not file a joint 
return. 
Tax timing, as well as practical cash and reinvestment needs 
and goals of the retired client, have to all be taken into 
consideration when determining when and in what form payments of 
qualified plan benefits and social security should be made. 
• 
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ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS 
I. BACKGROUND. 
TAX. 
A. UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSPER 
1. When property passes outright from one generation 
to a younger generation the transfer is generally subject to 
either the federal gift or estate tax. This continues as 
each generation transfers the property outright to the next 
generation. 
~xample (1): An individual (Gl) dies leaving 
certain property outright to his daughter 
(G2). Upon G2's death, G2 leaves such 
property outright to her son (G3). The 
property is subject to the federal estate tax 
at Gl's death, when the property passes 
outright to G2, and the property is again 
subject to the federal estate tax at G2's 
death, when the property passes outright to 
G3. 
2. Prior to enactment of the generation-skipping 
transfer tax under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 it was 
possible to set up certain generation-skipping trusts (and 
similar nontrust arrangements, such as life estates, 
referred to as generation-skipping trust equivalents) that 
passed beneficial enjoyment of property to a person in a 
generation younger than the initial transferor without 
subjecting the property to another transfer tax when it was 
subsequently passed to a person in an even younger genera-
tion. 
Example (2): Upon his death the initial 
transferor (Gl) transfers property to a 
trust, such that his daughter (G2) receives 
an income interest from the property in trust 
for her lifetime. The remainder, upon G2's 
death, passes to G2's son (G3). Neither the 
federal estate tax nor the federal gift tax 
would apply to the passing of the property 
upon G2's death, since G2 holds only a life 
interest in the trust. Thus, prior to enact-
ment of the generation-skipping transfer tax, 
the only transfer tax applicable to such 
property as it passed among three generations 
was that imposed upon the death of Gl. 
3. The purpose of the generation-skipping transfer 
tax was to "back-up" the federal estate and gift tax by 
imposing a transfer tax relative to each generation 
E-l 
receiving bnnef.icial enjoyment of property, regardless of 
the ability of tax planners to otherwise keep the trans-
ferred property from being a taxable transfer by intervening 
g~nerations (e.g., G2 in Example (2» for federal estate or 
9 i ft tax purposes. 
4. Transfers permitting an intervening generation 
younger than the initial transferor (e.g., G2 in Example 
(2» to receive beneficial enjoyment of property without 
subjecting the transferred property to the federal estate or 
gift tax when it passed from that intervening generation to 
an even younger generation (i.e., G3 in Example (2» were 
referred to as "generation-skipping transfers" in that such 
transfers skipped imposition of the the federal estate and 
gift, taxes relative to the intervening generation. 
B. THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX ONDER THE TAX 
REFqRM ACT OF 1976. 
i 
l. The generation-skipping transfer tax, initially 
imposed by t~e Tax Reform Act of 1976, attempted to close 
the generation-skipping transfer loophole by exposing such 
generation-sharing arrangements to this new federal transfer 
tqX in cases where the passing of beneficial enjoyment of 
such property from one generation to the next would, by its 
nature, escape the imposition of federal estate and gift 
taxes. 
2. The generation-skipping transfer tax under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 did not subject "direct skips" to the 
transfer tax. A "direct skip" is one where the initial 
transferor transfers property to a recipient at least two 
generations below his generation and there is no intervening 
economic enjoyment in the property by a generation younger 
than the transferor but older than the recipient. 
Example (3): If the initial transferor (GI) 
died leaving a life estate in certain real 
property to his daughter (G2), with the 
remainder interest therein passing to G2's 
son (G3) upon G2's death, then under the 
generati.on-skipping transfer tax enacted 
under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the 
property subject to that generation-sharing 
arrangement would be subject to two federal 
transfer taxes. The property would first be 
subject to the federal estate tax as a result 
of its passing on GI's death. The property 
would again be subject to a transfer tax 
(i.e., the generation-skipping transfer tax) 
upon G2's death. Fiowever, if GI had not 
created a generation-sharing arrangement with 
respect to'such property by giving a life 
estate to G2, with the remainder interest to 
E-2 
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(;1, but instead had transferred the property 
di.rectly to G3, the arrangement would be 
subject to on I y one trans fer tax: tha t bei ng 
the federal estate tax imposed upon the 
transfer at GI' 13 dea tho 
1. The tax on taxable generation-sharing arrangements 
was imposed when property subiect to such arrangement was 
distributed to a beneficiary that was at least one genera-
tion younger than the holder of An intervening intereAt and 
at least two qenerations younger than the initial transferor 
(i..e., a -"taxahle Ciistri.buti.on") or upon the termination of 
an intervening interest holder's interest in the generation-
sharing arrangement (i.e., a "taxable termination"). 
However, only distributions of corpus or principal were 
deemed to be taxable distributions. Distributions of income 
fr-om qeneration-sharing arrangements were not taxable dis-
tributions for:- purposes of the tax. 
F~ x am pie (4): Up 0 n G I 's de a t h , a t r us twa s 
created to provide discretionary distribu-
tions of principal and income to GI's 
daughter (G2) and grandson (G3) during G2's 
lifetime. The trust also provided that upon 
G2's death, the remaining principal of the 
trust woulCi be distributed outright to G3. 
If the trustee were to make any distributions 
to G3 during G2's lifetime, then to the 
extent sllch Ciistributions were from principal 
they would be taxable distributions, but to 
the extent that they were from income they 
would not be treated as taxable distribu-
tions. This prevented the distributed income 
from being subjected to both the federal 
income tax and the federal generation-
skipping transfer tax. Upon G2's death a 
taxable termination would occur. 
4. Tn order to subject taxable generation-sharing 
arrangements to a transfer tax substantially equivalent to 
the federal estate or gift tax that would have been imposed 
on an outright transfer by gift or inheritance to each 
successive generation, the tax was based upon the estate or 
gift tax rates applicable to the "deemed transferor" at the 
time of the qenera tion-sk ipping transfer, after increas i ng 
the deemed tr.ansferor's tax base by the amount of the 
generation-skipping transfer tax. 
5. 
upon the 
skipping 
The identity of the "deemed transferor" depended 
identity of the transferee of the generation-
tran~;fer. 
(a) The transferee was the person who 
received the d.istribution in a taxable dis-
E-3 
tributiofl. In the case of a taxable termina-
tion, the person who ha~ a present beneficial 
interest in the property after the taxable 
termination had occurred was the transferee. 
(b) The "deemed transferor" was generally 
the parent of the transferAe most closely 
related to the initial transferor, if the 
parent had a beneficial interest in the 
generation-sharing arrangement. 
(c) If I he parent had no beneficial interest 
i. nth e g I' n era t ion - s h a r i n gar ran gem e nt, the n 
the youn'lest ancestor of the transferee who 
~as related to the initial transferor and who 
had an interest in the generation-sharing 
drrangement was generally deemed the "deemed 
transferor." 
(d) Where the generation-sharing arrangement 
was created for the benefit of a person not a 
member of the initial transferor's family, 
the deemed transferor was generally the 
parent of the transferee most closely related 
to the initial transferor. 
6. The amount subject to the generation-skipping 
transfer tax was the fair market value of the property made 
the subject of the generation-skipping transfer at the time 
the taxable termination or taxable distribution was deemed 
to have occurred. 
7. A $250,000.00 exemption (per child of the initial 
transferor) was available for generation-skipping transfers 
to grandchildren to the extent that the property vested in 
the grandchildren at the time of the taxable distribution or 
taxable termination otherwise triggering the tax. Vesting 
occurred when the interest of the grandchild in the property 
was such that the interest wouln be taxable in the grand-
child's estat~. 
Example (5): If the initial transferor had 
two chi ldren I up to $500,000.00 could be 
transferred from a generation-sharing 
arrangement to the children of those two 
children ($250,000.00 to the children of 
each) without imposition of the generation-
skipping transfer tax on the termination of 
interests of the initial transferor's 
children in the generation-sharing arrange-
ment. 
8. To the extent any transfer was subject to the 
federal estate or gift tax it was not considered to be a 
E-4 
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t,u(ah'l;~ cHstributi.on or taxable terminati.on for purposes of 
the generation-ski.pping transfer tax. 
F:xample (6): The initial transferor (Gl) 
transferred property into a trust for the 
benefit of his daughter (G2) giving her a 
present {n~ome interest in such trust for 
life, plus a general power of appointment 
with respect to the property held in the 
trust. Dpon G2's death the property was to' 
pass outright to G2's son (G3) if the general 
power of dppointment was not exercised by G2. 
Upon G2's (leath, the trust property would be 
included in her estate for federal estate tax 
purposes because of the general power of 
appointment. Since the federal estate tax 
was appl icahle at that time, the transfer to 
83 would not be subject to the generation-
skipping transfer tax. 
9. The "deemed transferor" concept made the 
gEmeration-skipping transfer tax, imposed by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, uncluly compli.cated and, as previously 
men t ioned, the tax did not appl y to direct skips. Based on 
these and other complexities and loopholes found in the old 
generation-skipping transfer tax provisions of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted a new generation-
skippi.ng transfer tax under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
rI. THE NEW GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX. 
A. REPEAL OF THE OLD GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX. 
1. The unduly complicated generation-skipping 
transfer tax i.mposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has been 
repealed retroactively to its original effective date of 
June 11,1976. Pub.L. No. 99-514, ~1433(c)(1). 
2. Individuals who paid the old generation-skipping 
transfer tax may obtain a credit or refund (with interest) 
for any tax so paid. Pub.L. NO. 99-514, §1443(c)(1). 
3. To help accomplish this the statute of limitations 
for filing a refund claim has been extended to October 22, 
1987. Pub.L. No. 99-514, ~1443(c)(2). 
B. TRANSFERS SUBJECT TO THE TAX. 
1.. Transfers subject to the new generation-skipping 
transfer tax are: (1) taxable terminations, (2) taxable 
distributions, and (3) direct skips. I.R.C. &2611(a). 
E- '5 
2. Taxable Terminations. A taxahle termination is 
doeme(~ tC) OCCllr upon the termi.nation of an inter.est in a 
trust or trust equivalent if, after. such termination, all 
interests in the trust or trust equivalent are held by "skip 
Persons." I.R.C. §26l2(a)(l). If, when an interest is 
terminated, any portion of the assets of the trust are 
distributed to "skip persons" who are lineal descendants of 
the holder of the terminated interest, such termination is a 
"taxahle termination" with respect to the trust property so 
distributed ~ven if, after such termination, - not all 
interests in the trust or trust equivalent are held by skip 
persons. I.R.C. ~2612(a)(2). 
(a) A "skip person" is generally a person 
two or more generations below that of the 
transferor or a tr.ust for the benefit of any 
such person or persons. LR.C. ~2613(a). 
(b) A person is deemed to have an "interest" 
in a trust or trust equivalent where he has a 
current r.ight to receive income or corpus 
from such trust or trust equivalent. This is 
true whether he is a mandatory or merely a 
permissihle recipient of the income or corpus 
from the trust. I.R.C. ~2652(c)(1). For 
example, a person having an income interest 
for life or holding a general power of 
appointment is treated as having an interest 
in property. 
Example (7): The initial trans-
feror (Gl) creates a trust which 
provides for income to his children 
for life, and when the last of such 
children die, the remainder of the 
corpus of the trust will then be 
distributed outright to Glls grand-
children. The current interests of 
Glls children are "interests" in 
the trust. Generally, no taxable 
termination will have occurred 
until the last child of Gl dies. 
However, if the tr.ustee is 
instructed to distribute a portion 
of property in the trust to Glls 
grandchildren upon the death of any 
such child, such would constitute a 
taxahle ter.mination to the extent 
of the property distributed to such 
deceased child's children, even 
though all interests in the trust 
are not held by the grandchildren. 
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1. Taxable Distributions. A "taxable distribution" 
oct":ut"s wher.:e-there ls a distribution from a trust or tr.ust 
equivalent to a skip person, as defined above, which does 
not constitute a taxable termination or a direct skip. 
I.R.C. §2612(b). 
(a) The distribution of income, as well as 
corpus, is deemed a taxable distribution 
subject to the generation-skipping transfer 
tax. This ~"as not the cal-Hl under the old 
qeneration-skipping transfer tax wher.e only 
ciis'triblltions of corpus werG deemed taxable 
distriblltions. H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 82r;. 
(b) The imposition of the generation-
skipping transfer tax upon a taxable distri-
hution of income is mitigated to some degree 
in that the recipient of the taxable income 
distribution may take an income tax deduction 
for the qeneration-skipping transfer tax so 
imposed upon the distribution. I.R.C. 
~164(a)(6). 
Example (8): The initial trans-
feror (GI) sets up a trust for the 
benefit of his child (G2) and his 
granr'3child (G3). The trustee may 
makl"! distributions of income or 
principal to either G2 or G3. If 
the trustee makes distributions of 
either income or principal to G3 
while G2 still has an interest in 
the trust such will constitute 
taxable distributions. 
4. Direct Skips. A "direct skip" is any transfer of 
property by a transferor directly to a "skip person" if the 
initi~ I tran:~feror is subject to estate or gift tax on the 
transfer. I.R.C. ~2nI2(c)(I). nirect skips are different 
fr.-om taxable r'3istributions or taxable terminations because 
no one in generations between the initial transferor and the 
"skip person" enjoys an economic benefit from the arrange-
ment. 
Example (9): The initial transferor (GI) 
transfers property outright to his grandchild 
(G3). There is no intervening economic 
benefit to GI's child (G2). To the extent 
that such transfer is subject to the federal 
estate or gift tax it will be a "direct skip" 
for purposes of the generation-skipping 
transfer tax. The same is true if GI were to 
transfer the property to a trust for G3. 
E-7 
c. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF TAX. 
1. Applicable Rates. While there is a formula for 
d~termining the "applicable rate", transfers are essentially 
taxed at a flat rate equal to the then maximum unified 
estate and gift tax rate (i.e., 55% in 1987 and 50% in 1988 
an~ thereafter). I.R.C. ~264l. Because of thE! $1 million 
exemption available to each taxpayer (discussed below), the 
actual mechanical computation of the rate is as follows: 
Maximum Federal Estate Tax X 
Rate at the Time of the 
Taxable Event 
[l-(Amount of Transferor's 
$1 Million Exemption 
Allocated to the Taxable 
Event ~ The Value of the 
Property so Transferred)] 
For purposes of determining the "applicable rate", the value 
of the property so transferred is reduced by the sum of any 
estate or death taxes actually recovered from the property 
transferred and any charitable deduction allocable to the 
property transferred. I.R.C. ~2642(a)(2)(B). As you can 
see from the formula, unless some portion of the $1 million 
axemption is allocated to a generation-skipping transfer, 
the tax rate would generally be the then maximum estate tax 
rate. 
2. Amount Subject to Tax. The amount actually subject 
to the tax depends upon the type of taxable event triggering 
the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
(a) Taxable Terminations. The amount sub-
ject to tax where a taxable termination 
occurs is the value of the property with 
respect to which the prior intervening 
interest terminates, reduced by a deduction 
for certain expenses, indebtedness and taxes 
attributed to the property (to the extent 
such expenses would be allowed by 
I.R.C. ~2053). I.R.C. ~2622. The 
generation-skipping transfer tax due on a 
taxable termination is to be paid by the 
trustee of the trust or trust equivalent. 
I.R.C. ~2603(a)(2). The "trustee", in the 
context of a trust equivalent, is the person 
in actual or constructive possession of the 
property subject to the arrangement. I.R.C. 
~2652(b)(2). 
Example (10): The initial trans-
feror (Gl) transfers property into 
a trust in the amount of 
S200,OOO.00 for the benefit of his 
son (G2), for life, with any 
E-8 
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rem,'tining corpus going outright to 
Gl's gr.andson (G3) upon G2's death. 
Upon G2's death in 1987, a taxable 
termination has occurred. The 
resulting tax is paid by the 
trustee out of the property passing 
to G3. Assuming the trust corpus 
stayed intact, without the aid of 
any exemptions the tax would be 
$110,000.00 and the gr.andson would 
receive $90,000.00. 
(b) Taxable Distributions. Where a taxable 
distribution has occurred, the amount subject 
to the generation-skipping transfer tax is 
the amount received by the distributee, 
reduced by expenses incurred in connection 
with the determination, collection or refund 
of the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
T.R.C. ~2621(a). The person liable for 
paying the tax upon a taxable distribution is 
the distributee of the property. I.R.C. 
~2603(a)(l). If the trustee, rather than the 
distributee, actually pays the tax, the pay-
ment is an additional distribution to the 
distributee, which distribution would also be 
subject to the generation-skipping transfer 
tax. I.R.C. §262l(b). 
Example (11): Gl sets up a trust 
for the benefit of his child (G2) 
and grandchild (G3). During 1987, 
the trustee distributes $100,000.00 
of trust income to G3 while G2 is 
stl1l a beneficiary of the trust. 
The tax will be $55,000.00, to be 
paid by G3, and G3 will net 
$45,000.00. If the trustee had 
paid the tax on the taxable distri-
bution, the amount of taxable dis-
tribution for purposes of the tax 
would be $155,000.00 instead of 
$100,000.00, and the tax would have 
been $85,250.00. 
( c ) D i E!:."£!_ Ski E..! • W her e a d ire c t ski p 
occurs, the amount subject to tax is the 
value of the property received by the trans-
feree. I.R.C. §2623. The person liable for 
paying the tax upon a direct skip is the 
transferor of the property. I.R.C. 
~2603(a)(3). 
E-9 
Example (12): The transferor (Gl) 
grves $2 million to a grandchild 
(G3) in 1987 and no exemptions 
(described below) have been claimed 
with respect to same. Gl must pay 
a genera tion-skipping transfer tax 
on such transact,i.on of $1.1 
million, out of other assets of GI, 
and G3 receives $2 million. 
The amount of any taxable gift which consti-
t u t'e a a d ire c t ski pis inc rea sed, for g i f t 
tax purposes, by the amount of the 
generation-skipping transfer tax imposed upon 
the transferor with respect to such gift. 
I.R.C. §2515. For this reason, the transfer 
taxes paid by a transferor in a direct skip 
situation may actually exceed the value of 
the property transferred. The confiscatory 
nature of this situation makes it 
particularly important to review transactions 
which might be direct skips for purposes of 
the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
ExamE..!.~Jlll: Gl ia in the 50% 
federal gift tax rate bracket and 
makes a direct gift of $1 million 
to his grandchild (G3) in 1988, 
which is subject to the federal 
gift tax and the generation-
skipping transfer tax. GI would 
ha\Te to pay $500,000.00 in 
generation-skipping transfer taxes 
and $750,000.00 in federal gift 
taxes as a result of the trans-
action. Thus, the tax cost to GI 
of the transfer is 125% of the 
va 1 ue of the property transferred. 
3. Property to be Charged with the Tax. Unless other-
wise directed by a trust instrument specifically referring 
to the generation-skipping transfer tax, the tax imposed 
upon a generation-skipping transfer is to be charged to the 
property so transferred. !oR.C. §2603(b). Thus, the 
Internal Revenue Code appears to provide two "pockets" from 
which the generation-skipping transfer tax may be collected. 
The first is from the person 1 iable for the tax, the second 
is that the tax can be collected from the property involved 
in the generation-skipping transfer. 
4. Valuation of Property. 
(a) Property subject to the generation-
skipping transfer tax is to be valued at the 
--r 
... 
J 
J 
J 
i 
J 
j 
J 
J 
J 
j 
--
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
tim e 1 '1 e t d x: a b I e 
t • R. C. § hi 24 ( a ) • 
e'/ent occurs. 
(b) The va lue of property transferred wi 11 
be reduced by any consideration furnished by 
the transferee. I.R.C. &2624(d). 
(c) Where property is transferred by way of 
a direct skip, as the result of the death of 
the transferor, and the property is included-
in the transfero~'s estate, the value of such 
property Eor generation-skipping transfer tax 
purposes is the same as its value for estate 
tax purposes. I.R.C. ~2624(b). In such 
event, valuation on the alternate valuation 
date and special use valuations would be 
available in determining value for 
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. 
(d) Where a taxable termination occurs upon 
the death of an individual, an election may 
he made to value all the property as of the 
alternate valuation date for such 
individual's estate, for purposes of deter-
mining the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
I.R.C. §2624(c). 
D. GENERATION DETERMINATION. 
1. 
or not 
family. 
Generation determination is 
the beneficiary is a member 
I.R.C. §2651. 
dependent on whether 
of the transferor's 
- 2. If the t~ansferee is within the family line of the 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
transferor, generations are assigned beginning with the 
grandparent of the transferor. I.R.C. &265l(b)(l). 
(a) The transferor, his spouse, his 
brothers, sisters and their spouses, as well 
as his spouse's brothers, sisters and their 
spouses are members of the same generation, 
regardless of age. Thus, a spouse becomes a 
member of the same generation as the relative 
of the transfe~or to whom he or she is 
married. I.R.C. §2651(c). 
(b) The next succeeding generation consists 
of the transferor's and his spouse's 
chi Idren, nephews, nieces and their spouses. 
(c) The third succeeding generation consti-
tutes the transferor's and his spouse's 
<J~andchi ldren, grandnephews, grannnieces and 
E-ll 
spouses of same. This continues on for 
succeeding family levels. 
(d) Adopted children are treated as children 
related by blood for these purposes and 
family members by the half-blood are treated 
as relations by the full-blood. I.R.C. 
~2651(b)(3). 
3. Where the beneficiaries are not within ~he family 
line of ~he transferor they are determined by the respective 
~ges of the transferor and the transferee. I.R.C. §265l (d). 
(a) Any transferee born within the 12 1/2 
year period following the date of the trans-
feror's birth is of the same generation as 
the transferor. I.R.C. §265l{d)(1). 
(b) Beneficiaries born more than 12 1/2 
years but within 37 1/2 years of the trans-
feror's date of birth is a member of the 
first generation below the transferor. 
I.R.C. &2651(d)(2). Each succeeding genera-
tion is measured by equivalent 25-yea~ 
periods. I.R.C. &265l(d)(3). 
4. Where a trust, estate, corporation, partnership or 
other entity has an interest in the property being tran~­
ferred (other than certain types of charitable organiza-
tions), each individual who has a beneficial interest in 
such entity is treated as having an equivalent interest in 
~uch property and will be assigned to a generation under the 
rules described above. I.R.C. &2651(e)(2). 
E. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE TAX. 
1. Certain Transfers Subject to the Federal Estate or 
Gift Tax. Exempted from the generation-skippin~ transfer 
tax is any transfer (other than a direct skip) to the extent 
that the transfer is subject to an estate or gift tax with 
respect to a person in the first generation below that of 
the initial transferor. I.R.C. §2611(b)(l). See Example 
( 6 ) • 
2. Exemption for Direct Skips to Grandchildren. 
(a) A transferor may exempt up to $2 million 
of property transferred to each grandchild by 
direct skip. However, this only applies to 
direct skips made prior to January I, 1990. 
P.L. 99-514, §1433(b)(3). 
(b) While not clear, if the direct skip is 
in the context of a trust for the benefit of 
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a grandchild it may only qualify for this 
grandchil~ exemption if the interest vests in 
the grandchild at the time of the transfer. 
To vest, the property would need to be 
subject to taxation as a part of the grand-
child's estate if the grandchild died. For 
instance, consider a testamentary general 
power of appointment for the grandchild or 
distribution of the property to his estate 
up 0 n de a t h. S P r ink lin g t r u s t s w 0 u I d not> 
res~lt in the necessary vesting. 
(c) Married persons may elect to treat each 
such transfer as if made one-half by each 
spouse in a manner similar to the gift-
splitting rules under the federal gift tax. 
I.R.C. §2652(a)(2). 
3. Exemption for Direct Skips to ·Orphaned· Grand-
children. If a direct skip is made to a grandchild of the 
transferor at a time when the transferor's child, who is the 
parent of such grandchi ld, is deceased, the grandchi Id and 
all succeeding lineal descendants of such grandchild move up 
one generation. In such case, the transfer by the grand-
parent to such grandchild which would otherwise constitute a 
direct skip is not subject to the generation-skipping 
transfer tax. I.R.C. §2612(c)(2). 
Example (14): Gl transfers $3 
million to. his grandchild (G3), 
under a transaction otherwise 
constituting a direct skip, at a 
time when G2 (Gl's son and G3's 
father) is dead. The direct skip 
would not be subject to the 
generation-skipping tax. 
4. Exemption for Non-taxable Gifts. The generation-
skipping transfer tax is inapplicable with respect to life-
time transfers exempt under the annual exclusion rules of 
the federal gift tax and also with respect to the transfers 
qualifying for the exclus:i.on for tuition and medical 
expenses under the federal gift tax. I.R.C. §§261l(b)(2) 
and 2642(c). 
5. The One Million Dollar Exemption per Transferor. 
(a) Transferors are entitled to a $1 million 
exemption that they can allocate to any 
generation-skipping transfers they make. 
I.R.C. §2631(a). 
(b) In general, the transferor (or his 
executor) may make allocations as he sees fit 
E-13 
among his generation-skipping transfers. 
However, th~ exemption must be allocated 
prior to the date that the individual's 
estate tax return is due (including exten-
sions). I.R.C. ~2632(a)(I). 
(c) Any allocation, once made, is irrevoc-
able. I.R.C. §263l(b). 
(d) OnCA an allocation is made to property' 
any subsequent appreciation in the value of 
the 'prop~rty exempted under the $1 million 
exemption is also exempt from the generation-
skipping transf,:'!r tax. H.R. Rep. No. 426, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 826. 
E x am ~J 15 ) : The i nit i a 1 t ran s-
feror (GI}transfers property to a 
trust for the benefit of his child 
(G2) for life, with the remainder 
interest therein passing to his 
g r a It (1 chi I d ( G 3 ) • The am 0 u n t 0 f 
property transferred is 
$500,000.00. If GI allocates 
$500,000.00 of his $1 million 
exemption to the trust, then no 
part of such trust will ever be 
subj ect to the genera tion-skipping 
transfer tax. Thus, if 
subsequently a taxable termination 
occurs and the trust is worth $2 
mi 11 ion no portion of the $2 
million of property will be subject 
to the generation-skipping tax on 
that taxable termination. 
(e) It is obviously very important to make 
the allocation at the earliest possible time 
so that any appreciation in the property 
thereafter will not be subject to tax. 
(f) It il3 obviously advantageous to allocate 
the $1 mil lion exemption among property which 
is more likely to appreciate than to property 
which is not likely to appreciate. 
(g) Since appreciation of any property 
allocated to the $1 million exemption is free 
from the generation-skipping transfer tax it 
is advisable to isolate that property at the 
time the allocation is made so that there 
will be no dispute as to what appreciation 
may be covered by the exemption. 
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F. 
(h) If a generation-skipping transfer is 
made by a married individual, the spouses may 
elect to treat the transfer as made one-half 
by each spouse. I.R.C. §2652(a)(2). 
(i) If an individual makes a lifetime direct 
skip, then any unused portion of his $1 
million exemption is applied to such transfer 
unless the individual elects not to have this 
provision apply. I.R.C. §2632(b). If the $1 
mi~lion exemption has not been fully 
allocated at the time of transferor's death, 
it will be deemed allocated first to direct 
skips which occur as a result of his death 
and next to trusts with respect to which the 
individual is the transferor and from which a 
taxable termination or taxable distribution 
might occur upon death. I.R.C. §2632(c)(1). 
(j) Where property is transferred to a QTIP 
arrangement upon death, the estate of the 
decedent may, for purposes of the generation-
skipping transfer tax only, elect to treat 
such property as if the QTIP election had not 
been made. I.R.C. §2652(a)(3). This permits 
the property to be treated as that of the 
decedent whose estate can then allocate his 
$1 million exemption (or what remains of it) 
to the property constituting QTIP property 
and the recipient spouse may then have his or 
her $1 million exemption (or what remains of 
it) available for other property. This elec-
tion will normally be utilized where the 
decedent spouse's $1 million exemption would 
otherwise be wasted. 
INCOME TAX EFFECTS. 
1. The basis of property transferred in a generation-
skipping transfer is increased, by the portion of the 
generation-skipping transfer tax imposed which is attribut-
able to the appreciation in the property over the trans-
feror's basis (but not in excess of its fair market value). 
I.R.C. §2654(a)(l). 
2. Where a taxable termination has occurred as a 
result of a person's death the basis of such property may be 
stepped up in a manner similar to that provided under 
I.R.C. §lOl4(a), with certain very limited exceptions. 
I.R.C. ~2654(a)(2). 
G. DISCLAIMERS. If a disclaimer is made by a younger 
generation-beneficiary-whlch results in property being passed to 
a person at least two generations below that of the original 
E-15 
transferor, such will result in the imposition of a generation-
~kipping tr.ansfer tax. I.R.C. ~~2654(c) and 2518. 
H. STATE TAX CREDIT. There is a credit, not to exceed 5% 
of the generation-skipping transfer tax, for any generation-
skipping transfer tax imposed by a state on a generation-skipping 
tr.ansfer occurring as a result of an indi.vidual's death. I.R.C. 
S2604. 
I. OTHBR MISCELLANEOUS RULES. 
1. If a single trust provides for transfers to more 
than one gener.ation of generation-skipping beneficiaries, 
then the property is subject to a generation-skipping tax 
when it is transferred to each succeeding generation more 
than one generation below that of the original transferor. 
I.R.C. ~2653(a). 
2. If trusts have substantially separate and indepen-
dent shares for various beneficiaries, each such share will 
be treated as a separate trust for purposes of the 
genera tion-skippi ng transfer tax. I.R.C. & 2654( b). 
3. The new generation-skipping transfer tax, applies 
generally to transfers made after October 22, 1986. 
Interestingly, however, inter vivos transfers made after 
September 25, 1985 and on or before October 22, 1986 are 
treated, for purposes of the generation-skipping transfer 
tax as if made on October 23, 1986. Pub.L. No. 99-514, 
S1433(c)(3). 
TIl. PLANNING TIPS. 
A. Examine existing documents to make sure the client's 
will ~nd other dispositive instruments properly utilize exemp-
tions and do not provide for substantial taxable direct skips 
(which were not taxable under the old generation-skipping 
tral1EJfer tax). 
B. Give the executor of the cl ient's estate broad powers 
to allocate the $1 million exemption, to the extent still avail-
able upon the client's death. 
C. Give the executor or trustee the authority to divide 
any trusts established into separate trusts~ one which takes into 
qccount any allocable portion of the $1 million exemption and the 
other which does not. 
D. Take full advantage of the gift tax annual exclusion 
Bxemption to the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
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E. Try to leverage the $1 million exemption by using it in 
conjunction with the gift tax annual exclusion. 
F. Always try to allocate the $1 million exemption to 
assets with high appreciation potential. 
G. Allocate the $1 million exemption to genp.ration-
skipping arrangements involving multiple future skips since it 
exempts the property with respect to each such skip which would 
otherwise be taxable. 
H. T~ith respect to the $1 million exemption, consider 
giving the "poorer" spouse assets sufficient to use his or her 
exemption so that the opportunity to exclude a total of $2 
mi 11 ion (Le., the $1 mi 11 i on exemption of each spouse) wi 11 not 
be lost if he or she predeceases the "richer" spouse. 
I. Where exemptions are not available or have been used 
up, consider passing property outright to the intervening genera-
tion, who can then utilize available estate and gift tax exclu-
sions and credits of their own to eliminate taxation on transfers 
to the next succeeding generation. 
J. Consider leveraging exempt transfers to skip persons by 
utilizing the property so transferred to purchase life insurance 
on the life of the initial transferor. 
K. Take full advantage of the $2 million grandchild exemp-
tion before it expires on December 31, 1989. 
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1. 
CHARITABLE GIVING AND ESTATE PLANNING 
K. Sidney Neuman 
Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C. 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
Outright Charitable Gifts to Public Charities. 
A. 
B. 
Public Charities include supporting foundations and 
operating foundations, philanthropic and endowment 
funds of Public Charities, §170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii). 
Limitations on deductibility depend on type of gift: 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4 . 
5. 
Cash Gifts deductible up to 50 percent of 
contribution base and excess deductions are 
carried forward for up to 5 years, §170(b)(1)(A). 
The contribution base is adjusted gross income 
without adjustment for NOL carryback under §172. 
Appreciated Long-Term Capital Gain Property is 
deductible up to 30 percent of base and excess 
deductions are carried forward for up to 5 years, 
§170(b)(1)(C): 
a. If donor is in AMT, he loses benefit of 
appreciated portion of gift; 
b. Special election available for 50 percent 
limitation where taxpayer reduces the 
deduction by the appreciation. 
Ordinary Income Property gifts are deductible to 
extent of cost basis and subject to 50 percent 
limitation, §170(e). 
Tangible Personalty such as art is deductible at 
full fair market value only if use of gift by 
donee is related to its tax-exempt purpose. 
Example, a gift of a painting to an art museum for 
display, §170(e)(1). Deduction must be 
substantiated by appraisal if in excess of $5,000. 
Scientific Equipment manufactured by a corporate 
donor and gifted within 2 years of manufacture to 
University for research on the physical or 
biological services is entitled to an augmented 
deduction equal to basis plus half the 
F-l 
Sale of Stock 
Cost Basis 
Gain 
Cash Gift 
Tax on Gain 
appreciation but not more than twice the donor's 
basis (§170(e)(4)). 
Planning suggestion: Where appropriate, donor 
should make charitable gifts in appreciated 
capital gain property. We must be alert to 
opportunities brought on by LBO's and 
acquisitions. The following example compares sale 
followed by gift with gift of stock. 
1987 1988 
$100,000 $100,000 
1,000 1,000 
99,000 99,000 
100,000 100,000 
27,720 27,720 
Tax Savings on Gift 38,500 28,000 
Net Tax Savings 10,780 280 
Gift of Stock 100,000 100,000 
Tax on Gain -0- -0-
Tax savings on Gift 38,500 28,000 
Net Tax Savings 38,500 28,000 
The appreciation, $99,000, constitutes a tax preference under 
§57(a)(6). To the extent donor is in the AMT, he will be taxed 
at 21 percent on the appreciation which will equal the value of 
the deduction for the appreciation. The minimum tax credit under 
§53 now available to offset regular tax in later years is not 
available if AMT was attributable to charitable deductions. 
6. 
7 • 
8. 
Defer gifts of appreciated property to end of year 
or until taxpayer has reliable estimate of all 
income and expenses; 
Rate reduction from 38.5% to 28% allows more room 
for gifting appreciated property while avoiding 
AMT in 1987 than in 1988; 
Contribution of stock in a closely-held 
corporation to a Public Charity can: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Increase cash available to donor since he 
deducts fair market value of stock. 
If stock is redeemed by Corporation, it 
increases percentage of ownership of other 
stockholders. 
Be sure of valuation and that redemption by 
Corporation is optional by Charity. 
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Corporate Contributions, S170(b)(2). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Limited to 10 percent of contribution base. 
Excess contributions may be carried forward for up 
to 5 years. 
Excess contributions qualify as a deduction for 
computing tax on accumulated earnings. 
r II. Private Non-Operating Foundation. 
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A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
1984 TRA increased the limitation on contributions from 
20 percent to 30 percent on gifts of cash and ordinary 
income property. 
The limitation often is less than 30 percent since such 
contributions are allowable only to the extent of the 
lesser of (1) 30 percent of the donor's contribution 
base, or (2) the excess of 50 percent of contribution 
base over the amount of contributions allowable under 
S170(b)(1)(A) determined without regard to 
S170(b)(a)(C) (the special 30 percent limitation on 
capital gain property). 
Example: Mr. Donor with a contribution base of 
$500,000 gifts $300,000 of capital gain property to his 
university and $100,000 cash to his private foundation. 
The $300,000 gift to the university is subject to the 
30 percent limitation under 170(b)(1)(C), $150,000 
being deductible in the current year and the remaining 
$150,000 to be carried forward for up to 5 years. 
Since the $500,000 gift to the university exceeded 50 
percent of Mr. Donor's contribution base, he receives 
no current benefit from the gift to the private 
foundation but may carry it forward as well. 
The 20 percent limitation still applies to contribution 
of capital gain property. 
Contribution of capital gain property to private non-
operating foundations is generally limited to donor's 
basis. 
1. A special exception for gift of appreciated 
qualified stock to a private foundation where: 
a. 
b. 
such stock is publicly traded; 
not more than 10 percent of the outstanding 
stock was gifted by taxpayer and his family 
during his lifetime. 
F-3 
E. 
2 . In some cases it may be better for a donor to sell 
appreciated stock, pay tax on the gain at 28 
percent and receive a full deduction for the gift: 
a. 
b. 
if donor expects to be in AMT in later years; 
if donor's gifts in later years are expected 
to exceed 50 percent base. 
Burdens of Monitoring Private Foundation. 
1. Minimum Distribution Requirements. 
2 . 
3 . 
Excise tax of 2 percent investment income, §4940. 
Reduced to 1 percent if foundation meets certain 
payout requirements, §4940(e). 
Prohibitions against jeopardy investments, 
improper distributions, self-dealing. 
4. Administrative burdens: 
5 . 
a. 
b. 
c. 
annual reporting/public inspection 
investment fees 
trustees fees 
More stringent limitations on deduction for 
charitable gifts. 
III. Gifts of Partial Interests. 
A. 
B. 
Bargain Sales - Where taxpayer sells property to a 
charity at less than fair market value, the sale is 
treated as: 
1 . 
2 . 
A sale of an undivided interest and gift of the 
balance with taxpayer's basis being allocated 
between the sale and gift. 
Gift of encumbered property is treated as a 
bargain sale with amount of indebtedness treated 
as sale proceeds. 
Gift of Remainder Interest in Personal Residence or 
Farm. 
1 . 
2 . 
Charitable deduction calculated based on 10 
percent unisex actuarial tables. 
Deduction allowable for gift of undivided interest 
in remainder or in case of farm for gift of a 
remainder in specific acreage. 
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C. 
D. 
3 • 
4 . 
5 . 
Partial gift could be useful where gift is likely 
to exceed amount deductible in current and next 
five years. 
Particularly advantageous where donor knows 
property will be left to charity. 
Life interest can be retained by donor, spouse or 
other individuals. 
Qualified Conservation Contribution - A perpetual 
conservation restriction or easement granted to a 
governmental unit or conservancy, S170(f)(3)(B)(iii). 
1 . Conservation includes preservation of land: 
a. for education or recreational purposes; 
b. protect environmental system; 
c. open space for scenic enjoyment; 
d. historically important land areas. 
Charitable Gift Annuities - Where donor transfers 
property to a charity in return for the charity's 
promise to pay an annuity to donor and/or some other 
beneficiary. No statutory provisions. Rev. Rul. 73-1, 
1973-1 C.B 117. 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
Combination of bargain sale and private annuity 
rules apply: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Charitable deduction for fair market value in 
excess of value of annuity; 
Basis is allocated between annuity portion 
and charitable gift portion; 
Annuity portion is taxable in part and return 
of capital in part; 
If appreciated property is transferred then 
30 percent limitation instead of 50 percent 
limitation applicable. 
Committee of gift annuities. A voluntary 
committee recommends uniform gift annuity rates 
designed to produce a charitable deduction equal 
to 50 percent of the value of the property 
transferred. 
Some charities reinsure their gift annuities 
shifting the investment risk to insurance 
F-5 
E. 
F. 
4. 
companies, freeing up the surplus funds for 
current use. 
Gift annuities may create debt financed income for 
charity. 
Deferred Gift Annuities - An extension of the gift 
annuity by deferring the annuity starting date for a 
specified period. 
Pooled Income Funds - A common trust maintained by a 
public charity received gifts from donors who retain 
the income for life with remainder to the charity 
(§642(c) (5»: 
1. Income may be reserved for living individuals. 
2. Funds may not invest in tax-exempt securities. 
3 . 
4 • 
5 . 
6. 
7 . 
The rate of return of all income beneficiaries of 
a fund is determined by the rate of return of the 
fund for the year. 
The donor may retain the power exercisable only by 
will to accelerate the charitable remainder. 
All property transferred to the PIF must be co-
mingled. 
No donor may be a trustee of the fund. What if 
the donor is an officer or director of charity? 
Statutory requirements must be met otherwise PIF 
will fail to qualify and Service will disallow 
estate, gift and income tax deductions. 
B. Donor recognizes no gain on transfer of 
appreciated property to a PIF, unless property is 
encumbered. 
9 . If gift is of a future interest in tangible 
personal property, deduction must be deferred 
until intervening interests expire. 
10. While a PIF is not an exempt trust, it receives a 
set aside deduction for capital gains and is 
required to distribute its net income so there is 
no tax at trust level. 
11. Gift to a pooled income fund is an excellent 
alternative to donor desiring to make a relatively 
small remainder gift. 
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a. Donor avoids costly administrative expenses 
incurred by charitable remainder trusts. 
b. Donor gains the flexibility of pooled 
investments, i.e., diversification. 
c. Not restricted to a fixed income or fixed 
percentage as in charitable remainder trusts. 
Income should rise with inflation. 
d. Avoid capital gains tax on sale of 
appreciated securities. 
Charitable Remainder Trusts - Strict statutory 
provisions govern the qualification of split interest 
trusts, §664. . 
1. Charitable Remainder Trust must: 
a. be a written trust instrument; 
b. in the case of a unitrust, pay a fixed 
percentage (at least 5 percent) of the net 
fair market value of the corpus determined 
annually, and in the case of an annuity 
trust, pay a sum certain; 
c. payments must be made at specified intervals 
at least annually; 
d. payments must be made to one or more 
individuals who were living on date of 
creation of the trust; 
e. the trust must be for either the lives of the 
specified beneficiaries or a term not to 
exceed 20 years; 
f. upon expiration of the income term, the 
corpus must be held or distributed for the 
use or benefit of charitable organizations 
described in §170(c), §2522 and §2055(a). 
Example 1. Donor transfers $500,000 worth of stock 
with a cost basis of $5,000 and a current yield of 20 
percent to a 6 percent charitable remainder unitrust 
for the benefit of his son, age 25, for life with 
remainder to his community foundation. The donor 
serves as trustee with the son as successor. The son 
has the power to designate alternate charities as 
beneficiaries. The appreciated stocks are sold and 
F-7 
then invested in securities paying dividends of 6 
percent with capital growth of 4 percent. The donor is 
entitled to a current deduction of $40,540 producing an 
income tax savings of $15,608 in 1987. Donor has made 
a taxable gift of $459,460 for the benefit of his son. 
Donor will save $138,600 tax on the capital gain 
generated from the sale of the securities transferred. 
Assuming donor and his spouse have not used any of 
their unified credit, there will be no gift tax paid on 
the transfer. Donor's son will receive $30,000 the 
first year and may anticipate increases in later years. 
The $30,000 is likely to be taxed at a 28 percent or 
higher rate leaving $21,600 to spend or reinvest. 
Donor's son invests $3,000 a year to acquire $1,000,000 
of life insurance. Donor's son has a life expectancy 
of 58 years. The unitrust amount is likely to grow 
from $30,000 in the first year to $280,557 in year 58. 
The remainder to be received by the charity at the 
son's death in 58 years would be $4,862.993. Assuming 
the life insurance remained in force, the company's 
dividend schedule remains at 9 1/4 percent and all 
dividends are used to pay premiums or buy paid up 
additions, the son will have over $13,000,000 of life 
insurance for his beneficiary. 
Example 2. Assume the same facts except the donor 
creates a $30,000 per year annuity trust. The son's 
income remains the same, $30,000 per year. The 
accumulations for charity would total more than 
$50,000,000 for charity. 
2 . 
3 . 
Qualified Charitable Remainder Trusts are exempt 
from Federal income tax except on unrelated 
business income. 
a. 
b. 
No tax on capital gains or on surplus income 
earned in trust. 
Income retains its character for tax when 
distributed and distributions are deemed to 
be first out of: 
l. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
ordinary income 
capital gain 
tax-exempt income 
principal 
Grantor or beneficiary may serve as trustee, or 
retain the power to remove the trustee, but must 
avoid retaining certain powers that would treat 
grantor as owner under grantor trust rules. 
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4. 
5. 
6 . 
7. 
8 . 
Additions may be made at any time to a charitable 
remainder unitrust. 
a. 
b. 
Special valuation adjustment is made to 
determine increase in unitrust amount. 
Adjustments may be made where error is made 
resulting in an overpayment or underpayment. 
Charitable Remainder Unitrust may provide for 
distribution of lesser of unitrust amount or net 
earnings from trust, and in such case, CRUT may 
provide for catch up out of subsequent years 
earnings in excess of unitrust amount. 
Grantor and/or Beneficiary may retain the power to 
change charitable remaindermen, but such power 
would subject deduction to private foundation 
limitations. 
If Grantor Trust Rules under §671-678 result in 
taxing the grantor as owner, charitable remainder 
trust will not qualify: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
power to alter amount paid to a non-
charitable beneficiary; 
power to invade for benefit of a non-
charitable beneficiary; 
power to revoke, except power to revoke or 
terminate interest of non-charitable 
beneficiary by will; 
power to remove or appoint a trustee who has 
any of the prohibited powers. 
Donor is entitled to a gift tax or estate tax 
deduction for fair market value of charitable 
remainder. 
a. Calculation is based on 10 percent interest 
assumptions and 1969-71 mortality figures. 
i. Annuity Trust - Charitable remainder 
is calculated by deducting from the 
total fair market value, the value of 
the annuity under the tables provided 
by Reg. §25.2522. 
F-9 
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ii. Unitrust - Charitable remainder is 
calculated under tables provided by 
Reg. §1.664. 
b. Five Percent Rule - IRS would disallow gift 
or estate tax deduction if probability that 
charity will not receive anything exceeds 5 
percent, Rev. Rul. 77-324, 1972-2C.B.329: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
should not apply to unitrust since 
principal theoretically cannot be 
exhausted. But see PLR7915038. 
Ten percent interest assumption makes 
it less likely that 5 percent rule 
will apply. 
Courts may not follow the 5 percent 
rule, Moor v. Commissioner, TC Memo 
1982~299. 
Safe Course is to seek private ruling as to 
qualification of charitable remainder trust. 
10. A qualified Charitable Remainder Income Interest 
in favor of a spouse will, if it is the only 
terminable interest in advance of the charitable 
remainder, qualify for the marital deduction, 
S2056(b) (8). 
11. Planning Considerations for CRT. 
a. 
b. 
Determine grantor's objectives and where 
possible, prioritize them: 
i. Avoid tax on capital gain; 
ii. Diversify portfolio; 
iii. Increase spendable income; 
iv. Assure charity of capital on 
termination of trust; 
v. Provide growth in future income to 
beneficiary; 
vi. Provide growth in future income to 
beneficiary. 
vii. Benefit from current income tax 
deduction. 
viii. Take advantage of annual gift tax 
exclusions. 
Choice of unitrust v. annuity trust will 
depend on priorities: 
F-IO 
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i. Where grantor desires a high level of 
income, fixed income investments and 
minimum administration, the annuity 
trust will serve his purpose. 
ii. Where donor seeks a diversified 
portfolio, an increasing income, and 
expects to make periodic additions to 
the trust, the unitrust is preferred. 
Charitable Lead Trusts (CLT) - A split interest trust 
where an income interest benefits charity followed by a 
non-charitable remainder. 
1. Four general types of CLT: 
a. qualified non-grantor 
b. qualified grantor 
c. non-qualified non-grantor 
d. non-qualified grantor 
2. "Qualified" means to be entitled to a Federal 
income, gift or estate tax charitable deduction, 
the trust must be either an annuity type or 
unitrust type CLT. 
3. "Grantor or Non-grantor" refers to the 
applicability of the grantor trust rules under IRC 
§671-678. 
4. Qualified Non-grantor CLT: 
a. Subject to Federal gift or estate tax as the 
case may be; 
b. No income tax charitable deduction available 
to grantor, but the income of the trust is 
not included in his gross income; 
c. Subject to private foundation rules; 
d. Trust is taxable entity but receives a 
deduction for amounts paid to charity, §661 
et seq.; 
e. Avoids donor charitable deduction 
limitations; 
f. Allows donor to pass substantial wealth to 
remainderman with little or relatively low 
transfer tax cost. 
F-ll 
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g. Valuations based on government's 10 percent 
actuarial tables. May apply even if donor is 
terminally ill as long as he does not know 
it. Bank of California v. U.S., 672 F.2d 758 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
Qualified Grantor CLT: 
a. Donor takes a current deduction for actuarial 
value of charitable interest sUbject to 
limitations and carrybacks. 
b. Donor will be taxed on all income earned each 
year by the trust. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Donor will be taxed on the actuarial value of 
the gift to non-charitable beneficiaries and 
will not be entitled to an annual exclusion. 
Normally, results in the inclusion of the 
trust in donor's gross estate for Federal 
estate tax purposes, because of retained 
reversionary interest, power to designate 
remainderman, or power to designate 
charities. 
It may be possible for a CLT to be a grantor 
trust for income tax purposes without 
resulting in the inclusion of the trust in 
the grantor's estate for Federal estate tax 
purposes. For example, permitting surplus 
income to be used to pay life insurance 
premiums on donor's life, §677; or power to 
substitute principal of equal value, §675, 
may not result in the trust being included in 
the gross estate. 
6. Non-qualified Non-grantor Trust is where the split 
interest trust is neither an annuity trust or 
unitrust, nevertheless, a completed gift under 
local law. 
a. The trust will not qualify for a current gift 
tax deduction or income tax deduction. 
b. 
c. 
The trust income will, however, not be taxed 
to the grantor, thus allowing the donor in 
effect an unlimited income tax deduction. 
The non-qualified trust is not subject to the 
private foundation rules. 
F-12 
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8. 
d. Sometimes used by corporations creating 
charitable trust with a reversionary intent 
in order to avoid deduction limitations. 
Non-qualified Grantor Trust - Entitles grantor to 
no benefits from income, gift or estate taxes. 
Grantor will be taxed on income and receive a 
charitable contribution when funds are paid to the 
charity. 
Planning Considerations: 
a. Many donors created qualified grantor CLTs in 
1986 to take advantage of 50 percent 
charitable deduction, while reporting income 
in future years at hopefully lower rates. 
b. Beneficial in 1987 when rates are at 38.5 
percent if you believe rates will be lower on 
the average for the balance of the charitable 
term. 
c. May desire to use qualified non-grantor CLT 
with intent of reducing the transfer tax on 
the remainder by locking in high yields to 
fund a high charitable annuity. 
Example 1. Donor, age 60, transfers high-yield 
securities having a value of $500,000 and cost basis of 
$500,000 producing a 10 percent return into trust to 
pay a $50,000 annuity for his life to a specific 
charity, with remainder to his child. Donor receives a 
gift tax charitable deduction of $372,455 and reports 
as a taxable gift the remainder of $127,545. 
Example 2. Donor is in good health and at age 60 he 
has a life expectancy under the 1986 actuarial tables 
of 21 years. Instead of providing a $50,000 per year 
annuity for his lifetime under Example 1, he provides a 
$50,000 per year annuity for 21 years. He takes a gift 
tax charitable deduction of $345,948 and reports as a 
taxable gift $154,052. Assuming he lives his life 
expectancy, invests surplus tax free at 7 percent 
interest, his son will receive in 21 years $853,448. 
Example 3. Donor follows Example 2 but authorizes 
trustee to use surplus income to pay life insurance 
premiums on a policy on donor's life to be purchased by 
the trust. The trust can purchase $150,000 of life 
insurance on donor for $2,122 per year. Assuming donor 
dies in 21 years, the son would receive $1,003,448. 
The donor would claim a tax deduction in 1987 of 
F-13 
$345,948 saving Federal tax of $133,190. Donor would 
report each year and pay tax on the trust income. The 
following computer printout illustrates that at donor's 
death at the end of the 21st year, his son would 
receive $1,004,212 plus $150,000 of life insurance. 
Donor's estate would have decreased by $123,813. 
Q~dFIED GIWflOR CIftR:TMLE LEAD ~ITY TRlJS~ 
D~OII TIWiSFERS '50C ,DOC INTO TRU~ PR()..'IDING 140.DOC flER YEAR TO HIS COLLEGE FOR 21 YEARS 
W:TH THE REMINDER GOING TO HIS Stli UPIJi TE~I~T!1l\ OF THE TERM. THE TRUST EARNS 10i. ~ 
ITS INVESTHENTS ANC PER A~1HORIZATION IN THE AGREEM~l PA~S S2122 PER YEAR OF INS~RANCE PRE-
MIUMS ON A $150,000 LI~E INSURANCE PO~IC~ ON THE O~~OR'S LIFE. D~~~R RECEIVES AN INCOME TAX 
SAVI~GS IN YEAR 1 OF 38.~ OF $345948 O~ S133.19C AND INVESTS THE ~E AT 8.~~ TAA FREE 
BEGItfHNG EAit'HNGS fWUA.. ~,UA:" SURPLUS DIJiOR'S EARNINGS TRUST O~OR" S DECREASE INCREASE 
PRlN:IPA~ FOR THE PAY!1~" PA"11'19\~ I~\:)1E iO F~OE IJi DtmR INCIJ1E TAX. IN O:ltOF. IN FItlIl' 
YEAR BA~~CE YEAR CIt4Rm INSJIW,:E RE:rMS'" INJESTD F~DS TAXED FOR YEAR FlmS,''(R F~DS/YR 
1 500e:: 500C~ ~oo: 212i 7878 13319~ 10655 50000 14COC 334~ 4533 
2 507878 50788 40C~C 2122 8666 129845 10388 50~88 14221 3833 4833 
3 516~44 51654 4COOC 2122 9532 1260:2 10081 51654 14463 43B2 ~:5~ 
4 526C'6 526tS 400CC 2122 104c6 121630 9730 52605 1473C 5000 54B6 
5 536562 53656 4000C 2122 Il~34 11663C 933C 5365~ 15024 5693 584; 
6 548C96 54S:C 40000 2122 12688 110937 8875 54810 15347 6472 6216 
7 56C784 56C7E 40CC: 2122 13956 10446S 6357 56078 157C2 734~ 6612 
B 57474C 57474 4000[. 2122 15352 97120 777C 57474 16093 8323 7C2° 
9 590092 59009 40GO( 2122 16887 86797 71G4 590:9 16523 9419 746E 
10 606979 60696 4DO~O 2122 18576 79379 6350 60695 16995 1064~ 7931 
11 625555 62556 400C: 21~ 20434 68733 549y 625~~ 17516 12017 841~ 
12 6459S? 64599 400CC 2122 224:'7 56717 4537 64599 18088 1355C 8927 
13 66846~ 66847 40QCC 2122 2472~ 4316t 3453 66847 187~7 15264 946: 
14 693190 69319 40000 2122 27197 27903 2232 .69319 19409 17177 10C2e 
15 72C367 7203~ 40000 2122 29917 1C725 85S 72D39 20171 19313 106u' 
16 750304 75030 400:0 2122 3290B -85B7 0 7S030 21009 21009 1190C 
17 783212 78321 4000C 2:22 36:99 -29596 0 78321 2193G 2193C 14269 
18 819411 81941 40000 2122 39819 -5:526 0 81941 22944 22944 16B76 
19 859230 85923 4000& 2122 438:1 -74469 0 85923 24cse 240S8 19743 
20 903C31 fG3C3 48000 2122 41181 -m28 • 90303 25285 2528S 22896 
21 . ~S1212 95121 41000 2122 52999 -123813 a 95!21 2663' 26634 2636~ 
22 1004212 
Example 4. Donor transfers $500,000 to the trust and 
invests the trust funds in utility stocks paying an 8 
percent dividend with 2 percent annual appreciation. 
The other assumptions remain the same as in Example 2. 
The donor's funds generated sufficient funds to pay the 
tax on the trusts income. 
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IV. Testamentary Dispositions. 
A. Use income in respect of decedent items to satisfy 
charitable bequests. 
1. Retirement Plan Benefits - Avoid Federal estate 
tax and federal income tax, but lose benefit of 
deduction under §691(d). Probably will not avoid 
15 percent excise tax on excess distributions, 
§4981A. 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
Accrued salary, accrued interest, ex-dividends all 
can be designated to specific charities. 
Bequest of such items to a charitable remainder 
trust avoids income tax at trust level. 
Bequest of such items to a private foundation will 
generate the same tax benefits as to a public 
charity. 
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A. 
POST MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING UNDER 
THE 1996 INT~RNAL REVENUE CODE 
John T. Bqndurant 
July 17, 1987 
Reassessment of Traditional Post MOftem Planning Tech-
niquelS : 
1. Allocation of income between estate anq benefi-
ciaries (bo1;h individuals and trusts) 
(a) Significantly affected by reduction in indi-
vidual rates and compresl!\lion of rate brackets 
for estates and trusts. 
(1) Where the beneficiary is in a 28% bracket, 
since the estate's 15% bracket covers only 
its first $5000 of taxable income, the 
maximum potential saving by ret~nt1on of 
income in tqe estate is $650 (13% of 
$5000) 
(2) If the beneficiary's marginal income is 
subject to the 5% surtax applied to elimi-
nate the benefit the 15% bracket, the 
potential savings through taxation of 
income to the estate is somewhat greater. 
(3) T~e benefit of "trapping" distributions of 
principal by an estate to a beneficiary 
trust is simi larly reduced ($650 on the 
first $5000, slightly more if the estate's 
taxable income is between $13,000 to 
$26,000). 
(b) Choice of a fiscal year by the estate is still 
permi tted, which can push taxation of distri-
buted income to a beneficiary forward to tpe 
calendar year ip ~hich the estate's fiscal year 
ends, when both income and/or tax rates may be 
lower. Double deferral of estate income 
through a trust to a beneficiary is no longer 
possible. 
G-l 
2. Choice of fiscal year py es"t1ate 
(a) E;ffect of estimated tax provisions: 
(1) Estates mus~ now pay estimated tax for tax 
years ending more than two years after the 
decedent's death. The optimum first fis-
cal year for an estate from an estimated 
tax standpoint would be one ending eleven 
plus months ~fter the date of de~th. This 
would proviqe almost two full years in 
which tbe estate would not have to p~y 
estimated tax. 
(~) As a practical matter, if the estate makes 
significant distributions during its third 
fiscal year, th~ estate probably will not 
have to p~y any estimated tax for that 
year. 
(b) Utilization of administration expenses as fidu-
ciary income tax deductions: 
(1) With the credit equivalent now $600,000, 
there will be an increasing number of 
estates with a significant amount of 
administration expenses to be used, if at 
all, as fiduciary income tax deductions. 
(2) A~ estate will be entitled to deduct from 
gross income expense~ incurred in connec-
tion with the administration of the estate 
which would not have been incurred if the 
property were not held in an estate. 
While delineation of such expenses may be 
somewhat unclear, they will probably 
include administratiqn expenses tradition-
ally charged against principal, such as 
those relating to payment of claims, prep~ 
aration and examinatiop of death tax 
returns and di atribution of assets. 
(3) The maximum benefit will be obtained 
through the deduction of such expenses by 
~n estate in a tax year in which it has 
significant income. If these expenses are 
passed through to the estate's benefi-
ciaries in the year of final distribution 
as "excess deductions" I they will become 
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3. 
4. 
miscellaneous itemized deductions subject 
to the 2% floor on deductibi li ty, 
(4) In estates with significant administrat~on 
expenses but little or no estate tax, the 
executor may want to select a relatively 
short first fiscal year in which to accu-
mulate a moderate amount of. income taxable 
to the estate at favorable rates wi tllout 
utilization of significant administration 
expense qeductions, followed by a full 
fiscal year in which the estate has sub-
stantial income offset by deductions for 
administration expenses and a final tax 
year in which few if any deductions are 
taken for administration expenses and 
whatever income the estate receives is 
passed through to its beneficiaries. 
Utilization of medical expense deductions. Under 
§ 213 (c), the executor may elect to deduct medical 
expenses paid wi thin one year after death on the 
decedent's final return. If no estate tax will be 
due, the executor obviously will want to make this 
election. If some estate tax will be paid, the 
executor should consider 
(a) The respective marginal tax rates; that is, the 
estate tax rate versus the income tax rate on 
the decedent's final return (after 1987, the 
estate tax rate should be higher) i 
(b) The respective tax return due datesi and 
(c) The extent to which such exp~nses will be 
absorbed by the deductibility floor for medical 
expenses (5% for 1986, 7 1/2% for 1987 and 
afterwards). § 213 ( a) . 
Election to deduct administration expenses on estate 
or fiduciary income tax return 
(a) For fiscal years beginning after 1987, the top 
fiduciary income tax rate will be 28%, plus a 
5% surtax on taxable income between $13,000 and 
$26,000. Any estate tax will be at least as 
much as the highest marginal fiduciary income 
tax rate. 
G-3 
• 
(b) The effective date for an estate tax deduction 
is nine months after death. The effective date 
for a fiduciary income tax deduction is pro-
bably the due date for the return (three months 
and fifteen days after the end of the fiscal 
year) . 
(c) Some portion of the administration ~xpenses may 
be subject to the 2% floor. 
5. Election to recognize gain or loss on di stribution 
of property in kind 
6. 
(a) Under §643(d), added by TRA of 1984, an e~tate 
can elect to recognize gain or loss on the dis-
tribution of property in kind in circumstances 
where gain or loss would not otherwise be rec-
ognized, such as a residuary distribution. The 
amount of the gain or loss is determined as 
though the property had been sold to the dis-
tributee at its fair market value. The dis-
tributee's basis is the estate's basis adjusted 
for the gain or loss recognized. 
(b) The 1986 Act redesignated this provision as 
§643 (e) and "clarified" the previous language 
to require that such an election apply to all 
distributions made by an estate or trust during 
the entire fiscal year. § 643(e} (3) (B). This 
change probably significantly reduces the 
instances in which such an election ~ill be 
made. 
Special considerations for decedents dying prior to 
1987 
(a) An estate's fiscal year beginning in 1986 is 
subject to the prior law provisions regarding 
such matters as taxation of capital gains and 
the deductibility of administration expenses 
and interest. Note that the top rate on the 
estate's ordinary income will still be 50%, so 
the executor should consider di stributing 
income otherwise taxable to the estate at 
higher brackets to beneficiaries in lower 
brackets. 
(b) The beneficiary of an estate might be a trust, 
ei ther inter vivos or testamentary I having- a 
tax year beginning after January 1, 1987. The 
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B. 
taxable income of such a trust will be subject 
to lower maximum tax rates than the estate with 
a fiscal year beginning prior to January 1, 
1987. The trust might also pass income on to 
its individual beneficiaries, possibly with 
even lower tax brackets. Where the trust is 
required to convert to a fiscal year ending 
December 31, 1987 (§ 645), the trust benefi-
ciary receiving distributable net income during 
such "short" year is permitted to include one-
fourth of such income in the beneficiary's cal-
endar year 1987 income and an additional one-
fourth in 1988, 1989 and 1990. 1986 Act 
§ 1403 (c) (2) . Since the indi vidual t~x rates 
are destined to decline in 1988 and thereafter, 
forward spreading of income distributed by the 
trust is likely to reduce the tax impact. This 
might make it worth while to maximize distribu-
tions of taxable income to trust beneficiaries 
during "short" December 31,1987, years. 
P9st Mortem Tax Planning Introduced by 1986 Code 
1. Deductibi 1i ty of interest. S\1bj ect to application 
of certain transitional rules, many types of inter-
est paid by an estate which would have been deduct-
ible under the prior tax law will not be deductible 
on an estate's fiduciary income tax returns for tax-
able years beginning after January I, 1987. 
(a) Interest on unpaid income tax, gift tax or ad 
valorem property tax will apparently be non-
deductible. This circumstance should be taken 
into account by an executor in deciding whether 
to get an extension of time to pay such tax or 
whether to contest the purported tax defi-
ciencies. The executor might conclude to pay 
the disputed tax and file a claim for refund, 
assuming that interest will be paid on any 
refund that is forthcoming. 
(b) Interest on unpaid estate tax will in most 
instances be deductible for federal estate tax 
purposes when paid as an administration expense 
under § 2053. See CCH Federal Estate and Gift 
Tax Reporter ~ 7285.53. Since the marginal 
estate tax rate is generally higher than the 
marginal income tax rate of either an estate or 
its beneficiaries, there will probably be rela-
tively few instances where an execu1;:or will 
G-5 
want to deduct interest on unpaid estate tax on 
the estate's income tax returns. An executor 
should nevertheless take notice of new limita-
tions on the income tax deductibility of such 
interest: 
(1) Under §163(h)(2)(E), any interest paid on 
estate tax the time for payment of which 
has been extended under §p163 (estate tax 
on a reversionary or remainder interest) 
or §6166 (estate tax attributable to an 
interest in a closely held business) is 
still deductible. 
(2) Otherwise, interest on unpaid estate tax, 
including estate tax the payment of which 
has been extended under §6161 (reasonable 
cause) will no longer be deductible for 
income tax purposes. 
(3) The executor may be thus compelled to gen-
erate refunds of estate tax in order to 
claim estate tax deductions for subse-
quently paid interest on estate tax which 
would not be deductible for fiduciary 
income tax purposes. 
(c) Interest payable under KRS 394.520 on a spe-
cific pecuniary legacy which is not paid within 
one year after probate appears to be "personal 
interest" and, therefore, not deductible for 
fiduciary income tax purposes. 
(d) Under §163(h)(3), interest on certain secured 
indebtedness with respect to a "qualified resi-
dence" is deductible for income tax purposes. 
It is not clear if or when property can be 
regarded as a qualified residence by an estate 
or trust. The best procedure would appear to 
be to regard title to the real estate as having 
passed directly to the beneficiary, subject to 
any outstanding indebtedness. From a tax 
standpoint, the executor should include any 
interest accrued to date of death as part of. 
the outstanding mortgage or lien against the 
property on the estate and inheritance tax 
returns and have the devisee or surviving joint 
owner pay the accrued interest, so as to be 
able to take an income tax deduction, if the 
G-6 
j 
, 
I 
... 
J 
J 
j 
j 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
2. 
property would constitute a qualified residence 
under § 163 (h) (5) (A) . 
Ce) Under §163(h)(2)(B), investment interest is 
deductible for income tax purposes, subject to 
the limitation of §163(d). Interest on indebt-
edness incurred or continued by an estate to 
carry or purchase specific investment property 
should qualify as investment interest, as for 
any taxpayer. It might even be argued that an 
executor holds the entire estate (with the pos-
sible exception of tangible personal property) 
"for investment", so that general indebtedness 
of an estate might' be said to constitute 
"investment interest." From a tax standpoint it 
might be preferable for an executor to borrow 
money secured by investment assets to pay tax 
deficiencies, the interest on which would not 
be deductible for fiduciary income tax pur-
poses. 
Impact of passive acti vi ty assets 
(a) Under §469, passive activity losses are deduct-
ible only against passive activity income, 
unless and unti 1 the passive acti vi ty assets 
are disposed of. When a disposition occurs, 
the previously undeducted losses are first 
deductible from income or gain from the activ-
i ty which generated the losses (including any 
gain recognized on the dispositions), then from 
other passive income or gains, and finally from 
other income or gains. 
(b) Since under §469(g)(2) death is treated as a 
disposition, passive losses which have been 
"suspended" during the decedent's life may be 
deducted on the decedent's final return against 
non-passive income (§469(g)(1)(A», but only to 
the extent that such losses exceed the increase 
in the tax basis of the assets by reason of the 
decedent's death pursuant to §l014. 
§ 469 ( g) (2) (A). The remainder of the suspended 
losses are gone forever. § 469 (g) (2) (B) . 
(c) If significant suspended losses are likely to 
be allowable on the decedent's final income tax 
return, the executor should consider how to 
obtain the maximum benefit of the deductions 
thus generated (e. g., by electing to report 
G-7 
3. 
accrued interest on Series E and EE bonds on 
that return (see CCH Standard Federal Tax 
Reporter ~965.0848) and by increasing the 
post-death income of a surviving spouse includ-
ible on the j oint final return) . 
(d) Losses generated by passive activity assets 
owned by the estate will generally be subject 
to the limitations on losses set out in § 469, 
subj ect to a couple of special provi sions: 
(1) Under §469(i)(4}, an estate will be 
regarded as actively participating during 
any taxable years of the estate ending 
less than two years after death in all 
real estate activities in which the dece-
dent actively participated before his 
death. Subject to the phase-out provided 
for in §469(i)(3), the estate will be able 
to apply against other income losses from 
such activity of up to $25,000, less the 
amount of such losses allowable to the 
decedent's surviving spouse for the tax-
able year ending wi th or wi thin the tax-
able year of the estate. The availability 
of this provision obviously needs to be 
taken into consideration in choosing an 
estate's first fi scal year. 
(2) Under 1986 Act §502(d)(2), the estate of a 
deceased "qualified investor" in a "qual-
ified low-income housing project" who 
acquired his interest prior to December 
31, 1986, is entitled to the benefit of 
any special relief not used by the dece-
dent, but only during the estate's first 
two taxable years. Once again, the appli-
cability of this provision should be taken 
into account in determining such an 
estate's first fiscal year. 
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Elections and Con-
siderations 
(a) An executor must identify generation-skippinq 
and potential generation-skipping transfers, 
both those occurring by reason of the dece-
dent's death and those occurring during the 
decedent's life which became irrevocable after 
September 25, 1985. The executor should 
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ascertain the age and relationship to the dece-
dent of all beneficiaries, in order to deter-
mine generation assignments. 
(b) The executor should establish the extent to 
which the decedent's GST exemption had been 
allocated during the decedent's life and deter-
mine how the decedent's unused GST exemption 
should be allocated. 
(1) If the decedent made lifetime direct 
skips, any unused portion of his GST 
exemption will have been allocated to such 
transfers unless the decedent had affirma-
tively elected otherwise. §2632(b). 
(2) The executor may allocate the decedent's 
unused GST exemption to other lifetime 
transfers by the decedent, but must use 
the present value of the transferred 
assets rather than their value at the time 
the transfer occurred. See 1986 Act Gen-
eral Explanation, p. 1265. 
(3) Allocation of the GST exemption may be 
made at any time on or before the date 
prescribed for filing the estate tax 
return for the decedent's estate (includ-
ing extensions), whether such a return is 
required. §2632(a)(1). 
(4) If no allocation of the decedent's unused 
GST exemption is made, it will be deemed 
to have been allocated first to direct 
skips occurring at the decedent's death 
and then to trusts with respect to which 
the decedent is the transferor and from 
which a taxable distribution or taxable 
termination might subsequently occur. 
Allocation within these categories will be 
made on a pro-rata basis. §2632 (c) . 
(5) The executor should make an affirmative 
allocation of the decedent's unused GST 
exemption among any non-exempt interests, 
for the benefit of posterity, if for no 
other reason. 
(c) The executor must determine how to qet the most 
benefit from the GST exemption allocation. 
G-9 
(1) Priority should be given to allocation of 
the exemption to fully taxable (subject to 
the unified credit), long-term truly gen-
eration skipping trusts (as opposed to 
only potentially generation-skipping 
trusts) . 
(2) If the executor must choose between 
allocating to direct skips (with respect 
to which GST tax will otherwise currently 
be due) and generation-skipping trusts, 
the executor should take into account 
(A) The GST tax on direct skips is 
exclusive, while any GST tax on 
able distributions or taxable 
minations will be tax-inclusive. 
tax-
tax-
ter-
(B) The trust assets may appreciate in 
value prior to any distribution or 
termination. 
(e) Depending on the trust provisions and 
subsequent events, few (if any) tax-
able distributions or taxable ter-
minations may occur. 
(3) The Executor should allocate the GST 
exemption last to a QTIP trust of which 
the executor elects to have the decedent 
treated as transferor, since such trust's 
assets may be reduced by estate tax pay-
able upon the the death of the surviving 
spouse. 
(d) In order for an executor to be able to allocate 
part of the decedent's GST exemption to a QTIP 
trust, the executor must elect to have the 
decedent treated as the transferor pursuant to 
§26S2(a)(3) . 
(e) The executor may want to consider whether to 
suggest that a beneficiary disclaim one or more 
interests in order to achieve a more desirable 
GST tax result. Such a beneficiary should 
probably be separately advised with regard to 
the desirability of such a disclaimer. 
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5. 
S Corporation Considerations 
The statutory repeal of the General Utili ties doc-
trine by new §336, the enactment of new rules on the 
taxation of "built-in gains" of S corporations dur-
ing the ten year period after conversion and the 
lpwer individual income tax rates have significantly 
increased the likelihood that an estate will contain 
~tock in one or more S corporations. In such 
instances, the executor should consider 
(a) Subject to the proscription against unduly pro-
longing the administration of an estate, there 
is no limit as to how long an executor ~ay hold 
S corporation stock acquired from a decedent, 
during which the income and deductions of the 
corporation will pass through directly to the 
estate. 
(b) If the stock will ultimately be distributable 
to an ineligible shareholder, the executor may 
want to consider liquidating the corporation or 
selling the stock to an eligible shareholder. 
ec) Trusts having certain characteristics (such as 
a QTIP trust) will qualify as an S corporation 
shareholder. §1361(d)(3). The executor may 
want to consider whether a non-qualifying trust 
can be transformed into a qualifying trust by 
one or more qualified disclaimers. 
Cd) Where the decedent at death owned stock in a C 
corporation which could elect S corporation 
status, the executor should consider the 
desirability of doing so, especially if the 
corporation would still be covered by the tran-
sitional rules applicable to certain relatively 
small corporations through 1989. 1986 Act 
§633(d). 
Qualified Sale of Stock to ESOP 
New §2057 permits the deduction from a decedent r s 
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes of 
one ... half of the "qualified proceeds" of a "qualified 
sale" of "employer securities" to an ESOP or an eli-
gible worker-owned cooperative (EWOC). As orig-
inally enacted, this provision contains a number of 
perceived deficiencies. Consequently, in IRS Notice 
87-13, the IRS has indicated that until clarifying 
G-ll 
legislation is enacted it will not consider this 
provision to have been complied with unless certain 
requirements are met. Further, legislation has been 
introduced which, if enacted, will codify the pro-
visions of Notice 87-13 effective October 22, 1986, 
and will impose additional requirements. Neverthe-
less, an executor holding stock which might qualify 
for this deduction should consider taking advantage 
9f it. 
C. Conclusio~ 
Due to the comprehensive modifications of prior tax law 
cont~ined in the 1986 Code, every executor and everyone 
advising executors must be on the alert to identify and 
examine all estate assets as soon as possible and ascer-
tain any of them that possess characteristics which call 
for spacial attention for income or estate tax purposes. 
*** *** *** *** 
Portions of this outline are based on an outline by Henry 
~. Zeigler entitled "Postmortem Estate Planning after TRA 
as" for the New York University Institute on Federal Tax-
ation, May 11, 1987, and "Tax Reform Act of 1986 Makes 
Sweeping Changes in Income Taxation of Estates and 
Trusts" by Stephen L. Seftenberg, William C. Weinsheimer 
and Henry S. Zeigler in 12 Probate Notes 192 (1987) 
(American College of Probate Counsel) . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The attorney practicing family law has the satisfaction of. feeling that he 
is contributing to the g~)Od of the whole family rather than working toward 
the detriment of anyone. The family lawyer has traditionally had the oppor-
tunity to counsel with all of the members of the same family. Hopefully, the 
family has developed a relationship of complete trust in the advice of their 
r family lawyer. There is no consideration given to the need of employing 
r 
t 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
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another attorney to represent different family members and create additional 
legal fees. The family lawyer is not working in an adversary setting, and 
decisions are based on what is best for the family unit. This is the ideal in 
the practice of family law. 
The problem is that family members do not always have like interests, 
and the legal profession is becoming more conscious of the ethical dilemma in 
which the family lawyer is placed because of conflicts of interest among family 
members. The outline discusses a select few of the more frequently occurring 
conflict of interest situations that occur to the family lawyer, as well as some 
new situations that have been created by the new tax laws. The outline does 
not attempt to discuss the myriad of confli9t of interest situations that each 
lawyer can relate from his own experiences. 
H-l 
'l'he situations discussed are those where the family members are acting 
hal'moniously and are not considering the po~sible need of separate represen-
tation. Unlike in a hostile divorce setting when everyone is alert to their 
respective rights, these are situations when each member of the family is 
completely trusting the lawyel,' for advice. These are tJmes in which the 
clhmts are susceptible to being mislead and overreached by the attorney. 
I. 'rHE LAWYER'S ETHICAL GUIDELINES: 
'l'here is no "per self ethical prohibition against representation of 
closely-related family members in estate planning. This practice is 
sanctio.lled under both the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility and the older Disciplinary Rules so long as 
certain conditions are met. Wade, "When Can A Lawyer Represent Both 
lIusband and Wife in Estate Planning?," Probate and Property maga~ine, 
MarchI April, 1987. 
Under Discjplinary Rules 5-105(A) and (B), the basic rule is that a 
lawyer shall decline employment or shall not continue employment if the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client 
would likely involve him in representing different interests. The 
exceptioJl to the basic rule is provided under DR 5-105(C), which 
states: 
"In the situations covered l:>Y DR 5-10ij(Ar> and (B), 
a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is 
obvious that he can adequately represent the 
interest of each and if eacl) qom~ents to the 
representation after full disclosure of the possible 
effect of such representation on th,e exercise of his 
independent professional judgment on behalf of 
each." 
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Another of the Disciplinary Rules that is applicable in estate 
planning is DR 5-107. It prohibits a lawyer from being influenced by 
someone other than his own client. DR 5-107(A) states that except with 
the conse'nt of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept 
compensation for his legal services from other than his client. Further, 
under DR 5-107(B): 
't [AJ lawyer shall not permit a person who 
recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal 
services for another to direct or regulate his 
professional judgment in rendering such services." 
In the new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility pertaining to 
conflicts of interest is Rule 1.7. It provides that: 
"(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse 
to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and (2) each client consents after 
consultation. 
"(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibiUties to another 
client or to II third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected; and (2) the client consents after 
consultation. " 
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken J the consultation shall include an explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the advantage and risk 
involved. 
H-3 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT OCCUR PRIOR TO MARRIAGE: 
},... Antenuptit~.l Agreements. Kentucky is one of the many states that 
honor the enforceability of antenuptial agreements. However. 
Kentucky ('ourt decisions show the susceptiblity of such agreements 
to attack. Antenuptial agreements have the best chance of 
\'rithstandillg such attacks by the surviving spouse if the parties 
have had (1) independent counsel; (2) there has been a full 
disclosure of properties between the parties; and (3) the 
antenuptial agreement is "fair." 
1. Independent Counsel. Neither Kentucky law nor the 
Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act (which Kentucky has 
not adopted) require there to be independent counsel 
representing each of the parties to an antenuptial 
agreement. Nevertheless. this is one of the most 
frequent grounds for attacking the agreement. When 
there has not been independent counsel. the surviving 
spouse will invariably argue that he or she was coerced. 
mislead. unduly influenced. and did not understand what 
he or she was signing. 
The lawyer is frequently confronted with the 
couple's unwillingness to employ separate counsel. 
During this time of romance. it is distasteful to be 
discussing antenuptial agreements much less having "his" 
and "her" own attol'ney. If the parties have not had in-
dependent counsel during the negotiations for the 
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antenuptial agreement. the attorney drafting the 
antenuptial agreement should have a clear understanding 
that he is representing the interest of only one of the 
parties and continue to insist that the party who he is 
not representing confer with an attorney of his or her 
choosing before signing the antenuptial agreement. If the 
party steadfastly refuses to seek the advice of 
independent counsel, this fact should be documented by 
the attorney in a letter similar to the one which is 
attached as Appendix tI A tI to this outline. 
The antenuptial agreement itself should contain a 
provision that addresses whether or not both parties bad 
independent counsel. A clause similar to one of the 
following would be applicable depending upon the 
circumstance: 
(a) The parties have each had the opportunity to consult 
with their own respective legal counsel, tax advisor, 
and other professional persons concerning the terms 
of this agreement and their failures to do so shall 
not be a reason later to invalidate this contract, 
Vol. 4, Rutldn, Family Law and Practice (Matthew 
Bender, 1986). 
(b) acknowledges that he was not 
represented by counsel in the negotiation and 
H-5 
preparation of this Agreement. fie acknowledges 
that he has been informed of his right to separate 
counsel, including' an explanation of the implication 
of not having independent counsel and the risk 
involved. In signing this Agreement, he waives that 
right to separate counsel and states that he fully 
understands the terms and effect of this Agreement. 
2. Disclosure. Antenuptial agreements should contain a full 
3. 
and complete disclosure of the properties of each party tQ 
the agreement. Many times, a listing of assets will be 
attached as exhibits to the agreement. Anyone seeking to 
overturn the enforceability of an antenuptial agreement 
will compare the assets in the decedent's estate with the 
assets listed on the antenuptial agreement hoping to find 
that there was not a full disclosure by the decedent. 
However, there is precedent for disclosure not being 
an absolute requirement. In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 100 
A.D.2d 704,474 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1984), it was held that 
the failure to disclose all assets in an antenuptial 
agreement does not constitute fraud and overreaching 
sufficient to vitiate the antenuptial agreement, especially 
where full disclosure is not required as a part of the 
agreement. 
Fairness. When both parties are well-off financially, and 
both waive their rights to each other's properties, the 
H-6 
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'1fairness" test may not be applicable. HoweVflIr, it there 
is a larl'e d~sparity in the financial wealth of the parties, 
an antenuptial agreement that provid,., nothlng to the. 
non~ropertied person may be found to be an 
"unconscionable" contract. The Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act requires that antenuptial agreements must 
not be unconscionable at tpe date of the~r execution. 
Where one of the parties is wealthy and experienced in 
bJ,lsiness and the other is young. inexperienced, and 
nonpropertied, it is best to consider structuring the 
agreemel'lt to share with the nonpropertied spouse the 
"fruit of the tree" as the price for Preserving the tree as 
I 
separate property. Estate of Nelson. 224 Cal. App. 2d 
138, Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964). 
l'he Court held in In Re Marriage of Matson, 705 
P.2d 617 (Wash. App. 1985), that the antenuptial 
agreement was void because it did not meet the fairness 
test. The lawyer who drafted the antenuptial agreement 
h~d represented both the future husbaRd and wife and 
Imew both of them socially. The Court reasoned that the 
parties to prenuptial agreements do not deal with each 
o~her at arm's length. TheJr relationstup is one of mutual 
confidence and trust which calls for the exel-cise of good 
faith, capdor, and sincerity in all mat~el's. The 
H -7 
antenuptial agreement even contained a paragraph which 
stateQ: "This agreement is b~ing signed only after 
having been read completely by each party I and after 
each has had an opportunity to seek advice and counsel 
of his or hel:" own choosing." The Court found: 
"Using the foregoing concepts where 
courts construed fundamentally unfair 
agreements, we conclude this prenuptial 
~greement does not meet the standard of 
fairness test for several reasons: First, 
there was a reasonable expectation for 
Mr~. Matson to assume the attorney would 
protect her interests. They had known 
each other socially, he had represented 
her during l)er prior dissolution. and 
there was never any indication to her that 
he, in fact, was representing only· Mr. 
Matson's interest." p. 820 
D. Antenuptial Agr~ement~ and the. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 
("REAli). A new obstacle has been created by Congress in 
the drafting of antenuptial agreements that will meet the 
wi$he~ of your clients. It is the requirement that $pousal 
annuity benefits b~ provided to the surviving spouse under 
qualified pl~ns unless properly waived by the no.nparticipant 
spouse. Because of the tax advantage, a larger percentage of 
OUl1' clients' wealth is being accumulated in qualified employee 
benefit plans. It is common for the client to want those 
benefits to be subject to the antenuptial agreemeI:lt so that 
upon dearn, the client's children by a prior mar.riage are 
recipients of thOSe benefits. 
H-8 
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I. R. C. Sectiolls 401(a)(11) end 417 require that a defined 
benefit or money purchase plan must provide benefits in the 
form of a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity, where the 
participant has retired and has begun to receive distributions 
from the plan. In the case of a participant who dies prior to 
retirement. the plan must provide a qualified preretirement 
survivor annuity for the participant's surviving spouse. The 
new spousal requirements apply to plan years beginning after 
Decemb~r 31, 1984. 
A qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) is an 
annuity for the life of a participant with a survivor annuity 
for the participant's surviving spouse which is not less than 
fifty percent (50%) of the annuity payable during the joint 
lives of the participant and the participant's spouse. I. R. C. 
Section 417 (b) . An effective waiver of a joint-and-survivor 
annuity must be executed within ninety (90) days of the 
participant's annuity starting date. I. R. C. Section 
417 (a)(5 )(A). 
A qualified preretirement survivor annuity (QPSA) is the 
actuarial equivalent of the survivor annuity under a 
joint-and-survivor plan. but is payable in the event that the 
participant dies before retirement or before attaining the 
earliest retirement age, or for defined contribution plans. an 
a9nuity for the life of the surviving spouse the actuarial 
H -9 
equiva.lent of which is not less than fifty percent (50%) of the 
account bulance of the participant as of the date of death. 
I.R.C. Section 417(c). An effective waiver of the 
preretirement annuity must be executed on or after the fh'st 
day of the plan year in which the participant attains 
thirty-ofive (35) years of age. I.R.C. Section 417(a)(5)(B). 
For the spousal waiver to be effective. it must meet the 
following requirements of I.R.C. Section 417(a)(1) and (2): 
1. Spouse of participant must consent in writing. 
2. Witnessed by plan administrator or notary public. 
3. Spouse's consent must acknowledge the effect of the 
participant's election. 
4. Specific waiver of both joint-and-survivor annuity 
and preretirement survivor annuity benefits. 
5. Acknowledgement that designation of beneficiary or 
form of benefit cannot be changed without further 
consent of participant's spouse (Effective after 
October 22. 1986). 
I. R. C. Section 401(a)(1l)(B)(iii) requires profit-sharing 
and stock-bonus plans to provide the automatic survivor 
annuity benefits, unless: (1) the participant's nonforfeitable 
accrued benefit is payable in full to a participant's surviving 
spouse. or if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving 
spouse consents to a designated beneficiary; (2) under a plan 
II -10 
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that otters a Hfe annuity, the participant does not elect 
paYlJlent of benefits in the form of a life annuity; and (3) the 
plan is not a transferee of a plan that is subject to the 
quali!1e4annqity requirements. 
Tbe exemption provided by I.R.C. Section 401(a)(l1)(B) 
for oertain profit-sharing or stock bonus plans from the REA 
survivor annuity provisions is illusory. The participant's 
entire nonforfeitable account balance must be paid to the 
surviving spouse. unless the spouse consents. (in the same 
manper as required to execute a REA spousal annuity waiver), 
to the designation of a non-spouse beneficiary. 
Individual Retirement Accounts are not required to 
provide automatic survivor annuity benefits. 
Query: Do the requirements of the REA survivor annuity 
p1;'ovisions effectively preempt the parties' antenuptial 
agreement with respect to the parties' qualified benefit plan? 
The REA survivor annuity provisions require that the 
pal'ticipant's accrued benefit must be paid to the surviving 
spouse in the form of either a QJSA or a QPSA. unless the 
spouse has previously consented to waive his/her rights. 
Pursuant to the preemption provisions of ERISA. REA survivor 
annuity provisions would preempt any conflicting designation in 
an antenuptial agreement. 
In order to avoid having the antenuptial agreement 
preempted with respect to the disposition of qualified plan 
H-U 
benefits, it can be argued that the antenuptial agreement itself 
constitutes a valid waiver for purposes of REA of a spouse's 
right to receive either a QJSA or a QPSA. 
The problem with this argument is that the antenuptial 
agreement must be executed before marriage and the I. R. C. 
spousal waiver to plan annuity benefits seems to indicate that 
it must be executed after the marriage. It is assumed that the 
use of the word "spouse" in the context of I. R. C. §401(a)(1l) 
and 417 requires that the "spousal consent" can be executed 
only after the participant becomes married. However, the 
word "spouse" could be viewed as strictly a relational term to 
identify a particular person at the time of the participant's 
death. As long as the "spouse" received all of the necessary 
information to make an informed decision regarding the waiver 
of their survivor annuity rights. it should not make any 
difference if the spouse executed the survivor annuity waiver 
before or after they married the plan participant. 
If the law develops to require that a valid spousal waiver 
cannot be made until after the participant and his spouse-to-be 
have actually become married. an attorney can use the 
antenuptial agreement to obtain B spousal waiver after the 
marriage. The antenuptial agreement should be drafted to 
include language which specifically recognizes that the spouse 
has REA survivor annuity benefits in her spouse's qualified 
H -12 
! , 
! 
... 
J 
.J 
l 
'j 
... 
j 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
'r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
plan accounts. that sqe waives those rights. and that she 
agrees to execute ill the future all necessary documents. 
waivers, releases, etc.. in order to give effect to the 
antern?ptial flgl'eemeht, Max Gutierrez, Jr., Esq., in his 
artick entitled, r'Marrtage As a Business Relationship: Conse-
quenees 191' Trust and ~state Lawyers." presented to the 
Amerioan College ot Pl'obateGounsel, suggested that 
antenuptial agreef"ente whicl1 intend to be a waiver of all 
spousal am~uity rights created by REA contain language similar 
to the following: 
"Husband is a participant of the 
qualified employee benefit plan 
in connecU~n ",tth his employment' with 
• Either or both of 
.".,Ul"""le--p-a ..... rt .... i-ea--m-a-.-y--.alr-s-o---;"become participants in 
other qualified ePlployee benefit plans during 
their marriage. Under the Retirement Equity 
Act of 1984, Wife will be entitled to payment of 
penefits upon HU~band's death whether prior to 
retirement 9r af~~r retirement as his surviving 
spouse. These spousal benefits must be 
provided unlesEj Wife consents to an alternative 
electi9n of ben~fits by Husband. A consent by 
Wife woulp perQJit Husband to choose the form 
of benefi~ palabJe and to designate the benefi-
ciary or benefici~'te8 of such benefit. It is the 
intention of the parties to give Husband 
complete discretion in making an election under 
the plan as to the payment of benefits and the 
person or persons who shall enjoy such 
benefits. It is ~.so the intention of the parties 
to give one anpther complete discretion in 
elf;lction of heneflts I under any qualified 
~mployee Qenflfit plan in which either shall 
l:;.cquire rights. 
"Upon the request of Husband, Wife hereby 
agrees ~o w~ve any rig'hts she may have in the 
R-13 
qualified employee benefit 
plan or any other q1,1alified employee benefit 
~l~n in which Husband may have rights or 
l:icquire rights. Wife agr~es to consent to an 
election by Hu~band of a form of benefit other 
than a joint and survivor annuity and to his 
designation of beneficia1'y or beneficiaries. Wife 
also agrees to consent to an· election by 
Hu~band to waive a preretirement spousal 
annuity which would be payablc in the event 
Husband died prior to retirement and if 
Husband elects another form of preretirement 
benefit. Wife agrees to consent to his 
designation of beneficiary or beneficiaries. Wife 
agrees to execute the ne~essary documents for 
an effective consent if and when presented to 
her by Husband. Wife further agrees to 
consent to any subsequent elections by 
Husband. 
II If Husband files an electlon subsequent to the 
date of this Agreement, then this Agreement 
shall, to the fullest extent possible under the 
law, constitute tl consent to such election. 
"If Husband files an election subsequent to the 
dflte of this Agreement waiving spousal 
benefits, but such election is ineffective solely 
due to a lack of effective consent by Wife, and 
the benefits are, in fact, paid over to Wife, she 
agrees to pay tpose benefits over to the 
beneficiary designated by Husband in the 
otherwise ineffective eleqtion. 
"Wife alsQ agrees to consent· to any loan . from 
the plan or any oUler pJan or any reduction of 
an account balance or the present value of an 
aQcrued benefit to satisfy. an obligation of 
Husband arising in connection with a loan from 
the plan. 
"~f Wife becomes a participant in anf qualified 
employee benefit plan,. Husband agrees to 
consent in a similar manner to Wife's election of 
form of payment of 1)enefits and the person or 
person~ who shall enjor such benefits and to 
any loan from the plan by Wife." 
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Mr. Gutierrez's sample language indicates that if the 
antenuptial agreement is ineffective to waive the spouse's 
interests in the participant's qualified plan accounts due to 
lack of effective consent by the spouse t and those benefits are 
in fact paid to the spouse t that the spouse agrees to pay 
those benefits to the beneficiary designated by the participant 
in his ineffective beneficiary designation. However t would the 
combination of the ERISA anti-alienation provisions t the RHA 
annuity provisions t and the ERISA preemption provisions deal 
a death blow to such a provision. As an alternative, the 
antenuptial agreement could reduce the amount of any other 
property going to a spouse by the amount of any REA benefits 
received by the spouse t because of an ineffective spousal 
waiver. 
The effect of REA upon antenuptial agreements has not 
been litigated in a reported case as of June 25 t 1987. 
c. Antenuptial Agreements to Protect Business and Professional 
Interests. Frequently t clients want their closely-held business 
interests protected by an antenuptial agreement. The need to 
keep the new spouse out of the family business may have more 
far reaching consequences than a waiver of the spousal 
statutory share of any other assets in the estate. 
Sometimes antenuptial agreements are ambiguous on 
whether the parties intended the appreciation in value of the 
H -15 
closely-held business after marriage to be marital property or 
property subject to the antenuptial agreement. For instance, 
the attorney representing the surviving spouse concedes the 
antenuptial agreement was intended to include the Five 
Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($500,000.00) fair 
market value of the business at the date of marriage, but 
contends that the date of death value of the business was One 
Million and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000,000.00). Therefore, the 
attoruey claims the Five Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars 
($500,000.00) of appreciation after marriage was not intended 
to be covered by the antenuptial agreement. 
The attorney drafting the antenuptial agreement should 
discuss and understand the intention of the parties on how 
appreciation in value of the closely-held business after 
marriage is to be handled in the antenuptial agreement. 
If the intent is to make the appreciation in value of the 
closely-held business after marriage subject to the antenuptial 
agreement, language similar to the following would be 
applicable: 
The ownership interest of in 
, Inc., is his separate property 
-an---:d~t"rh-e-p-a-r""'b""e-s intend that it will remain his 
separate property regardless of any increase in 
value of his interest resulting from his personal 
services, skill, effort. and work. All profits 
and appreciation of 's 
ownership interest in 
Inc.. during the marriage, whether or not 
resulting from his personal services, skills, 
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effort, alld work, shall be his separate prop-
erty and shall be enjoyed by him and shall be 
subject to his disposition as his separate 
property in the same manner as though the 
parties had Il~ver entered into the proposed 
marriage. Notwithstanding, except as set forth 
above, any payments made to 
from , Inc., -w~h"'Ti"-le-a-n-e-m-p-"-lo-y-e-e 
of , which payments are 
identified and characterized by the entity as 
payment for serv~ces rendered (including 
salary, commissions, fees, and bonuses) shall 
constitute marital property. However, any 
further interests acquired by , 
whether or not the interest acquired would have 
otherwise been deemed compensation for serv-
ices to the party from that entity, i. e., stock 
received 8.S a corporate dividend, shall be his 
separate property. 
CONFLICTS 0:1" INTEREST THAT OCCUR DURING MARRIAGE: 
A. Business Buy/Sell Agreements. Frequently, an attorney is the 
counsel for both the closely-held corporation as well as the family 
attorney for one of the shareholders. 
It is obvious that in this type of situation there are different 
interests to be protected. What is in the best interest of the 
corporation may not be in the best interest of the surviving widow 
of the deceased shareholder. For example: 
1. The buy / sell agreement may result in a financial windfall 
to the surviving shareholders to the prejudice of the 
deceased shareholder's widow. 
2. The valuation of the shares set forth in the buy / sell 
agreement may be relevant in a divorce proceeding. 
3. The possibility of the spouse becoming an unwanted 
shareholder by reason of death or a divorce decree. 
H-17 
The issue that arises during a divorce is whether a 
shareholder's wife will be bound by the terms of the buy/sell 
agreement. The majority of cases have held that a buy/sell 
agreement will be given considerable weight t but will not be binding 
upon the wife of a shareholder. 
In Su~her v. Suther t Wash. App. t 627 P. 2d 110 t the wife was 
held not to be bound by the valuation of the stock set forth in the 
buy / sell agreement notwithstanding that the wife had signed the 
buy/sell agreement. The court found that the wife never 
participated in the operation of the business, had no financial 
experience. had no real concept of corporate structure t and did not 
understand the legal purport of the buy/sell agreement. The trial 
court made a finding that the wife was not represented by counsel 
when the ag-reement was effectuated. The Washington Court looked 
at the law of different jurisdictions and concluded: 
"We conclude that the courts which have 
recently considered the question of the 
applicability of a buy / sell agreement to the 
determination of the value of the stock of a 
dose corporation in a dissolution proceeding 
have held that such an agreement is a factor to 
be considered but is not determinative of the 
13tock's value." 
There is also the possibility that the divorce court might enter 
a decree directing that the shares of stock in the closely-held 
eorporatioIl be divided between the divorced couple. 
The buy/sell agreements in Durkee v. Durkee Mower Co. t 428 
N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1981) and Castonguay v. Castonguay, 306 
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N.W.2d 143 (MilLn. 1981) were both found inadequate to 
prevent a former spouse from acquiring shares in a family 
corporation. However, the court in the Castonguay decision added 
that 'the agreement could have precluded a transfer incident to a 
divorce decree by covering involuntary transfers. 
Based upon this knowledge, the attorney has a conflict of 
interest problem. After the attorney has advised the stockholders 
that the majority of court decisions hold that wives are not bound 
by the buy I sell agreement in the event of a divorce, he knows that 
'he can sug gest certain actions to be taken that will increase the 
probability of a court finding that the wife is bound by the 
buy I sell agreement. If the attorney considers himself also the 
attorney for the wife of the stockholder, does he make those 
suggestions? He has a difficult ethical decision. For example, if 
the attorney elects to suggest ways to make the buy/sell agreement 
more likely to be enforceable against the wife, the attorney can 
recommend: 
1. Have the wife sign the buy I sell agreement because it 
would have a better chance of being enforceable against 
the wife if she had signed the agreement along with the 
shareholders. 
2. Have the buy I sell agreement contain a clause that would 
require the wife to sell any shares that she was awarded 
by a divorce court decree. The typical buy/sell 
agreement will cover both voluntary and involuntary 
H -19 
lifetime transfers. Usually. the involuntary transfers are 
defined to include: (i) the filing of a shareholder's 
voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy; (ll) the insolvenoy 
of a shareholder; and (iii) the receipt by the shareholder 
of a notice of a public. private, or judicial sale of all or 
any portion of the shares. As an additional involuntary 
transfer. the buy I sell agreement could contain a clause 
that states (Iv) the entry of a final order of a court in a 
divorce proceeding. from which there is no further right .1 
of appeal, directing a transfer of the shares. constitute$ 
an involuntary transfer. Such an involuntary transf~r 
would trigger an option in the corporation or the other 
shareholders to purchase the affected shares at the value 
determined in the buy I sell agreement. The disadvantage 
to the corporation is that it may force the company into 
acquiring shares when it is not economically feasible to do 
so. It also may alter the percentage of ownership among 
the shareholders so that the divorcing shareholder may be 
placed in minority shareholder status. 
For additional planning techniques through the use of 
buy / sell agreements to protect shareholders against 
ex-spouses' claims, see Landsman. "Divorce Planning in the 
Closely-field Business Context." (Trust & Estates. May 1984). 
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B. Wills for Family Members. 
1. Wills for Husband and Wife. The most common 
occurrence in the practice of family eS~llte plan1'\ing 
is the huspan<i and wife asking the lawyer to dr.aft 
Wills for them. Some of the potential conflict of 
interest situations created are: 
(11) Qualified terminable interest trust (Q-Tip 
Trust) created by ERTA of 1981; 
(b) Financial management of trusts; 
(c) Gifts during lifetime between husband and wife; 
(d) Irrevocable Trust; 
(e) Powers of Appointment; and 
(f) Different testamentary desires. 
2. Wills for Family Members Other Than Husband and 
Wife. Sometimes certain members of the family ,ssert 
enormous pressure and influence on other memb~rs 
of the family and the lawyer in estate planning. In 
these circumstances. the lawyer must keep in mind 
who in the family is his client for whom he is drafting 
the Will. Otherwise, the lawyer may be guilty of 
malpractice or be subject to disciplinary action 9f the 
bar association. Haynes v. First National State 
Bank, N. J. 432 A. 2d 890 (1981) and Committee on 
Professional Ethics v. Christian, 191 F. Supp. 87 (DC 
V.l. 1961). 
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CONCLUSION 
There will continue to be a place for the family lawyer in estate plan-
ning. He provides a valuable service of being a mediator and problem-solver 
for members ot the family unit. In most cases t the family lawyer is able to 
provide his legal service more efficiently and at less legal cost than when 
each party is represented by independent counsel. However, attorneys have 
an increased sensitivity to the conflicts of interest that continually arise in 
estate planning. The legal profession's codes of conduct are not always 
helpful in these conflict situations. The Code of Professional Responsibility is 
more applicable to the lawyer who is acting in his role as advocate. The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not always give the family lawyer 
clear directions. 
Although the family lawyer will continue to do estate planning for 
members of the same family, there are times when the lawyer should require 
separate legal representation for the parties. 01' t at a minimum, document that 
he has recommended and explained the reasons why there is need for in-
dependent legal counsel. Recent court decisions are using a lawyer's contlict 
of interest as grounds for refusal to enforce contracts, wills, trusts, and 
other legal documents that the lawyer prepared. It would be a grave disser-
vice to your client for a document you drafted to be held unenforceable 
because of your dual representation being found to be a conflict of interest. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Dear 
-------
This will confirm that I have been employed by as his 
attorney in the negotiation and drafting of an antenuptial agreement between 
you and ' • I have only represented 
and you have understood that I have not been represen"":"t11'""n-g-y-o-u--""Tl-n--:"1t hl"""il"""s----
matter. I have recommended to you on several occasions that you retain 
independent legal counsel of your own choice. You have informed me that 
you do not wish to retain separate counsel and have acknowledged that you 
have voluntarily and with knowledge that by entering into the antenuptial 
agreement releasing rights which would accrue to you by reason of your 
marriage to , decided not to obtain separate legal counsel and to 
execute the agreement without the advice of such counsel. 
You understand that under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
you are giving up the right to certain spousal rights, including, but not 
limited to, the right to inherit from an amount equal to one-
half (1/2) the value of his personal property, and an amount equal to 
one-half (1/2) the value of his real property if he dies before you without a 
Will. In addition, you are releasing the right to receive the surviving 
spouse's statutory share of $7,500.00. If he has a Will, you are giving up 
the right to renounce his Will and take an amount equal to one-half (1/2) the 
value of his personal property and an amount equal to one-third (1/3) the 
value of his real property owned at the time of his death. 
You further confirm by your signature below that you will not claim that 
the antenuptial agreement between you and is void or 
unenforceable because you were not represented by independent counsel. 
Sincerely, 
Attorney for 
---------------------
I acknowledge that I have read, understand, and accept as true the 
above statements contained in Hon. letter to me. 
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I. TYPES OF CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP 
A. Joint tenancy with right of survivorshie 
B. 
C. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Right to entire property upon death of co-
tenant. 
Unilaterally severable. 
Income and control are equally shared. 
Severance usually creates tenancy in common. 
Creditors of either owner have rights against 
that share. 
Interest may not be devised or bequeathed. 
Tenancy by the entirety 
1. Between spouses only. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Right of survivorship. 
Cannot be unilaterally severed. Severed by 
mutual consent or divorce. 
Control and income shared equally in most 
states. 
Rights of either spouse subject only to claims 
of creditors of both spouses--not separate 
creditors. 
6. Interest may not be devised or bequeathed. 
Tenancy in common 
1. No right of survivorship. 
2. Unilaterally severable by sale. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Control and income shared equally. 
Each tenant's share is subject to claims of 
creditors of that tenant. 
-
May be devised or bequeathed. 
I-I 
II. 
D. Community property 
1. Exists in 8 states: Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Washington. 
2. 
3~ 
4. 
Formerly existed in Hawaii, Montana, Oklahoma, 
and Oregon. 
Covers property acquired by either spouse during 
marriage (other than by gift, descent or 
distribution). 
Similar to a tenancy in common, in that each 
spouse has a separate interest. 
5. Control sometimes vested solely in husbanQ. 
6. CAVEAT: The community property laws of eacn 
state vary significantly. Check out any 
problems individually. 
NONTAX CONSEQUENCES OF CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP FORMS 
A. Control: Results in a loss of testamentary control, 
since 
B. 
c. 
o. 
BUT: This can result in an over funded marital 
deduction. 
Simelicity: Eases the burden of estate 
admlnistration, but the estate tax return may be more 
complicated. 
Cost: May result in reduction in probate fees and 
inheritance taxes but the savings offset by costs of 
retitling. 
Creditors: May avoid creditors' claims, at least 
creditors of only one owner. 
III. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP FORMS 
A. Joint tenancies with right of survivorship (not 
between spouses) 
1. Income tax conseguences. The joint owners 
typically split income equally. Income ta~es 
follow. 
Dividend exclusions doubled. 
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2. Gift tax consequences. A taxable gift may occur 
when a joint tenancy is created or terminated. 
a. Creation. The creation of a joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship is a taxable 
gift for gift tax purposes if: 
a. 
1. the transfer is completed (i.e., tpe 
donor cannot take back the transfe~), 
and 
ii. One tenant receives a share 
disproportionate to his or her 
contribution. Regs. S25.25l1-1(h)(5), 
and . 
iii. PARTIES ARE NOT SPOUSES. 
EXAMPLE: A purchases an office 
building for $500,000 and takes title 
as joint tenants with B, his 
brother. Absent other circumstances, 
A has made a taxable gift to B of 
$250,000--B'S interest in the 
tenancy. A must file a gift tax 
return. 
Termination: The termination of.a joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship is a 
taxable gift if one tenant receives a 
distribution disproportionately greater 
than his or her contribution. Regs. S 
25.2511-2(d). 
i. Completed transfer. If the "donor" 
has a right to reimbursement from the 
donee under state law, it may be 
argued that the transfer is not 
completed. 
ii. EXAMPLE: A and B purchase a residence 
together for $100,000. A and B ~acn 
contribute $50,000. Ten years later, 
when the residence is worth $200,000, 
the tenancy is dissolved and B 
receives $75,000 and A receives 
$125,000. B has made a taxable gift 
of $25,000, the difference between A's 
share of the proceeds and A's 
proportionate share of the property. 
1-3 
b. 
c. 
iii. PLANNING: When severing jointly-held 
property interests, to avoid a taxable 
gift, sever according to relative 
contributions. 
Conversion: The conversion of a joint 
tenancy into a tenancy in common 
constitutes a potentially taxable 
termination of the joint tenancy. Rev. 
Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507. 
Specific assets: 
i. Bank accounts: Normally, bank 
accounts are of a type in which each 
co-owner has an unlimited withdrawal 
right. Either tenant can withdraw the 
entire amount. 
AA. Taxable gift. In this type of 
account, the deposit is not a 
taxable gift because it is 
revocable. Regs. § 25.2511-
l(h)(4). However, withdrawal of 
the funds from this type of 
account by the noncontributing 
co-owner constitutes a taxable 
gift. 
ii. Securities: When securities are 
purchased jointly, a taxable gift of 
one-half of the value of the gift 
occurs at registration. Regs. § 
25.25ll-l(h)(5). 
AA. NOTE: If the securities are sold 
and the proceeds are reinvested 
in the same percentage of 
ownership, there is no additional 
taxable gift. 
BB. Distinguish this from joint 
brokerage ~ccounts containing 
street name shares, which are 
trreated like a joint bank 
account. Rev. Rul. 69-148, 1969-
1 C.B. 226. 
iii. Savings bonds: Series E bonds are 
issued at a discount and interest is 
received upon redemption. Series H 
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3. 
bonds are issued at face amount and 
interest is paid twice a year. 
AA. The only joint ownership of 
savings bonds is "A or 8," which 
creates a joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship. 
BB. The purchase of a bond with 
disproportionate contributions 
does not constitute a taxable 
gift because it is revocable. 
Regs. S 25.2511-1(h)(4); Rev. 
Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399. 
CC. The redemption of the bonds by 
the noncontributing owner (or a 
disproportionate distribution of 
the proceeds) is a taxable gift, 
unless local law provides a right 
to reimbursement. Rev. Rul. 68-
269, supra. 
Estate tax consequences: Except as to married 
joint tenants, the full value of the jointly 
held property is included in the estate of tpe 
first owner to die, subject to exclusion of a 
ratable share shown to be attributable to 
contribution by a survivor. Code § 2040(a). 
(All references to "Code" are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.) 
a. Consideration: The exclusion is available 
only if the contribution is made in money 
Or money's worth. 
i. Money or property given to the 
survivor by the deceased does not 
count. Regs. § 20.2040-l(c)(4). 
Therefore, if A gives B a one-half 
interest in property held jointly with 
A, not only has A made a taxable gift 
but the entire value of the property 
is included in A's gross estate. See 
~, Estate of Lyons, 35 T.C.M. 605 
(1976). 
ii. Services rendered by surviving owner 
do not count as a contribution. B4t 
see Code S 2040(c); Estate of Evert 
Otte, 31 T.e.M. 301 (1972); and Craig, 
42 AFTR 2d 148, 265 (D.S.D. 1978). 
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B. 
b. 
iii. Income received by the survivor from 
property given by the decedent and 
contributed to the property is 
separate consideration and it 
counts. Regs. S 20.2040-l(c)(5). 
iv. It is unclear whether realiz'ed or 
unrealized appreciation in the value 
of property given to the survivor by 
the decedent constitutes separate 
consideration. Regs. S 20.2040(a)(2); 
but see Estate of Goldsborough, 70 
T.C. No. 96 (1978) in which 0 gave his 
two daughters realty worth $25,000. 
Three years later they sold it for 
$32,500, and invested the proceeds in 
securities as joint tenants with their 
father. 7,500/32,500 was excluded 
from the father's gross estate under 
Code S 2040(a). See also Harvey, 185 
F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950); First 
National Bank of Kansas City, 223 
F.Supp. 963 (W.D.Mo. 1953); and 
Schwartz, 182 F. Supp. 540 (D. Mass. 
1960). 
Gifts and inheritances: If the jointly 
held property was acquired by gift or 
inheritance, rather than by purchase, the 
contributions of the two owners are deemed 
to be their relative shares received. 
Regs. S 20.2040-l(c)(8). 
Tenancy by the entirety. 
In general, tenancies by the entirety and joint 
tenancies with right of survivorship between spouses 
are treated the same. 
1. 
2. 
Income tax consequences. Income from the 
property, and the income tax liability for it, 
is split between the spouses. (This makes a 
difference only if no joint income tax return is 
filed. ) 
Gift tax consequences. 
a. Prior to 1977, the creation or termination 
of any concurrent ownership estate with a 
survivorship right that was not 
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b. 
c. 
unilaterally severable (typically, a 
tenancy by the entirety, but not a joint 
tenancy), resulted in a taxable gift, 
unless the contribution or distribution of 
proceeds were made in accordance with the 
actuarial life expectancies of the joint 
owners. 
EXAMPLE: H (50) and W (45) purchased a 
stock portfolio in 1960 to be held as 
tenants by the entirety, each contributing 
$50,000. Each has a one-half interest in 
the stock, but the H's interest is 
actuarially worth $55,716. Therefore, W 
has made a $5,716 gift to H. 
Fifteen years later(1975), the stock 
has doubled in value to $200,000, and the 
owners (now 65 and 60, respectively) divide 
it in half. However, at those ages the W's 
interest is worth $115,642. Therefore, W 
has made another gift, of $15,642, to H. 
Section 2515(c), as amended by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 and the Revenue Act of 
1978, eliminates the requirements of using 
actuarial values on the creation or 
termination of tenancies by the entireties, 
and uses instead one-half of the value as 
the measure of one tenant's interest. 
More significantly, the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 provided an unlimited 
marital deduction against the gift and 
estate tax, which eliminates most concerns 
about whether the creation or termination 
of a tenancy by the entirety (by 
definition, only between spouses) results 
in a taxable gift. 
3. Estate Tax Consequences. 
a. 
b. 
Code Section 2040(b) provides that upon the 
death of one spouse, his estate will 
include one-half of the value of all 
property held by the decedent and his 
surviving spouse as tenants by the 
entirety. 
Unless disclaimed, the decedent's interest 
passes to the spouse, and will qualify for 
I-7 
C. 
D. 
c. 
the unlimited marital deduction under Code 
Section 2056. 
Upon the surviving spouse's death, the 
entire value of the property will be 
included in his/her estate. 
Tenancies in Common 
l~ Income tax consequences: In whatever 
proportions the tenancy is shared, the income 
and income tax consequences are shared. 
2. Gift tax consequences: 
3. 
a. Creation: The creation of a tenancy in 
common is a taxable gift if the interests 
received a disproportionate to the 
contributions, and if it is a completed 
gift. 
b. Termination: The termination of a tenancy 
in common is a taxable gift if the 
interests received are disproporationate to 
the interests of the owners. 
Estate tax consequences: 
(or other proportionate) 
his or her gross estate; 
but under 2033. 
Each owner's one-half 
interest is included in 
not under Code § 2040 
a. Passes by will, not operation of law.' 
Community property: Generally, community property is 
much like a tenancy in common, but it is important to 
review the applicable state laws because they vary 
substantially. 
1. 
2. 
Income tax consequences: the income derived 
from property held as community is divided 
equally. 
Gift tax consequences: 
a. Creation: The acquisition of property as 
community property is not treated as a 
taxable gift because it occurs by operation 
of law, not donative transfer. 
i. NOTE: If separate property is 
converted into community property by 
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IV~ 
express agreement of the spouses, this 
is a taxable gift. 
b. Termination: When community property is 
converted into separate property by 
agreement of the spouses, it is a taxable 
gift. 
i. NOTE: Conversion of community 
property into jointly held property is 
probably not a taxable gift since the 
interests have not changed. 
3. Estate tax conseguences: Generally, the estate 
of the deceased spouse includes only one-half 
interest held by that spouse in the property. 
Consecutive Ownership. 
A. Clifford or Spousal Reversion Trusts 
1. Prior Law: Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
Clifford trusts and spousal remainder trusts 
(Clifford trusts with a gift of the remainder to 
the grantor's spouse) were used to shift income 
from a specified period from a high-bracket 
taxpayer to a lower-bracket one (typically a 
child or parent). At the termination of the 
specified period, the property reverted back to 
the grantor or his spouse. This form of 
"consecutive" ownership lost many of its tax 
benefits under the 1986 Act, which now taxes all 
income from such trusts to the grantor if his 
reversionary interest (or that of his spouse) is 
worth more than 5% of the value of the property. 
2. Grandfather Rules: Clifford or Spousal 
Reversion Trusts created and funded before March 
1, 1986 are grandfathered (i.e., not treated as 
grantor trusts. However, any property 
subsequently transferred to such a trust is not 
grandfathered. 
3. Continuing Alternative: One alternative 
remaining is to create an income trust for the 
benefit of a parent, with the reversion to a 
child or other non-spouse beneficiary. This 
would not be considered a grantor trust under 
the 1986 Act. 
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B. Joint Purchase. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Design: Another method of planning for 
consecutive ownership is a joint or "split" 
purchase. It usually is accomplished by having 
an older-generation family member purchase a 
life estate in property with a simultaneous 
purchase of the remainder interest by a younger-
generation family member. Upon the death of the 
life tenant, the property passes to the 
remainderman. 
Gift Tax Consequences: There should be no gift 
tax consequences if each owner is paying the 
fair market value of his respective interest to 
the seller. Generally, these can be determined 
using the tables provided at Treas. Reg. § 
25.2512-5 for valuing a life interest, and using 
the balance of the fair market value of the 
remainder. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Note that the tables are not to be used 
when the death of either tenant is "clearly 
imminent"; Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 
194. 
The IRS might also challenge the use of the 
tables if the property purchased is not 
income-producing. 
Any improvements to the property, and the 
principal of debt incurred with respect to 
it, should be paid by the tenants in 
proportion of their respective interests at 
the time the improvement is made; otherwise 
a gift may result. Grant v. Commissioner, 
202 F.Supp. 608 (W.O. Va. 1962); Penn v. 
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1497 (1951), aff'd 
199 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 927 (1953). 
Interest on any debt incurred should be 
paid entirely by the life tenant. 
Income Tax Consequences: The income tax 
consequences are more complex than one might 
assume. Generally, the life tenant will be 
entitled to all of the income and charged with 
all of the interest under state law, and will be 
taxed on it. 
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a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
If the property is sold, both of the owners 
will recognize gain or loss (probably 
capital), notwithstanding that capital gain 
is ordinarily allocated to principal under 
state principal and income allocation 
statutes; Rev. Rul. 71-122, 1971-1 C.B. 
224. Each owner will have his own basis in 
his interest against which to measure gain 
or loss. 
Since the life tenant has purchased a 
wasting asset, he should be entitled to an 
amortization deduction if the property is 
held for the production of income; Bell v. 
Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954), 
Acq., Rev. Rul. 62-132, 1962-2 C.B. 73. 
The annual deduction would be the purchase 
price of the life tenancy divided over the 
number of years of the life tenant's life 
expectancy at the time of the purchase, and 
is allowable even if the underlying asset 
is not depreciable (e.g., unimproved real 
estate, or securities). 
NOTE: In Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 
No. 18 (1985) the Tax Court disallowed an 
amortization deduction as to a split 
purchase, but the result is based on poor 
execution of the formalities, which allowed 
the Court to consider the transaction as a 
purchase of the whole, followed by a 
transfer of the remainder interest, by the 
life tenant. 
If the underlying asset is itself 
depreciable, the life tenant should be 
entitled to a depreciation deduction. 
i. Section 167(h) provides that the 
depreciation deduction is to be 
"computed as if the life tenant were 
the absolute owner of the 
property ••• ". 
ii. Regs. S 1.167(h)-1(a) provides that a 
life tenant "will be entitled to the 
deduction during his life, and 
thereafter the deduction, if any, 
shall be allowed to the remainderman." 
1-11 
4. 
5. 
iii. It is not clear whether the life 
tenant will be entitled to both a 
depreciation deduction as to the asset 
and an amortization deduction as to 
his life interest. Theoretically, two 
distinct property interests exist, and 
the double deduction should be 
allowed. Even if this is not so, the 
life tenant should get an amortization 
deduction as to his interest in any 
otherwise nondepreciable portion of 
the underlying asset. For example, 
the life tenant of a commercial office 
building should be entitled to the 
depreciation deduction as to the 
building, and an amortization 
deduction as to his interest in the 
underlying ground (although it is not 
depreciable). 
Appropriate Circumstances: 
a. A joint purchase may be more or less 
appropriate, depending on the age of the 
life tenant, the expected rate of 
appreciation of the asset, and the 
comparative tax brackets of the tenants. 
Note that the parties forego any basis 
step-up at death. 
b. The key advantage is that the IRS tables 
used in determining the purchase prices of 
the interests assume that all assets yield 
a 10% after tax return, and do not 
appreciate in value. Therefore, if the 
objective of the parties is to maximize the 
current income tax benefits to the life 
tenant, and to maximize the transfer of 
wealth (at no estate tax cost) to the 
remainderman, the asset selected should be 
one that will appreciate in value over 
time, such as real estate or securities. 
If the real estate is income producing, the 
depreciation deduction is an extra bonus. 
If the securities are tax-exempt bonds, the 
life tenant will have an amortization 
deduction, and no taxable income. 
Implementation: 
a. If the asset is real estate, the 
documentation required is a recorded deed 
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C. 
b. 
c. 
reflecting the life tenancy and the 
remainder interest. These are not unusual. 
Securities are not typically owned this 
way, so more care is required. 
i. The certificate may be jointly titled 
to reflect the interests of-the 
parties, as in a real estate deed, or 
ii. if securities are held in a brokerage 
account, a written agreement between 
the parties would be helpful (see the 
"Joint Purchase Agreement" in the 
Gordon case, supra). 
The remainderman should, in any case, 
provide his own funds. If they are 
received by gift from the life tenant, the 
IRS may collapse the transaction, as in the 
Gordon case, and the entire value of the 
property would be included in the life 
tenant's estate under Code S 2036. 
Sale of a Remainder Interest 
Another possibility is for an owner of property to 
sell a remainder interest in the property to others. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Gift Tax Consequences: If the sale is at the 
fair market value of the remainder interest, 
there is no gift. 
Gift Tax Consequences: If the sale is at the 
fair market value of the remainder interest, the 
asset is not included in the life tenant's 
estate at death. Code S 2036{a). 
a. If the value of the remainder interest is 
even slightly higher than the sales price, 
the entire value of the property is 
included in the life tenant's estate. 
b. If the value of the remainder interest is 
deliberately set too high, the remainderman 
has made a gift to the life tenant of the 
excess. 
Income Tax Conseguences: 
a. The life tenant will have gain or loss on 
the sale {after allocating his basis in the 
I-13 
D. 
b. 
asset between the interest sold and that 
retained.) 
The remainderman-purchaser will have a 
basis in the remainder interest acquired, 
which is a nondepreciable, non-income 
producing asset. 
c. The life tenant wil~ not be entitled to 
amortize his life estate, even if the asset 
is income-producing: Lomas Santa Fe, Inc. 
v. Comm'r, 693 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Nontax Consequences of Consecutive Ownership 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Control: Consecutive ownership normally means 
loss of control by either party, since a life or 
remainder interest, though severable, will not 
be readily salable. 
Simplicity: Techniques for creating consecutive 
ownership are almost as simple or straight 
forward as the more typical ownership formats, 
but are more unusual and hence require more 
care. 
Cost: May result in lower probate and estate 
taxes, and hence are beneficial. Costs incurred 
in evaluating and creating the interests may 
mitigate benefits. 
Creditors: Although consecutive interests are 
severable and may be subject to liens, they are 
inconvenient for creditors to attach (especially 
remainder interests). 
1-14 
J 
.J 
\ 
J 
-
J 
t 
~ 
-
j 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
INSURANCE PRODUCTS UNDER TAX REFOru1 
By 
Daniel B. Santos, C.L.V. 
@ copyright 1987 
Daniel B. Santos 
Louisville, Kentucky 
Section J 
~ 
J 
J 
oJ 
J 
j 
J 
I 
• 
..; 
f 
-
j 
j 
r 
r 
r I. 
r II. 
III. 
r IV. 
r V. VI. 
r VII. 
VIII. 
r 
r , 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Life Insurance: Tax-Favored Benefits 
Annuities 
Consumer Interest (Personal Interest) 
Loans on Corporate Owned Policies 
J-l 
J-l 
J-l 
J-3 
B.U.R.P. - Book Income (Business Untaxed Reported Profits) J-6 
Executive Bonus Insurance J-16 
Split Dollar Life Insurance for Key Employers J-17 
Family - Estate Tax J-22 
J 
J 
, j 
J 
j 
,j 
J 
I 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
" 
:r 
r 
,r 
.'L LIFE INSURANCE: TAX-FAVORED BENEFITS 
A. Two key advantages enhance the attractiveness and 
marketability of life insurance in light of current tax 
law climate: 
1. Death benefit continues to be income tax-free. 
r (Exception - transfer-for-va1ue) 
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2. Cash values continue to grow on a tax-deferred basis. 
II. ANNUITIES 
A. Tax deferred growth of cash values for individuals. 
B. No withdrawal penalties after 59-1/2. 
C. Ten percent withdrawal penalty before age 59-1/2. 
III. CONSUMER INTEREST (PERSONAL INTEREST) . 
A. Under pre-'86 law consumer interest generally deductible 
(life insurance must meet the "4 out of 7" rule, however) 
B. New Law - Consumer interest not deductible - law provides 
4 year transition period - can deduct. 
65% in 1987 
40% in 1988 
20% in 1989 
10% in 1990 
0% in 1991 
C. No grandfathering of pre-1987 transactions. 
J-l 
C. Continued 
1. New Law applies to: 
a. Personal loans 
b. Credit and debt 
c. Finance charges for purchases of durable items 
(autos, furniture, household appliances, etc.) 
d. Minimum deposit policy loans 
e. Interest on tax under payments (except deferred 
payments of estate taxes) 
2. New Law does not apply to: 
a. Interest on debt incurred in connection with the 
conduct of a trade' or business. 
b. Investment interest. 
c. Interest taken into account in computing taxpayers 
income or loss from a passive activity. 
d. Qualified residence interest (taxpayer's principal 
residence and second home used as a family second 
residence or vacation home. 
e. Interest on estate tax payments deferred under 
Sec. 6166 or Sec. 6163. 
3. Investment Interest 
a. Prior law - could deduct net investment interest 
equal to $10,000 plus net investment income. 
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4. Mew Law 
a. Investment interest can be deducted up to extent 
of "net investment income". 
b. Excess interest can be carried forward indefinitely. 
c. $10,000 floor of prior law phased out over a 4 
year period, 1987-1990. 
Comment - Can life insurance interest be treated as investment 
interest? Perhaps, if taxpayer can show funds borrowed from 
," 
policy and invested a minimum deposit plan does not seem to 
qualify. 
IV. LOANS ON CORPORATE-OWNED POLICIES 
A. Old Law; meeting the "4 out of 7" minimum deposit rule 
was the only requirement to be met in order to deduct 
any and all policy loan interest on the corporate tax 
return. 
B' New Law; The minimum deposit rule must still be 
satisfied; but even then, there is a limitation on 
loan interest deductibility for policies owned ~ 
the corporate taxpayer. 
1. Policies purchased June 21, 1986, or earlier -
they are all "grandfathered" and the old, liberal 
law applies to them. 
2. Policies purchased June 21, 1986, or later -
a. Interest is deductible only on loan amounts 
which do not exceed $50,000. 
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B. New Law - Continued 
2. b. If loans exceed $.50,000. only the interest on 
the first $50,000 may be deducted. 
c. Policies involved in new rules: 
(1) those on life of an officer or employee; 
(2) those on life of any person who is financially 
interested in the trade or business of the 
taxpayer; 
(3). in the case of an unincorporated business, 
J 
J 
I 
.J 
J 
.J 
J 
those on the life of the sole proprietor J 
or any partner - the limitation applies also 
to a ,. business othCi!r than a corporation. J 
d. $50,000'.10an cap applies on an aggregate basis 
for each insured, i.e., the insured is an 
officer in several businesses of the taxpayer; 
affiliated corporations are deemed to be a single 
J 
taxpayer. This means that all such policies must J 
be added together to determine if the $50,000 cap 
on loans has been exceeded. 
e. Apparently, it matters not what the business 
purpose might be for use of the borrowed amounts. 
This directly reflects on policies used f~r 
purposes of salary continuation/deferred compensa-
tion, stock redemptions, etc. 
J-4 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
; 
r 
l 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
i 
r 
r 
r 
B. New Law - Continued 
f. Definitions of the words "purchase" and "purchased": 
1. The exhange of a pre-6/20/86 life policy for a 
new policy from a different insurance company 
Plat 6/20/86 is the purchase of a new policy. 
2. Substitution of insureds, i.e., Insurance Exchange 
Rider: a Senate coloquy said that this event 
would not be considered a new purchase of the 
policy; but Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski 
disagreed. Thus, the law here is unclear. 
3. If an application for insurance was submitted on 
or before 6/20/86, it was purchased by that date, 
even if issued post 6/20/86. 
4. Query? Some commentators theorize that old 
issued personally-owned policies transferred by 
individuals to corporations they own would be 
grandfathered. Is this a way for personal 
policies with "fat 1.0ans" to continue through 
corporation ownership on a limited mini-dip basis? 
This theory stretches item (3) and is unsubstantiated. 
The taxpayer's own counsel would need to render an 
opinion on this point. 
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B. New Law - Continued 
g. 'Can an over-$50,000 policy loan fo~ true and normal 
business indebtedness allow interest deduct~ons for 
the loan excess over $50,000? A senate coloquoy 
said yes. Majority' leader Dole gave the example 
of a farmer who borrowed to plant crops and wno 
p~edged his life insurance as security. Senate 
Finance Chairman Packwood said. "The new provision 
would not disallow interest on indebtedness incurred 
under the circumstances described." 
However, Rep. Rostenkowski did not issue any 
compliance, so the point is unclear. Taxpayer 
must seek private counsel. 
V. B, U. R. P. - BOOK INCOME (Business Untaxed Reported Profits 
A. These are income items which increase a corporation's 
net worth on its annua1.financia1 statement, but which 
are not subjected to regular corporate income tax -
what is reporeed ~o shareholders for non-tax purposes. 
B. This'new Code Section 56 provision is effective :r::or ehe 
three taxable years beginning in 1987, 1988, and 1989. 
Treasury Secretary is to make recommendations to Congr~s 
for 1990, and beyond. 
O. Book income provisions provide that the AMT income will 
inc1uie 50% of the amount by which adjusted net book 
income exceeds tne ALV1T (alternative ml.nimum eax) income 
before other calculations are made. 
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V. B. U. R. P. - BOOK INCOME - Continued 
C. (Cont.) Stated simply, these are items the corpora-
tion shows on its "books"; and-. which would not other-
wise be taxed (but for these new provisions). These 
4tems are the business untaxed reported profits or 
B.U.R.P. 
D. Relevance to life insurance: 
1. Tax-free inside buildup of cash values is now a 
cor~.orate book income preference item; 
2. Any death benefit in excess of cash value is now 
a corporate book income preference item; 
3. This could mean a tax of 10% on the cash value 
growth or death proceeds - effectively, only half 
of the usual 20% AMT .rate. 
E. Cash va1ue.inc1uded in book income is only that amount 
which exceeds net premiums paid. 
1. Effect uncertain on new sales, but let us presume 
that the provision will end in 1989. 
2. Already-issued policies with high cash value will 
become affected this year. 
F. Death benefits where insured dies prior to 1990 will 
be affected. 
1. Total.proceeds exceeding cash value must be included 
in book income. This means amount at risk could be 
subject to a 10% levy (half of 20% AMT). 
J-7 
F. 2. Example, excluding additions, etc: 
$250,000 Face Amount Policy 
50,000 Cash Value 
$200,000 Amount at Risk 
$200,000 x 10% = #20,000 tax payable 
G. On the brighter side, that portion of the premium 
attributable to the amount at risk, and policy loan 
interest paid, will be deductible in determining net 
book income. 
1. This would partially cancel out cash value increases 
or death proceeds received that must be included to 
determine net book income during these three years. 
H. Suggestion 
1. May need to Split Dollar a policy now held as 
Key Person Insurance. The insured's personal 
beneficiary will received the amount at risk. 
Result - No BURP on amount paid to personal 
beneficiary. 
2. May need to sell more insurance to increase the 
coverage, so that any prospective AMT on the 
death proceeds amount at risk will not dissipate 
the amount needed by the corporation, i.e., 
corporation needs $500,000 for a stock redemption 
immediately after death of shareholder. 
Formula to calculate precise total face amount 
needed: present face amount, divided by one 
minus effective AMT rate of 10%. 
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H. Suggestion - Continued 
2. (Cont.) $500,000 ~ (1 - .10) = 
$500,000 ~ (.90 = $555,555 new total 
face amount. 
(Within a few years, the valuation of this 
insured's corporate share interest will increase 
this much at least, assuming we are at 1990, 
or beyond.) 
3. Remember, depending on the regular tax payable, 
there might not be any AMT! 
I. Buy-Sell Agreements in the Corporation 
1. Stock Redemption vis-a~vis Cross Purchase Prologue: 
Before you can attempt to convince a client what 
type of an agreement is best, you must first convince 
the client that an agreement is necessary. The 
client must come to the realization of the personal 
and family benefits to be obtained through such an 
agreement. This applies whether the client dies 
first or one of the co-shareholders dies first. 
The purpose for a buy-sell agreement might be 
summarized as follows: 
a. It permits a survivor to carryon the business 
without the possible problems of having a 
hostile co-shareholder (e.g., the widow, widower., 
executor of a former shareholder or a third 
party purchaser from the estate). 
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I. Buy-Sell Agreements - Continued 
1. Stock Redemption (Cont.) 
b. It permits decedent to provide for an equita-
ble market for stock after death, provided the 
agreement is properly drafted. 
c. Stock Redemption (sometimes called "Retirement" 
means that the corporate entity purchases back 
the stock of the deceased shareholder. 
~orporation owns life insurance policy on each 
shareholder, and is beneficiary thereof. 
d. Cross Purchase (sometimes called "Criss-Cross") 
means that each shareholder owns a policy on 
every other shareholder, and is beneficiary 
thereof. Each surviving shareholder makes a 
direct purchase of stock from deceased's estate. 
Big advantage: the actual purchase gives the 
survivor(s) a higher basis for income tax 
purposes in event of a later sale of stock 
during lifetime. 
J. Tax Reform Implications in Rede~ption Agreements 
1. Book Inoome problem might cause cash values or 
death proceeds to become a BURP (Business Untaxed 
Reported Profits) item. This could be true of old 
or new life policies. 
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J. Tax Reform Implications - Continued 
2. "Transfer for Value" and death proceeds: One 
cannot transfer ownership of policies on the life 
of one shareholder from the corporation to a co-
shareholder without creating potential income tax 
problems at the instant of death. 
a. There is an exception to the transfer for value 
rule: a policy on an officer or shareholder can 
?e transferred to the corporation, but not vice-
versa. Neither does a two-step process work 
using the insured as a "straw party" for the 
first step in the transfer process from corpora-
tion to co-shareholder. 
b. The key person policies in the corporation for 
stock redemption should be left there for that 
purpose. 
3. New buy-sell agreements should be written on the 
cross purchase method, so as to avoid the book 
income problem. This is true, even if there are 
three or four shareholders, unless they insist on 
limited minimum depositing in the corporation. 
Assuming phase-out of the book income provisions, 
the cross-purchased policies could be transferred 
to corporate ownership later. 
J-ll 
K. Salary Continuation - Deferred Compensation 
1. Salary Continuation (sometimes called a SERF 
supplemental executive retirement plan) is a 
"Golden handcuffs" corporate fringe benefit 
provided to key employees over and above what 
they will receive from a pension and/or profit 
sharing plan. A written agreement is used to 
state the benefits and the obligations. 
2. Def~rred Compensation (sometimes used as a generic 
term to encompass salary continuation) is an agree-
ment (in its true form) between employee and corpo-
ration whereby the employee decided. for income 
tax purposes. to forego a year-end bonus or a 
merit increase. "Don't pay it to me now; but pay 
it to me later. 
3. In either scenario, the corporation "agrees" to 
payout the benefits at some later time. usually 
starting at normal retirement age. If the agree-
ment is properly drafted, benefits ehould be taxable 
only when received by the employee. These plans 
can be discrimatory. 
4. The former, Salary Continuation (SERP) is the more 
popular. 
5. Funding for an "unfunded" SERP. 
a. Annuities, as changed by tax reform implications, 
primarily aimed at corporation ownership -
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K. Salary Continuation - Continued 
5. Funding (Cont.) a. Annuities 
(1) Generally, .non-individual owners will be 
currently taxed on any increase in the 
cash surrender value attributable to 
"premiums" or "purchase payments" made 
after February 28, 1986, regardness of when 
the policy was issued. Prior "premiums" 
or "purchase payments" retain their tax-
deferred status. Generally, this will 
mean that earnings under .. annuities owned 
by corporations or certain trusts will be 
treated as current, ordinary income and 
are subject to federal income tax, unlike 
annuities owned by or for the benefit of 
individuals. 
(2) In addition, this change, which applies to 
policies owned by other than "natural persons" 
has exceptions. It does not apply to 
policies acquired for pu~poses of estate 
administration, purchased and held by an 
employer upon termination of a qualified 
pension or profit-sharing plan, held by a 
tax-qualified plan, an IRA or TSA, an 
immediate annuity (where the first payment 
is deferred no longer than one year after 
purchase), or a trust established for the 
benefit of an individual. 
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K. Salary Continuation - Continued 
5. Funding (Cont. a. Annuities 
(3) Generally, annuities are used in Sala~y 
Continuation plans only when there is an 
uninsurable person to be benefited. 
b. Life Insurance - the preferred funding method. 
The corporation is the applicant, owner, premium 
payer, and beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy on the employee. It is a key employee 
policy which sits on the shelf for future use. 
(1) Book Income/BURP could be a problem in the 
short term, but let's assume that those 
provisions fade out of existence several 
years hence, 
(2) Life Insurance is still the best way to 
build, and informally fund for, pre-retire-
ment death benefits disability retirement 
benefits, and the ultimate post-retirement 
benefits - all through one policy. 
(3) Key employees will be looking for more ways 
for their corporations to supplement their 
pre-retirement and post-retirement income 
because of now-limited qualified plan fund-
ing and distribution rules about to take 
effect. Life Insurance is the natural way 
to'do this ·funding on a selective basis 
through a Salary Continuation/SERP agreement, 
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K. Salary Continuation - Continued 
5. Funding (Cont.) b. Life Insurance 
(4) Better yet, the corporation can give more 
"benefit for the buck" in the future. Corporate 
tax rates are coming down, so it will take less 
after-tax income to fund a specific SERP amount. 
-Tax deduction is allowable only when benefits~ 
are actually paid out to the employee. 
(a) The top corporate tax bracket will soon be 
only 34%. It will take $15,152 before taxes 
to have $10,000 left for a premium. 
(b) Formerly, to set aside that $10,000, it took 
$18,519, in a top 46% bracket pre-tax. 
(c) Have the corporation still set aside $18,519 
pre-tax = bigger premium for bigger policy 
for key employee!! 
(5) Will corporate tax rates go back up in 1989 when a 
new President, takes office? Probably .. 
(a) Let the corporation use inexpensive dollars in 
these early years, then take its payout deduc-
tion later when dollars will probably be more 
expensive. 
(b) If the corporation is in the top 34% tax 
bracket, it must earn barely more than $1.50 
to pay $1.00 in premiums after taxes. 
(c) Assume the top tax rate later goes to 46% 
again, i.e., when the benefit payout time 
arrives. 
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K. Salary Continuation - Continued 
5. Funding (Cont) b. Life Insurance 
(5) (c) Then, it will cost the corporation only 
54 cents in taxes when it pays out each 
dollar to the retired employee. 
VI. EXECUTIVE BONUS INSURANCE (sometimes called a Plus Employee 
or IRe Sec. 162 Plan) 
1. Let's keep assuming that the corporation stays in the 
top 34% Federal tax bracket. 
2. Selling life insurance through an Executive Bonus 
arrangement is an attractive way to satisfy traditional 
needs for personal life insurance. 
3. There are two advantages of the Executive Bonus method. 
a. The employer buys a life insurance policy on the 
life of an employee - usually an executive or other 
valued employee - pays the premiums, and receives 
a tax deduction for each premium paid. The employee 
owns the policy and obtains the insurance protection 
for the cost of the taxes on the premium. 
b. In effect, a valuable fringe benefit is provided to 
the employee without the employer becoming entangled 
in nondiscrimination requirements or tedious and 
burdensome paperwork and record-keeping. 
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4. The Executive Bonus arrangement is usually most impressive J 
when the combined tax brackets of employer and employee 
operate to reduce the total combined outlays to less than 
100% of the premium. 
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4. (Continued) 
If, for example, an employer is in the 34% tax bracket 
the premium really costs the employer 66 cents per 
dollar. If the employee's marginal income tax bracket, 
after the increase in income is 28%, the tax paid by 
. 
the employee is 28 cents per dollar. Obviously, the 
higher the employer's tax rate, and the lower the 
employee's rate, the better the tax leveraging. 
5. The employee owns the policy, and can reduce later 
" 
outlays by electing to receive the dividends in cash. 
If the employee uses premium offset, the employer's 
outlays can be limited to premiums due before the off-
set year. 
6. The corporation can double-bonus the amount of premiu~ 
to the insured and deduct it (assuming it is considered 
reasonable compensation). 
7. No book income/BURP problem. The corporation pays the 
premiums, and has no interest in the policy. 
SPLIT DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE FOR KEY EMPLOYEES 
1. Let us now assume that a closely held corporation's 
marginal tax bracket is only 15% -- pre-tax profits 
have been used for salary, qualified plan and other 
fringe benefit funding, so that only $50,000 or less 
will be taxable. Since the shareholder-employee(s) 
take out so much as salary, they personally will be 
in a 28% or 33% marginal tax bracket. 
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VII, SPLIT DOLLAR LIFE - Continued 
2. Split Dollar Life insurance is a method of joining 
the life insurance needs of selected employees, 
including shareholder-employees, with the premium 
paying ability of the corporation. When the employee 
dies, the proceeds are split. Generally an amount 
equal to the premiums paid by the business is paid to 
the employer. The employee's beneficiary receives 
the ba~~nce of the proceeds. 
3. The employer might pay the ent~re premium for the 
life insurance, or the employee might contribute part 
of the premium. If the employee contributes a part of 
the annual premium, the approach is called a contri-
butory arrangement. This is the usual method today. 
If the employee's contribution is less than the 
current value of the life insurance protection, the 
difference must be reported as taxable compensation. 
4. The advantages of split dollar life insurance to the 
business. 
a. Split dollar life insurance can be used as a 
selective extra benefit to attract and hold key 
employees to the business. The business dollar 
is used to help the employee acquire and maintain 
additional life insurance protection that would 
normally be paid for with personal after-tax 
dollars. 
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VII. Split Dollar Life - Continued 
4. b. The employer is "owner" of its cash values. 
Thus, the business has a growing and readily 
available reserve fund to call upon for business 
needs and opportunities. 
c. At the employee's death, the business recovers 
all premiums it has paid over the years. 
d. The arrangement may be installed with a minimum 
of .procedural detail and need not be submitted 
to the Internal Revenue Service for approval. 
5. Advantages to the employee 
a. Insurance protection at a favorable overall cost. 
b. Increased protection that the employee may not be 
able to afford otherwise. 
c.~ Insurance.which may be ·kept free from the federal 
estate tax, in certain circumstances. 
d. A particularly attractive benefit for shareholder-
employees. 
6. Back to the income tax aspects, and Leveraging 
a. Lower tax brackets now make it less costly for 
the corporation to pay its nondeductab1e portion 
of the premium (no deduction because the corpora-
tion can now borrow against the cash values and 
receive part of the death proceeds). 
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VII. Split Dollar Life - Continued 
6. b. The "economic benefit" included in the gross 
income of the insured employee will be taxed 
at lower individual rate~ now; or, it will be 
less costly if the economic benefit is contri-
buted by the insured as part of the annual 
program. 
c. Book Income/BU~ will hardly be a problem, 
(1) Corporation has rights to cash values only to 
extent of gross premiums paid (in the usual 
collateral assignment method). Cash value 
included in book income is only that amount 
which exceeds net premiums paid, so the 
difference would be slight. 
(2) Corporation receives death proceeds only to 
extent of gross premiums paid. BURP should nQt 
encompass the death proceeds, because the 
amount would not exceed cash value; and, the 
cash value was taken into account in AMT 
(alternative minimum tax) calculations for all 
years prior to death. 
7. Some practical uses of corporate Split Dollar would be: 
- To fund cross-purchase buy/sell agreements . 
• For deferred compensation; and 
To purchase personal life insurance 
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VII. Split Dollar Life - Continued 
7. (Cont.) Let's take a look at how.' this last item 
could work with a whole life contract. In the illus-
tration in Appendix A, the employer makes premium 
contributions for 17 years. The employer, at all 
times, is entitled to a return of his money through 
borrowing, surrender, or death proceeds. The 
difference between the employer's premiums and the 
total pash value increase in the contract then goes 
to the employee. The employee is paying premiums 
based on our IPT rates. 
For instance, in~the 10th year, if the employees pays 
a $370 premium, the employees' cash value account 
would increase by $2,349, ~otalling $7,102. 
At age 65, the total premiums paid by the employee 
equals $6,941, and the employee's cash value totals 
$51,870. (In the past, illustrations have been 
"product driven" in that they showed the numerical 
results of premium impact over a period of time). 
We, (New York Life) are making rapid advances toward 
"market driven" illustrations such as the one used 
here where the prospects' objectives are outlined 
and the premium will be determined to meet these 
objectives. 
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r APPENDIX A 
SPLIT DOLLAR SALES OPPORTUNITY I (see page 21) 
r 
r MR. PROSPECT 
WHOLE LIFE ILLUSTRATION 
r Face Amount $100.000 Sex M Ar 45 New York Life Insurance Co. Premiums Paid nnually 
Rated STANDAHO NON-SMOKER 
r 
WHOLE LIFE ILLUSTRATION 
POLICY DNIDEND OPTION Paid .. Up Additions 
DIVIDEND SURRENDER Surrender table 
SPLIT DOLl..AR TYPE Contributory 
r ECONOMIC BENEfIT RATES IPT Employer Employees Emplo6ers Emplo~ees Employers Employees Premium Premium ash ash Net Death Net Death 
Contribution Contribution Value Value Benefit Benefit 
r Yr Age B.O.Y. B.O.Y. B.O.Y. B.O.Y. B.O.Y. B.O.Y. 1 45 2,024 221 0 0 2.024 97,976 
2 46 2.014 231 1,150 0 4,038 96,661 
r 3 47 2,003 242 3,466 0 6,041 95,760 4 48 1,991 254 5,968 0 8,032 95,288 
5 49 1,978 267 8,784 0 10,010 95,276 
r 6 50 1,960 285 11,809 0 11,970 95,671 7 51 1,942 303 13,912 1,155 13,912 96,492 8 52 1,922 323 15,834 2,749 15,834 97,760 
9 53 1,900 345 17,734 4,753 17,734 99,503 
r 10 54 1,875 370 19,609 7,102 19,609 101,753 11 55 1,847 398 21,456 9,835 21,456 104,539 
12 56 1,814 431 23,270 13,491 23,270 107,894 
r 13 57 1,765 480 25,035 17,273 25.035 112.361 14 58 1,700 545 26,735 21,637 26.735 117,038 15 59 1,614 631 28,349 26,651 28,349 122,482 
16 60 1,506 739 29,855 32,485 29,855 128,861 
r 17 61 1,369 876 31,224 38.970 31,224 136,140 18 62 -31,224 0 0 41,917 0 107,379 
19 63 0 0 0 45,058 0 108,391 
20 64 0 0 0 48,416 0 109,697 
r Age 65 65 0 0 0 51,870 0 111.314 
70 70 0 0 0 74,329 0 125,631 
r Policy Premo of $2,245.00 with WP of $0.00 ADB of $0.00 PPO of $0.00 AVERAGE NET 
r Net Death Benefit . . . 20th yr. $117,734 Net Death Benefit ... 20th yr. $109.697 Cost of a Dollar . . . . . 20th yr. $ 0.324 Cost of a Dollar . . . . . 20th yr. $ 0.348 
r 
r 
r J-21a 
VIII. FAMILY - ESTATE TAX 
A. Top rate in 1987 - 55%, drops to 50% in 1988. 
Estate rate highest Federal tax rate: 
B. Emphasis now on reducing impact on federal estate 
tax. 
C. How do you reduce estate tax? 
1. Spend your estate 
2. Give away estate 
3. Freeze estate 
," 
4. Provide for non~estate taxable liquidity 
D. Spend your estate - Imeans -
1. Have a good time 
2. Don't plan for your future 
3. Don't plan for your family 
4. Finish up on Medicaid 
5. For practical purposes, enjoy your estate but 
don't "blow" it 
E. Give your estate away -
1. Make use of your annual exclusions 
2. Utilize gift tax marital deduction to equalize 
estates so that both spouses claim unified credit 
3. Use taxable gifts to transfer property you 
believe will appreciate in future. 
4. Keep enough of your estate so that you can live 
comfortably. 
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VIII. FAMILY - ESTATE TAX - Continued 
F. Freeze your estate (give away future appreciation) 
1. Recapitalization 
a. Exchange your voting common shares for 
preferred shares and common shares 
b. Preferred shares will equal present value 
of business. 
c. If interest rates stay down, preferred share 
dividends are manageable. 
d. Common stock has little value, can be given 
away and remove appreciation from estate 
e. Keyman policy f~r redemption of preferred 
shares or third party ownership to provide 
estate liquidity 
2. - Personal_H61di~g' Company.~ l 
a. Transfer stock to PHC common and preferred 
shares 
b. The present value of old shares equal value 
of preferred shares - give away common shares 
at no gift tax cost. 
c. See (1.) above for similar details. 
3. Family Limited Partnership 
a. Family partnership has general partner and 
other limited partners 
b. Business owner transfers assets to partner-
ship capital is frozen, business owner will 
retain fixed income preference, nominal 
appreciaton rights and management control 
J-23 
VIII. Family - Estate Tax - Continued 
3. c. appreciation to limited partners 
d. some advisors believe that the family partner-
ship to be more flexible than corporate form 
e. Life insurance in partnership to liquidate 
general partner's interest 
4. Private Annuity 
a. Sales tt family business for an annuity for life 
of seller 
b. Value of annuity equals value of business 
c. at death of seller, payments stop - nothing 
included in estate. 
d. Insurance sale on life of buyer - buyer's 
estate carries out contract. Insurance proceeds 
offset by debt 
5. Charitable Lead Trust 
a. transfer property to irrevocable trust 
b. income to a charity for period of years 
c. at end of trust, property reverts to remainder 
beneficiaries (next generation) 
d. it doesn't claim income tax deduction - income 
not taxed to donor 
e. gift of remainder interest is a gift of 
present value of property to be received some-
time;in future - greatly reduced gift 
f. .when trust ends - property passes to beneficiaries 
if donor dies before trust ends 
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VIII. FAMILY - ESTATE TAX - Continued 
5. g. Insurance on donor's life to provide income to 
trust beneficiaries 1f donor dies before trust 
ends 
6. a. transfer property to irrevocable trust 
b. donor has current income tax deductions for 
present value of remainder interest that will 
pass to charity 
c. ~ncome to donor and. perhaps donor's estate 
d. after life estate(s). property passes to charity 
- not taxable in donor's estate 
e. use some income from trust to acquire life 
insurance to replace property gifted to charity 
- some form of third party ownership 
f. donor has income from trust and an income tax 
deduction in year trust is funded. Property not 
taxable in donor's estate 
G. Non-estate includable liquidity 
1. Outright Third Party Ownership of life insurance 
a. estate owner gifts premium dollars 
b. outlive 3 year period of Sec. 2035 - donor 
"home free" 
c. if premium gift exceed annual exclusion -
keep appreciation out of estate 
J-25 
VlII. FAMILY - ESTATE:, TAX - Continued 
G. 2. Trust Owner of policy 
a. donor gifts premiums 
b. Crummey clause avoids gift tax 
c. donor has to liv(a 3 years to be "home free" 
d. trust allows donor to avoid problem of 
outright gift of proceeds to individuals 
can have splits in income and principal 
and can have payment discretion in hands of 
trustee 
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The Tax Reform Act has left the individual life product line 
stronger than ever. Life insurance still provides the best 
way to protect income, and may be one of the few remaining 
income tax deferment alternatives available. 
Cash value buildup not currently taxed and policy loans not 
taxed. If surrendered, gain taxed. If insured dies, life 
insurance proceeds are received by beneficiary income tax free. 
The following illustrations show a premium payment method based 
on present dividend scales or current interest rates. These 
dividends and interest rates are not guaranteed. 
Whole Life Using Optional Premium Payment Rider (OPP) 
Illustration 1 - Male Age 1 
2 - Male Age 1 
3 - Male Age 35 
4 - Male Age 35 
Universal Life 
Illustration 5 
- Male Age I 
6 - Male Age 35 
Single Premium Life 
Illustration 7 - Male Age 1 
8 - Male Age 35 
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JOHN DOE 
WHOLE LIFE ILLUSTRATION 
Face Amount $ 100,000 Sex MAge 1 ILLUSTRATION 2 
YR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
New York Lite Inlurance Co. Premiums Paid Annually 
Rated Standard 
CUSTOM DESIGNED ILLUSTRATION 
POLICY DIVIDEND OPTION Paid-Up Additions 
DIVIDEND SURRENDER Premium only at age " 
CASH FACE 
POLlCY VALUE NET AMOUNT 
NET CASH OF CASH OF 
PREMIUM VALUE ADDS VALUE ADDS 
1064 0 548 548 9812 
1064 0 1328 1328 19331 
1064 0 2225 2225 32218 
1064 0 3236 3236 46209 
1064 0 4392 4392 61036 
1064 0 5696 5696 76983 
1064 0 7163 7163 93884 
1064 200 8813 9013 111693 
1064 500 10668 11168 130497 
1064 800 12746 13546 150353 
1064 1300 15052 16352 171286 
1064 1800 17605 19405 193182 
1064 2300 20429 22729 216176 
1064 2800 23549 26349 240457 
1064 3300 26996 3029b 2b'203 
1064 3800 30822 34622 293668 
1064 4300 350b8 393b8 323140 
1064 4800 39775 44575 354798 
1064 5300 44988 50288 388651 
1064 5900 50761 5b911 424667 
NET 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
109812 
119331 
132218 
146209 
161036 
176983 
193884 
211693 
230497 
250353 
271286 
293182 
316176 
340457 
3bb203 
393668 
423140 
454798 
488b51 
524667 
**** AGE *********************************************************************** 
65 10'4 52900 5219042 52724b7 8823491 892401b 
70 
° 
blOOD 8147852 8209377 12120860 12221390 
75 
° 
68700 12545250 12b14480 16690600 16791120 
80 
° 
75bOO 19081100 19157220 232294bO 23329990 
84 
° 
80500 26423770 2b504790 30309110 30409640 
Pol i~y Premo of $ 532.00 wI WP ot $ 0.00 AOB of $ 0.00 PPO of $ 0.00 
*************** AVERAGE *************** ***************** NET ***************** 
Net Death Benetit 20th yr $ 280,212 Net Death Benetlt 20th yr $ 524,667 
Cost ot a Dollar 20th yr $ .076 Cost at a Dollar 20th yr. $ .041 
This illustration Is not valid without form 11939. 
This Illustration was prepared tor New York Lite Insurance Co. using ISIS. 
Insurance Sales II IUltrations Systems Is an Independent computer sottware 
service company and I, not aftl I iated with any Insurer or tlnancial Institution. 
Page I 11 Al Ver. 2.0 Date Prepared Ob-23-1987 by DANIEL B. SANTOS CLU 
J-29· 
JOHN DOE 
WHOLE LIFE ILLUSTRATION ILLUSTRATION 3 
Face Amount $ 100,000 Sex MAge 35 
New York Life Insurance Co. Premiums Paid Annually 
Rated Non-Smoker 
CUSTOM DESIGNED ILLUSTRATION 
POLICY DIVIDEND OPTION Paid-Up Additions 
DIVIDEND SURRENDER Premium only at age 66 
NET 
YR PREMIUM 
1 1130 
2 1130 
3 1130 
4 1130 
5 1130 
6 1130 
7 1130 
8 1130 
9 1130 
10 1130 
11 1130 
12 1130 
13 1130 
14 1130 
15 1130 
POLlCY 
CASH 
VALUE 
o 
o 
300 
1200 
2100 
3100 
4000 
5100 
'6100 
7200 
8400 
10100 
11800 
13600 
15400 
CASH 
VALUE 
OF 
ADOS 
o 
180 
421 
731 
1125 
1608 
2194 
2893 
3721 
4693 
5841 
7187 
8751 
10555 
12626 
NET 
CASH 
VALUE 
o 
180 
721 
1931 
3225 
4708 
6194 
7993 
9821 
11893 
14241 
17287 
20551 
24155 
28026 
FACE 
AMOUNT 
OF 
ADOS 
o 
o 
884 
1987 
3316 
4907 
6747 
8856 
11242 
13920 
16909 
20276 
24044 
28224 
32828 
NET 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
100000 
100000 
100884 
101987 
103316 
104907 
106747 
108856 
111242 
113920 
116909 
120276 
124044 
128224 
132828 
16 1130 17300 14991 32691 37881 137881 
17 1130 19100 17685 37260 43401 143801 
18 1130 21100 20743, 42393 49427 149902 
19 1130 23000 24204 47829 55987 156537 
20 1130 25000 28115 53815 63123 163748 
**** AGE *********************************************************************** 
65 1130 44700 119713 165663 197114 298364 
70 0 54200 200372 255822 292548 393798 
7S 0 63200 325945 390395 427679 528929 
80 0 71300 517399 589949 623700 724950 
99 0 100000 2686889 2788139 2548664 2649914 
Pol icy Premo of $ 1,130.00 wI WP of $ 0.00 ADB of $ 0.00 PPO of $ 0.00 
*************** AVERAGE *************** ***************** NET ***************** 
Net Death Benefit 20th yr $ 121,301 Net Death Benefit 20th yr $ 163,748 
Cost at a Dollar 20th yr $ .186 Cost ot a Dollar 20th yr. $ .138 
This I I lustratlon Is not valid without torm 11939. 
This Illustration was prepared for New York Life Insurance Co. using ISIS. 
Insurance Sales Illustrations Systems I. an Independent computer software 
service company and 15 not aftl I lated with any Insurer or financial Institution. 
Page # 11 Al Ver. 2.0 Date Prepared 06-23-1987 by DANIEL 8. SANTOS CLU 
J-30 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
l r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
YR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
b 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1b 
17 
18 l' 20 
JOHN DOE 
WHOLE LIFE ILLUSTRATION 
Face Amount $ 100,000 Sex M Age 35 
New York Life Insurance Co. Premiums Paid Annually 
Rated Non-Smoker 
CUSTOM DESIGNED ILLUSTRATION 
POLICY DIVIDEND OPTION Paid-Up Addition. 
DIVIDEND SURRENDER Premium only at age bb 
CASH FACE 
POLlCY VALUE NET AMOUNT 
NET CASH OF CASH OF 
PREMIUM VALUE ADDS VALUE ADDS 
22bO a 117b 117b b007 
22bO 0 271b 2716 11779 
2260 300 4454 4754 18881 
2160 1200 b409 7609 26344 
22bO 2100 B650 10750 34195 
22bO ·:uOO 11173 14273 4265S 
2260 4000 14009 18009 51611 
2260 5100 17193 22293 61112 
2260 6100 20759 26859 71189 
2260 7200 24752 31952 81884 
2260 8400 29228 37628 93249 
2260 10100 34242 44342 105380 
2260 11800 39847 51647 118337 
2260 13600 46098 59698 132158 
2260 15400 53062 68462 146886 
2260 17300 60807 78507 162587 
2260 19100 b9414 88989 179313 
22bO 21100 78968 100b18 197153 
2260 23000 89562 113187 216189 
22bO 25000 101304 127004 236521 
Il.LUSTRATION 4 
NET 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
10b007 
111779 
11BBBl 
126344 
134195 
142b55 
151b11 
161112 
171189 
lB18B4 
193249 
2053BO 
218337 
232158 
246886 
262587 
279713 
297b28 
316739 
337146 
r **** AGE *********************************************************************** b5 1130 44700 345019 3909b9 578284 b79534 70 0 54200 5512b2 bOb712 814798 91b048 
7S 0 b3200 8b5214 929bb4 1145413 124bbb3 
r 80 0 71300 133b4b5 1409015 1621114 1722364 99 a 100000 b5920bO b693310 b263805 6365055 Pol Icy Premo of $ 1,130.00 wI WP of $ 0.00 ADB of $ 0.00 PPO of $ 0.00 
*************** AVERAGE *************** ***************** NET ***************** r Net Death Benefit 20th yr $ 199,774 Net Death Benefit 20th yr $ 337,146 Cost of a Dollar 20th yr $ .22b Cost of a Dollar 20th yr. $ .134 
r 
r 
r This I I lustratlon Is not valid without form 11939. This Illustration was prepared for New York Life Insurance Co. using ISIS. 
Insurance Sales Illustrations Systems I. an Independent computer software 
r service company and I. not affiliated with any Insurer Or financial Institution. Pa~e " 11 Al V.r. 2~0 Date Prepared Ob-23-1987 by DANIEL B. SANTOS CLU . 
r J-31 
.. ---_ ... _-- -.. - .. ,"--'''',., ........ 
PREPARED FOR' 2 INITIAL SPECIFIED FACEI lDDIDDD 
MALE AGE 1 STANDARD 
DEATH BENEFIT EQUALS SPECIFIED FACE AMOUNT 
ILLUSTRATION 5 J 
----------CURRENT MORTALITY CHARGES-------- GUARANTEED MORTALITY 
CURRENT INTEREST ILLUSTRATED INTEREST GUARANTEED INTEREST J 
OF '.6DD~ OF 8.DDD~ OF 4.5DD~ 
A 
G 
. E YR 
ANNUAL-
IZED 
PREMIUM 
ACCUMU-
LATION 
VALUE 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
ACCUMU-
LATION 
VALUE 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
ACCUMU-
LATION 
VALUE 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
---~---- -~-------- ---------- ---------- ---------- --------- ----------
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
b b 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 
1111 
12 12 
13 13 
14 14 
15 15 
lb lb 
17 17 
18 18 
19 19 
20 20 
408 
366 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
249 
491 
75b 
1,047 
1,3b7 
1,730 
2,127 
2,57b 
3,Db8 
3,b08 
.. '
4,200 . 
4,838 
5,525 
b,255 
7,045 
7,888 
8,802 
9,795 
10,873 
12,057 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
244 
477 
730 
1,002 
1,297 
1,b28 
1,985 
2,384 
2,815 
3,281 
3,784 
4,31b 
4,880 
5,4b5 
b,08b 
b,735 
7,424 
8,159 
8,943 
9,791 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
205 100,000 
--__ --_____ ._.~ •• ~------__ ------------------------------------............ M•.... ____ ___ 
61 bl 
b2 b2 
b3 b3 
b4 b4 
b5 b5 
bb bb 
b7 b7 
b8 b8 
b9 b9 
70 70 
71 71 
72 72, 
73 73 
74 74 
75 75 
7b 7b 
77 77 
78 78 
79 79 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
3bb 
-50,000 
-~O,oOo 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-50,000 
-5Df ooo 
-50,000 
-pD-,OOO 
-50,000 
532,935 
581,504 
b34,422 
b92,108 
755,01b 
7b8,513 
783,090 
798,848 
815,901 
834,3b5 
854,732 
877,2b2 
902,280 
930,194 
9bl,493 
b82,157 
732,b95 
78b,b83 
844,372 
90b,020 
914,530 
924,04b 
934,b52 
94b,445 
959,520 
9b5,847 
973,7bl 
983,485 
995,308 
1,009,5b8 
995,370 1,045,138 
1,032,020 . 1,083, b21 
1,071,bbb 1,125,250 
1,114,534 1,17o,2bl 
252,121 
271,245 
291,775 
313,82b 
337,523 
308,790 
277,874 
244,b28 
208,893 
170,499 
129,317 
85,123 
37,bb3 
322,714 
341,7b9 
3bl,801 
382,8b8 
405,028 
3b7,4bO 
327,892 
28b,215 
242,31b 
19b,074 
14b,128 
94,48b 
41,053 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND INFORMATION 
MODAL PREMIUM. ANNUAL 
MINIMUM FIRST YEAR ANNUAL PREMIUM = 408 
GUIDELINE SINGLE PREMIUM = 5,331 GUIDELINE ANNUAL PREMIUM = 416 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
1 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
~ .... - _ ... 
TARGET LIFE 11 - FLEXIBLE PREMIUM ADJUSTABLE LIFE INSURANCE 
PREPARED FORI JOHN DOE INITIAL SPECIFIEO FACEI 100,000 
MALE AGE 35 NON-SMOKER ILLUSTRATION r DEATH BENEFIT EQUALS SPECIFIED FACE AMOUNT 
----------CURRENT MORTALITY CHARGES-------- GUARANTEED MORTALITY 
i r CURRENT INTEREST ILLUSTRATED INTEREST GUARANTEED INTEREST OF '.6ooY. OF 6.000Y. OF 4.500Y. 
r A ANNUAL- ACCUMU- ACCUMU- ACCUMU-G IZED LATlON DEATH LATI0N DEATH LATlON DEATH E YR PREMIUM VALUE BENEFIT VALUE BENEFIT VALUE BENEFIT 
-------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- --------- ----------
r 35 1 1,266 1,065 100,000 1,047 100,000 959 100,000 36 2 1,266 2,222 100,000 2,169 100,000 1,952 100,000 
37 3 " 1,266 3,460 100,000 3,370 100,000 2, fn, 100,000 
36 4 1,266 4,63' 100,000 4,647 100,000 4,032 100,000 
r 3' 5 1,266 6,320 100,000 ~,,017 100,000 5,124 iOO,OOO 
40 6 1,266 7,924 100,000 7,479 100,000 6,245 100,000 
r' 41 7 1,266 9,676 100,000 9,050 100,000 7,397 iOO,OOO 42 6 1,266 11,569 .. 100,000 10,716 100,000 6,512 100,000 43 , 1,266 13,650 100,000 12,526 100,000 9,761 100,000 
44 10 1,266 15,936 100,000 14,465 100,000 11,017 100,000 
r 45 11 1,286 18,455 100,000 16,608 100,000 12,262 100,000 
46 12 1,286 21,203 100,000 18,888 100,000 13,576 100,000 
47 13 1,286 24,215 100,000 21,350 100,000 14,906 100,000 
r 46 14 1,286 27,520 100,000 24,009 100,000 16,263 100,000 49 15 1,266 31,147 100,000 26,682 100,000 17,646 100,000 
50 16 1,286 35,138 100,000 29,997 100,000 19,064 100,000 
r 51 17 1,286 39,506 100,000 33,350 100,000 20,504 100,000 52 16 1,286 44,293 100,000 36,963 100,000 21,973 100,000 
53 19 1,266 49,537 100,000 40,652 100,000 23,454 100,000 
r 54 20 1,286 55,290 100,000 45,047 100,000 24,951 100,000 ---_ ... _- & L ............... ....-..... .............. " ..... 65 31 -20,000 146,227 175,472 98,358 116,02' 19,630 80,000 
r 
66 32 -20,000 137,619 164,005 64,271 100,263 
67 33 -20,000 126,622 151,774 69,099 61,537 
68 34 -20,000 118,562 138,717 52,760 61,730 
69 35 -20,000 107,565 124,775 35,171 40,796 
r 70 36 -20,000 95,488 109,811 16,228 18,663 71 37 -20,000 82,323 93,025 
72 38. -20,000 67,969 75,445 
r 73 39 -20,000 52,311 57,019 74 40 -20,000 35,223 37,668 
75 41 -20,000 16,557 17,385 
r ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND INFORMATION 
-----------------------------------
r MODAL PREMIUMs ANNUAL MINIMUM FIRST YEAR ANNUAL PREMIUM. 626 
GUIDELINE SINGLE PREMIUM. 16,461 GUIDELINE ANNUAL PREMIUM • 1,336 
r 
; r 
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SINGLE PR~MIUM Llf~ ~ULIL' WIIH ~NUUWM~NI ~~N~rll 
PREPARED FORI JOHN DOE INITIAL DEATH BENEFITI 
MALE AGE 1 SINGLE PREMIUM 
297,973 
10,000 • 
clLLUSTRATlVE VALUES REFLE'CT"CURRENT HJTEREST 'Or >t;'209', < If..LUS,TRATION 7 
" .. -- ';:, " 
• 
A 
G 
~,Ei YR 
1 1 
2 2 
3,3 
4 4 
5 ,5 
, '" 
, '" 
A CURRENT., INTEREST ;RA;TE; alr'"i, .. 7; .. ?"Oljlfo, .lp ~I,I~AI'HE~D FOR 1 YEAR 
THE GUARANTEED' INTEREST 'R'AfE:'l tHI::Rt~FtE~; ;r'S'~i 4 .OOOY. 
114LUSTRATIVE 
i .:'t 
VALUES· . , 
, i ',i J'i'"lt'l 
! \ :,' 1 f ;,! ~UARANTEED VALUES 
-------------------~-GROSS GROSS CASH 
CASH SURRENDER 
, , 'VA~UE , , VALUE 
10,720 
11 ,492 
12,319 
13,206 
~4,IS7 
9,970 
10,802 
11,703 
12,678 
13,732 
GROSS 
. " DEATH 
, .. ~~NEFIT 
----.;.~'------
297,973 
297,973, ' 
297,97~ 
297,97~. , 
297,97;:3" 
; " 
\ . 
GRbss GROSS CASH 
. ,CA~H SURRENDER 
, \JAl,;Ur::" VALliE'; 
~ _____ .,;.~~ .. L.L~t~J --__ ~!...;.~.J __ 
, ;,' 
, I 
} ~ 
ft]',720 
q~149 
1 tt595 
tZf059 
~2,541 
~fti'" j j ,» 
9,~';7b;" 
10,480 .. 
11.015 
H~i;516 
l'Z~ it,5 
GROSS 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
-----~.,..---
291,973 
297.973 
291'i973 
297,973 
297'1973 
6
7 
6
7 
15,176 14,873 297,973 tj,043 
16,269 16,106 297,973 13,564 
1'2',792 
13,429 
1411&17 
tto6vl 
'15',258 
297,973 
297,973 
. 29rl,973 
29'7,;.973 
, 297,,973 
8, 8 17,440 17,440 297,97~,t; 141107 
10
9 190 18,696 18,696 297, 97'3Lld 'Hd6Vl 
, 20,042 20,042 297,97:3;" 'is,2S8 
I,:; 
" ~ ;.' 
11 11 21,485 21,48S 297,973" lSiBb8 1S,'8 1 8 29 
12 12 23,032 23,032 297,973 c 7,973 
13 13 
16,503 16,503 29 ,  
24,691 24,691 297,973' " " 1'" l' '" ,17, J 1~-3 
14 14 2 
'-' ,..6;;, c: ';,97,,973 
~)J 468 26,468 297,973:' ", 1 '17'i 8SC 
,..
-'1..;;S,!-J.1..;;t5 ____ -:-7"'A~. ~.:1.7./J!L' __ --:;-UO .... L...,J-L.:Z.Io·.,;.' ",,' ~~',2Q.;;&..i~' ..... !:!! ~.~-:::;.J.l. "'-_~ ..... .-....'+-__ .+o17 ... - '.' 8a;,.5",0~-.,.;· • ..;;~97' 973 
__ __ _ __ ~_.. Zl"f 42','" .; 292 e"~l·'·n) -.~t F.":« 1?&'-' ' " !"J~ 
,408,2Z~~f; '51,487 ,:51,467 :2971973 4141 
42 42 
43 43 
44 44 
45 45 
46 46 
47 47 
48 48 
49 49 
50 50 
51 51 
52 52 
53 53 
54 54 
55 55 
56 56 
57 57 
58 58 
59 59 
60 60 
172,976 
185,430 
198,781 
213,094 
228,436 
244,884 
262,515 
281,417 
301,679 
323,399 
346,684 
371,645 
398,404 
427,089 
457,839 
490,804 
526,142 
564,024 
604,634 
648,167 
172,976. 
18S,430 
198,781 
213,094 
228,436 
244,884 
262,515 
281,417 
3{]1,679 
323,399 
346,684 
371,645 
398,404 
427,089 
457,839 
490,804 
526,142 
564;024 
604,634 
648,167 
424,636"5'3,926:53,,926 ' '2"17,973 
, 44
5
4
8
1 ,' 2
15
95
1
, " 55,667 55,667 297,973 
57,693 ,57,693· ,29] 1 973 
477, 4j~ i 'bO, 209 :60,209 ,'2~;7, 973 
497,li,b2,617 62,617 ,2971973 
517,15SbS,'12265d22 :,., 2_~q,973 
537,506 67,721 67,727 297,973 
5S8,1D5 7.0,436 70,436 297,973 
575,851 ,,73,254 73,'254 '1.97,973 
592,830 
609,499 
625,494 
640,633 
668,446 
696,941 
726,076, 
755,792 
786,024 
829,654 
76,,184 761184 2,17,973 
79,231 ,79,231 ,! 297,973 
82,400 82;400 2'7,973 
I,S5,b96 85,696 297,973 
69,1.24, .89,124 '297,973 
92;689 ~2~b89 297,973 
96~397 96.397 2~71973 
100,252 100~2S2 297,973 
104,263 104,263 297,973 
108 j 433 108,433 2f:17, 973 
PRESENTED BYI DANIEL B. SANTOS) ctu " 
NYL112086 THIS IS AN ILlUSTRATioN, NOT A,CbNTRACT '" 
3 06-22-1987 01121142 COPYRIGHT'1966 PHILIBERT SOFTWARE GR()~,lNC.' 
J-34 
-
,j 
J 
J 
J 
1 
J 
J 
j 
i 
J 
J 
f 
.J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
PREPARED 
MALE AGE 
NEW YORK LIFE 
SINGLE PREMIUM 
FORI JOHN DOE 
35 
INSURANCE AND ANNUITY CORPORATION 
LIFE POLICY WITH ENDOWMENT BENEFIT 
INITIAL DEATH BENEFITI 
SINGLE PREMIUM 
ILLUSTRATIVE VALUES REFLECT CURRENT INTEREST OF 7.200ft 
A CURRENT INTEREST RATE OF 7.200ft IS GUARANTEED FOR 1 YEAR 
THE GUARANTEED INTEREST RATE THEREAFTER IS 4.000ft 
ILLUSTRATION 8 
ILLUSTRATIVE VALUES GUARANTEED VALUES 
A 
G 
E YR 
35 1 
36 2 
37 3 
38 4 
39 5 
40 6 
41 7 
42 8 
43 9 
44 10 
45 11 
46 12 
47 13 
48 14 
49 15 
SO 16 
51 17 
52 18 
53 19 
54 20 
55 21 
56 22 
57 23 
58 24 
59 25 
60 26 
61 27 
62 28 
63 29 
64 30 
GROSS 
CASH 
VALUE 
10,720 
11,492 
12,3-19 
13,206 
14,157 
15,176 
16,269 
17,440 
18,696 
20,042 
21,485 
23,032 
24,691 
26,468 
28,374 
30,417 
32,607 
34,955 
37,471 
40,169 
43,062 
46,162 
49,486 
53,049 
56,868 
60,963 
65,352 
70,057 
75,102 
80,509 
GROSS CASH 
SURRENDER 
VALUE 
9,970 
10,802 
11,703 
12,678 
13,732 
14 ,8'73 
16,106 
17,440 
18,~96 
20,042 
21,485 
23,032 
24,691 
26,468 
28,374 
30,417 
32,607 
34,955 
37,471 
40,169 
43,062 
46,162 
49,486 
53,049 
56,868 
60,963 
65,352 
70,057 
75,102 
80,509 
GROSS 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
78,032 
82,344 
86,871 
91,624 
96,611 
GROSS GROSS CASH 
CASH SURRENDER 
VALUE VALUr; 
10,720 
11,149 
11 ,595 
12,059 
12,541 
13,043 
13,564 
14,107 
14,671 
15,258 
15,868 
16,503 
17,163 
17,850 
18,564 
19,306 
20,078 
20,881 
21,717 
22,585 
23,489 
24,428 
25,406 
26,422 
27,479 
28,578 
29,721 
30,910 
32,146 
33,432 
9,970 
10,480 
11,015 
11,576 
12,165 
12,782 
13,429 
14,107 
14,671 
15,258 
15,868 
16,503 
17,163 
17,850 
18,564 
19,306 
20,078 
20,881 
21,717 
22,585 
23,489 
24,428 
25,406 
26,422 
27,479 
28,578 
29,721 
30,910 
32,146 
33,432 
PR~SENTED BY: DANIEL B. SANTOS, CLU 
NYL112086. THIS 15 AN ILLUSTRATION, NOT A CONTRACT 
GROSS 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
75,454 
4 06-22-1987 01:25138 COPYRIGHT 1986 PHILIBERT SOFTWARE GROUP, INC. 
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